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I. INTRODUCTIO N
At a recent meeting of the Minnesota Governor's cabinet, a number of state department and agency heads expressed dissatisfaction
with Minnesota's existing rulemaking process.' There are good
grounds for dissatisfaction. The rulemaking process prescribed by the
Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA)2 is unnecessarily
complicated, cumbersome, costly, and time-consuming. It scatters
authority and responsibility and discourages rulemaking, without
which there can be no effective and efficient administration of state
government. Before an agency rule can become effective as law under
MAPA, the following steps must have been taken:
-If the agency wishes to obtain any outside views, even before
proposing the adoption of a rule, it must afford all interested persons
the opportunity to present their views on the subject of concern.
-If the proposed rule will have its primary effect on Spanishspeaking people, it must be submitted to the Council on Affairs of
Spanish-speaking people for review and recommendation before its
publication as a proposed rule.
-If the agency decides to propose a rule, it must notify the
public of its intention, hold a public hearing, and afford all affected
interests an opportunity to participate.
-The Chief Hearing Examiner, head of an independent State
Office of Hearing Examiners, must assign a hearing examiner to conduct the public hearing.
-Within a specified time after the end of the public hearing and
the close of the "hearing record," the hearing examiner who conducted the hearing must submit a written report to the agency, setting forth the examiner's findings of fact, conclusions, and recommendations.
-The hearing examiner's report must be made available to all
1. MINN. GOV'T REP., July 20, 1978, at 1.
2. MINN. STAT. §§ 15.01-.41 (1976), as amended by Act of April 5, 1978, ch. 790,
§ 1-3, 1978 Minn. Laws 1155; Act of March 28, 1978, ch. 674, §§ 2-3, 1978 Minn. Laws
494; Act of March 28, 1978, ch. 592, §§ 1-2, 1978 Minn. Laws 327.
The specific provisions prescribing the rulemaking procedures are found at Minnesota Statutes, sections 15.0411-.0417, .047-.052 (1976 & Supp. 1977), as amended by
Act of March 28, 1978, ch. 674, §§ 2-3, 1978 Minn. Laws 494.
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affected persons requesting it before the agency acts finally on the
rule.
-The agency's final rule must be submitted to the Chief Hearing Examiner so that he may determine whether a new public hearing
is required because the final rule is "substantially different" from the
proposed rule, or because the agency failed to comply with MAPA's
rulemaking procedures.
-The final rule must be submitted, together with the "complete
hearing record," to the Attorney General for review as to "form and
legality."
-If the Attorney General approves the rule, he must file it
promptly in the Office of the Secretary of State. The agency must
then submit the rule to the Commissioner of Administration for publication in the State Register.
-A rule approved by the Attorney General and filed in the
Office of the Secretary of State has the force and effect of law five
or specified in the rule)
working days (or more if required by statute
3
after its publication in the State Register.
-If the Attorney General disapproves the rule, he must state his
reasons in writing; the rule may not then be filed with the Office of
the Secretary of State or published in the State Register.
-A rule that has become effective is subject to review and suspension by the Legislative Commission to Review Administrative
Rules.
-A rule that has become effective is also subject to review by
the appropriate district court and, ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court.
It has been estimated that it takes a minimum of 234 days to
promulgate a set of simple rules requiring no more than a day of
public hearing,' and then only if the Chief Hearing Examiner and the
Attorney General determine that the final agency rules are not
"substantially different" from the proposed rules, and the final rules
are approved by the Attorney General on initial submission.
3. A period of five days is prescribed by Minnesota Statutes, section 15.0412(4)
(Supp. 1977), but Minnesota Statutes, section 15.0413(1) (1976), provides that a rule

shall become effective twenty calendar days after its publication in the State Register
(unless a later date is required by statute or specified in the rule). The Revisor of
Statutes is aware of the discrepancy between the two provisions and will call it to the
attention of the next Legislature.
In the meantime, the five-day provision controls because it was enacted by Act of
June 2, 1977, ch. 443, § 2, 1977 Minn. Laws 1217, whereas the twenty-day provision in

Minnesota Statutes, section 15.0413(1) (1976) was enacted earlier. When two statutes
passed at different sessions of the Legislature are irreconcilable, tht later provision
prevails over the earlier. Id. § 645.26(4).
4. See note 293 infra.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:151

Unlike the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (FAPA),s
MAPA does not distinguish between informal or notice-and-comment
rulemaking and formal or on-the-record rulemaking and impose different procedural requirements for each type of rulemaking.6 All rulemaking subject to MAPA-except the adoption of temporary
rules-is treated alike, in the sense that the same procedural requirements must be met: those of on-the-record rather than notice-andcomment rulemaking.
This Article analyzes and evaluates the rulemaking provisions of
MAPA and compares them with those of the Revised Model State
Administrative Procedure Act (Revised Model Act) 7 and the Iowa

Administrative Procedure Act (IAPA).' In my judgment, the existing
rulemaking provisions of MAPA should be scrapped. The rulemaking
provisions of both the Revised Model Act and IAPA are much preferable to those of MAPA. Minnesota would do well to follow the IAPA,
except in certain respects that will be noted.
Both the Revised Model Act and IAPA distinguish between the
procedures that an agency is required to follow in adopting a rule and
the creation of the record on which judicial review of the rule's validity will be based. Under both the Revised Model Act and TAPA,
however, the record for judicial review is to be made in the reviewing
court, that is, there is to be a "trial" of the validity of the rule in that
court. In my view, this is undesirable. It is also undesirable to have
the record consist of the product of the rulemaking proceedings. Accordingly, it is recommended that any person seeking judicial review
of a rule should be required first to file a protest against the rule with
the agency that promulgated it. That agency would then conduct an
"on-the-record" hearing of the protest, limited to the issues raised by
it. This hearing could be written or oral, or both, but provision should
be made for an oral hearing, with or without cross-examination,
5.

5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976), as amended by Act of March 27, 1978,

Pub. L. No. 95-251, §§ 1-3, 92 Stat. 183, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 183; Privacy Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-38, 92 Stat. 179 (1977), reprinted in
[1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 179.
6. See Auerbach, Informal Rulemaking: A ProposedRelationship Between Administrative Proceduresand Judicial Review, 72 Nw. U.L. Rsv. 15, 17-26 (1977). See
also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519 (1978).
7. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT, Commentary and
Draft (1961), reprintedin 13 UNiFoRM L. ANN. 347 (1978).
8. IOWA CODE ch. 17A (1977), as amended by Act of June 27, 1978, S.F. 244,
§§ 12-20, 1978 Iowa Legis. Serv. 479 (West); Act of April 17, 1978, H.F. 2099, §§ 1-5,
1978 Iowa Legis. Serv. 74 (West). For an analysis of IAPA by its principal draftsman,

see Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act: Background, Construction,
Applicability, PublicAccess to Agency Law, the Rulemaking Process, 60 IowA L. REv.
731 (1975). My great indebtedness to this excellent article will be apparent and I wish
to acknowledge it.
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whenever the protesting party showed it to be necessary for an adequate presentation of the protest. Subsequent judicial review would
then be based exclusively on the record made in the course of the
protest proceeding.
II.

APPLICABILITY OF PRESCRIBED RULEMAKING
PROCEDURES

The rulemaking procedures prescribed by MAPA govern only
those administrative units of the state that are defined as agencies
by MAPA, and only when they issue statements defined as rules
thereunder.
A.

DEFINITION OF "AGENCY"

1.

General

MAPA does not define "agency" in all-inclusive terms. The
MAPA definition covers "any state officer, board, commission, bureau, division, department, or tribunal, other than a court, having a
statewide jurisdiction and authorized by law to make rules or to
adjudicate contested cases." 9
The limitations written into the definition raise several questions. Why should a state agency that has no authority to make rules
or adjudicate cases be excluded if it affects the rights of private
parties by "investigating, prosecuting, negotiating, settling, or informally acting" and there is no special reason for excluding it?10 Why
should a state agency be excluded because it has only a limited geographical jurisdiction?11
IAPA's general definition is preferable to that in MAPA. IAPA
defines an "agency" in all-encompassing terms to mean "each board,
commission, department, officer or other administrative office or unit
of the state."'"
9. MINN. STAT. § 15.0411(2) (Supp. 1977).
10. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES-TExT-PROBLMS 1 (5th ed.
1973).
11. It may be noted that MAPA specifically declares the Capitol Area Architectural and Planning Board to be an "agency" even though it does not have statewide
jurisdiction. MINN. STAT. § 15.0411(2) (Supp. 1977). This provision was added by
MAPA's 1977 amendments. Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 443, § 1, 1977 Minn. Laws 1217.
During the 1977 legislative session, an unsuccessful attempt was made also to include
the Metropolitan Council, the Metropolitan Airports Commission, the Metropolitan
Transit Commission, and the Metropolitan Waste Control Commission, all of which
do not have statewide jurisdiction. The Attorney General has ruled that the Metropolitan Council is not an "agency," but a political subdivision not covered by MAPA.
12. IowA CODE § 17A.2(1) (1977). This definition is similar to that in Revised
Model Act § 1(1), which defines an "agency" to mean "each state [board, commis-
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Exclusions

MAPA excludes from the definition of "agency" certain state
administrative units. These exclusions are considered in the Appendix to this Article.

B. DEFINION OF "RULE"
1.

General

Prior to amendment in 1975,11 section 15.0411(3) of MAPA defined a "rule" to include "every regulation, including the amendment, suspension, or repeal thereof, adopted by an agency, whether
with or without prior hearing, to implement or make specific the law
enforced or administered by it or to govern its organization or procedure ....
14 The term "regulation" was not defined.
It was charged that many agencies circumvented the rulemaking
procedures prescribed by MAPA by issuing "bulletins," "guides,"
"announcements," "memoranda," "manuals," "policy statements,"
"directives," and "instructions," which, in effect, were "regulations"
under other names. 5 In response, the 1975 amendments broadened
the definition of "rule" to include "every agency statement of general
applicability and future effect, including the amendment, suspension, or. repeal thereof, made to implement or make specific the law
enforced or administered by it or to govern its organization or procedure." The phrase, "adopted by ap agency, whether with or without
prior hearing," was deleted to eliminate the intimation that some
rules might be promulgated without a prior public hearing.
The general definition of "rule" now contained in MAPA is not
as specific as that of the Revised Model Act or IAPA. The Revised
Model Act defines "rule" to mean "each agency statement of general
applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy,
or describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of
any agency" and includes "the amendment or repeal of a prior rule
"17

sioner, department, or officer], other than the legislature or the courts, authorized by

law to make rules or to determine contested cases."
13. Act of June 4, 1975, ch. 380, § 1, 1975 Minn. Laws 1285.
14. MINN. STAT. § 15.0411(3) (1974) (amended 1975-1976).
15. Triplett & Nobles, Rulemaking Under Minnesota's Administrative Procedure Act: 1975 Amendments, HENNEIn LAw., Jul.-Aug., 1975, at 14, 15.
16. Act of June 4, 1975, ch. 380, § 1, 1975 Minn. Laws 1285, codified at MINN.
STAT. § 15.0411(3) (1976).
17. REVISED MODEL STATE ADrmnSTIrVE PRoCEDURE Acr § 1(7) (1961). The
IAPA definition is almost identical to the Model Act's. It defines "rule" to mean "each
agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes
law or policy, or that describes the organization, procedure or practice requirements
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Professor Arthur E. Bonfield explains that IAPA, like the Model
Act, eliminated the requirement that the general statement must be
"of future effect," because "every statement of general applicability
must, almost by definition, have future effect at the time it is first
issued."" Deletion of this requirement also eliminates a difficulty
that can occur when parties rely on a rule that is subsequently declared invalid. In Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc.," for
example, the Supreme Court declared invalid a rule of the Administrator of the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division defining
the "area of production" within which employees engaged in handling agricultural or horticultural commodities for market were exempt from the wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938. In such a case, a subsequent rule may be made retroactive, at least to exempt those employees who had been exempt under
the invalid rule upon which employers relied. It is not entirely clear
whether the new rule, given both retroactive and future effect, would
be a statement of "future effect" within the meaning of MAPA. There
is no reason why the new rule should not be subject to MAPA's
rulemaking procedures. Deletion of the requirement of "future effect"
would assure its coverage.
The greater specificity of the Model Act and IAPA is also to be
preferred. It is reasonable, however, to read the MAPA definition that
a "rule" is a general statement "made to implement or make specific
the law enforced or administered by it,"" as including. every statement that, in the language of the Revised Model Act and IAPA,
"implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy."'" The reason
for the latter, more specific, definition is to ensure that every agency
statement will be treated as a rule if it declares, recognizes, makes,
promulgates, prescribes, implements, interprets, indicates, creates,
or authorizes law or policy of general applicability. 2 This is also the
purpose of the MAPA definition.
MAPA also defines as a "rule" every agency statement "to govern its organization or procedure."" The comparable definition in the
Revised Model Act and IAPA includes any statement that "describes
the agency's organization, procedure, or practice requirements." 4
of any agency" and includes "the amendment or repeal of an existing rule." IOWA CODE
§ 17A.2(7) (1977).
18. Bonfield, supra note 8, at 829-30.

19. 322 U.S. 607, 618 (1944).
MINN. STAT. § 15.0411(3)

20.

(1976).
IOWA CODE § 17A.2(7) (1977); RI.SED MODEL STATE ADuNISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr § 1(7) (1961).
22. Bonfield, supra note 8, at 830.
23. MINN. STAT. § 15.0411(3) (1976).
24. IOWA CODE § 17A.2(7) (1977); see REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRMTIVE PRO-

21.

CEDuRE

Acr § 1(7) (1961) (punctuated differently than quotation).
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Certainly "procedure" in MAPA may reasonably be read to include
"practice requirements."
Finally, the MAPA definition, unlike that of the Revised Model
Act or IAPA, includes the "suspension," as well as the amendment
or repeal, of a rule. In this respect, the MAPA definition is preferable.
MAPA, IAPA, and the Revised Model Act are alike in that their
definitions of "rule" all include interpretative rules, general statements of policy, and rules of agency organization, procedure, and
practice. In this respect, all three state acts differ from FAPA, which
exempts these agency statements from its rulemaking procedures.,,
The Senate Comparative Print of the bill that became FAPA, dated
June, 1945,28 justified the exemptions as follows:
First, it is desired to encourage the making of such rules. Secondly, [these] types of rules vary so greatly in their contents and
the occasion for their issuance that it seems wise to leave the matter
of notice and public procedures to the discretion of the agencies
concerned. Thirdly, the provision for petitions contained in subsection (c) affords an opportunity for private parties to secure a reconsideration of such rules when issued. Another reason, which might be
added, is that "interpretative" rules-as merely interpretations of
statutory provisions-are subject to plenary judicial review, whereas
"substantive" rules involve a maximum of administrative discretion."
A number of these justifications are indeed persuasive. To subject
interpretative rules and general statements of policy to the prescribed
rulemaking procedures may result in discouraging agencies from issuing such statements. This would greatly disadvantage the public.
One objection that may be raised to the FAPA exemption is that
it provides a means of circumventing the prescribed rulemaking procedures because it is difficult to distinguish between "substantive"
rules on the one hand and, on the other, "interpretative" rules and
"general statements of policy." This has not, however, proven to be
a problem under FAPA. The analytic distinction between these categories is clear. The Attorney General's Manual on FAPA28 offers as
a working definition of substantive rules, those "rules, other than
organizational or procedural . . .issued by an agency pursuant to
statutory authority and which implement the statute" and have "the
force and effect of law."" Professors Hart and Sacks suggest a sharper
25. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A), (d)(2) (1976).
26. SENATE Commrrrsz ON THE JuDIcriRY, ADbcNs'RATrvE Paoc uxa AcT LzGisLATwE HIsToRY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1946).
27. Id. The "provision for petitions" referred to is found at 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)

(1976).
28.
ISrRATV

29.

Dm'T OF JusTIcE, ATTORNEY GENERAL's MANUAL ON THE AnmINPRocEDuRE AcT (1947) [hereinafter cited as ATroRNEY GENERAL's MANUAL].
UNrrED STATES

Id. at 30.
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definition-that a substantive rule (or "legislative rule," as it is often
called) is "one without which the statute imposes no duties."3 To
build upon Justice Jackson's striking phrase, it is one that completes
the "unfinished law" passed by the legislatureA'
The Attorney General's Manual defimed "interpretative rules" as
"rules or statements issued by an agency to advise the public of the
agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it administers." It defined "general statements of policy" as "statements issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner
in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power."
Hart and Sacks telescope the latter two definitions and suggest that
an "interpretative rule" is one that states the agency's view of the
nature and scope of the duties imposed by the statute (or, it may be
added, by a legislative or substantive agency rule), or that announces
general agency policy regarding the enforcement or administration of
the statute (or, again, of a legislative or substantive agency rule) .3
There is no difficulty of definition that should stand in the way
of subjecting only legislative or substantive rules to the rulemaking
procedures prescribed by MAPA. Yet the fact remains that interpretative rules and general statements of policy affect private interests
and the general public. The same reasons for public participation in
their making apply as in the making of legislative or substantive
rules. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis points out that, even on the
federal level, the idea is growing that fairness requires that the public
be afforded the opportunity to participate in the making of those
rules that have substantial impact on private rights and obligations
whether or not FAPA mandates such an opportunity.3
30. H. HART & A. SACKS, Toa LEGAL INocass:
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1315 (Tent. ed. 1958).

BASIC

PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING

31. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 485 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). It is
the author's view that a legislative or substantive rule is also one that alters the duties
imposed by the statute; for example, a rule providing an exemption not made by the
statute itself as in Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944).
Addison is discussed in the text accompanying note 19 supra.
32. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 30.

33. Id.
34. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 30, at 1315.
35.

K. DAVIS,

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE

SEVENTIES

§§

6.01.7-.10 (1976). In

§ 6.01.8 of his treatise, Professor Davis cites and discusses cases requiring notice-andcomment for rulemaking exempt from FAPA. There is, however, serious question
whether these cases will stand in the face of the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519
(1978). In Vermont Yankee, the Court affirmed "the very basic tenet of administrative
law that agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure" and rejected
the argument that FAPA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976), merely establishes minimum procedural requirements, permitting the courts to impose more stringent requirements when
they think fairness so dictates. 435 U.S. at 544-45.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court also seems to have accepted this
idea. In McKee v. Likens,3" the court was called upon to decide
whether a policy bulletin issued by the Commissioner of Public Welfare in 1973 (before MAPA's definition of "rule" was expanded by the
1975 amendments) allowing the coverage under the state's medical
assistance program of elective, nontherapeutic abortions, was a
"regulation" within the meaning of MAPA. The court held that it
was a regulation because it "involved a question of social and political policy so important to the public as a whole." 7 For this reason,
whether it was termed legislative, interpretative, or procedural, the
policy bulletin could not become effective unless preceded by MAPA
rulemaking.
After considering the arguments for and against subjecting interpretative rules and general statements of policy to the rulemaking
requirements of an administrative procedure act, Professor Bonfield
concluded that an exemption was probably justified. He recommended that if such an exemption is provided, the agencies should
be urged to utilize the rulemaking procedures voluntarily whenever
they think it would be feasible and useful. Bonfield, however, did
not succeed in persuading the Iowa Legislature to adopt this position.
The Minnesota Legislature should reconsider the coverage of interpretative rules and general statements of policy in light of experience with them. It should also consider the practical difficulty of
enforcing MAPA's requirements as applied to interpretative rules. It
is difficult to know what the consequences would be of an agency's
failure to comply with MAPA before it issued an interpretative rule
or general statement of policy. A legislative or substantive rule issued
without such compliance would not have "the force and effect of
law." 9 But what would that mean for an interpretative rule or general
statement of policy? The agency could still act accordingly. Even if
a court disregarded the interpretative rule or policy statement in a
judicial proceeding involving the agency action, it would know that
the action itself reflected the agency's policy and interpretation of the
statute it was implementing. This agency view, whether or not embodied in an interpretative rule or policy statement, would be entitled to weight upon judicial review, though it would not be binding
upon the court any more than the interpretative rule or policy statement itself.
36. 261 N.W.2d 566 (Minn. 1977).
37. Id. at 577-78.
38. Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participationin the Making
of InterpretativeRules and General Statements of Policy Under the APA, 23 AD. L.
REv. 101, 127-28 (1971).
39. MiNN. STAT. § 15.0413(1) (1976).

MINNESOTA RULEMAKING

1979]

2. Exclusions
MAPA excludes from the general definition of "rule" five categories of statements that might otherwise be included. These exclusions
are considered in the Appendix to this Article.
C.

TEMPORARY RULES

Although not excluded from the definition of "rule," temporary
rules may be promulgated by an agency without following the rulemaking procedures otherwise prescribed.'" A temporary rule may be
adopted if the agency "is directed or authorized by statute, federal
law or court order to adopt, amend, suspend or repeal a rule in a
manner that does not allow for compliance with" the prescribed procedures." The meaning of this provision is not entirely clear. It could
be construed to mean that a temporary rule may be promulgated only
if a statute, federal law, or court order specifies a timetable for rulemaking that cannot be met by satisfying MAPA requirements. This
would be an unduly restrictive reading of the provision that would
deprive the agencies of needed flexibility. A reasonable construction
of the statutory provision in question would also authorize an agency
to adopt a temporary rule if the accomplishment of the objectives of
the rule imposes time constraints that cannot be met if MAPA's
requirments had to be satisfied. There is little danger that the authority to issue temporary rules will be abused. A temporary rule is initially effective for only ninety days and it may be continued in effect
for another ninety days."
Under the temporary rulemaking procedures, the agency must
publish the proposed temporary rule in the State Register. 3 For at
least twenty days thereafter, the agency must afford all interested
persons an opportunity to submit written data and views on the proposal. The agency must transmit the rule as published, or as modified
in light of the data and views submitted, to the Attorney General for
review as to form and legality. The Attorney General must approve
or disapprove it within five working days. The temporary rule takes
effect upon its approval by the Attorney General or his failure to act
within the five days. Notice of the Attorney General's decision must
be published in the State Register. The adopted temporary rule must
be published in the same manner as any permanent rule.
Both the Revised Model Act and IAPA contain much broader
exemptions in this context. The Revised Model Act provides:
40.

MINN. STAT.

41.
42.

Id.
Id.

43. Id.

§ 15.0412(5) (Supp. 1977).
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If an agency finds that an imminent peril to the public health,
safety, or welfare requires adoption of a rule upon fewer than 20
days' notice and states in writing its reasons for that finding, it may
proceed without prior notice or hearing or upon any abbreviated
notice and hearing that it finds practicable, to adopt an emergency
rule. The rule may be effective for a period of not longer than 120
days [renewable once for a period not exceeding days]. ....
The IAPA exemption, based on that contained in FAPA, is even
broader:
When an agency for good cause finds that notice and public participation would be impracticable or contrary to the public interest,
[the prescribed rulemaking procedures] shall be inapplicable. The
agency shall incorporate in each rule issued in reliance upon this
provision either the finding and a brief statement of the reasons
therefor, or a statement that the rule is within a very narrowly
tailored category of rules whose issuance has previously been exempted [from the prescribed rulemaking procedures] by a special
rule relying on this provision and including such a finding and statement of reasons for the entire category. In any action contesting a
rule adopted pursuant to this subsection, the burden of proof shall
be on the agency to show that the [prescribed procedures] were
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest and
that, if a category of rules was involved, the category was very narrowly tailored."
Professor Bonfield justifies this broad exemption on the ground
that it "attempts to reconcile the [IAPA] requirements for public
participation in rulemaking . . . with the practical realities of life,
more specifically, the agencies' need to conduct their business effectively and efficiently."" Thus, the IAPA exemption is intended to
cover, among others, any instance in which "the cost of adhering to
usual procedures may be so great for certain rules proportional to any
conceivable benefits that it is unwise for the agency to use those
procedures."' 7 At the same time, Professor Bonfield is convinced that,
in light of the federal experience, adequate safeguards surround the
use of the exemption to discourage agencies from abusing it." The
addition of the Iowa exemption to MAPA would be wise.
44.

REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIsmRATvE PRocEDuRE Acr § 3(b) (1961).

45. IowA CODE § 17A.4(2) (1977); cf. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (1976) (the FAPA
provision upon which the IAPA section is based).
46. Bonfield, supra note 8, at 860.
47. Id. at 861.
48. See id. at 861-873. Unlike FAPA, IAPA places on the agencies the burden of
proving in a court that the challenged use of the exemption was justified. IOWA CODE
§ 17A.4(2) (1977).
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STATUS OF RULES OF EXEMPT AGENCIES

A state officer, board, commission, bureau, division, department, or tribunal, other than a court, that is excluded from the definition of "agency" 4' is not required to follow any rulemaking procedures other than those prescribed by MAPA's section 15.0413(3)10 or
some other applicable statute. Section 15.0413(3) states that the rules
of such an agency "shall have the force and effect of law if they are
filed in the office of the secretary of state in the same manner as rules
adopted pursuant to section 15.0412 are so filed and if they are submitted to the commissioner of administration in a manner he shall
prescribe and published in the state register." 5' Rules of the Regents
of the University of Minnesota are excepted by this section even from
these requirements. 2
There is no requirement, so far as MAPA is concerned, that rules
of exempt agencies must be approved by the Attorney General. There
is such an express requirement for temporary rules, so it is not reasonable to imply such a requirement for the rules of exempt agencies.
Nor, apparently, do MAPA's judicial review provisions, sections
15.0416 and 15.0417, apply to exempt agency rules, since these sections relate to the determination of the validity of "any rule." The
definition of "rule" in section 15.0411(3) includes "every agency
statement" except statements of exempt agencies.
MAPA does not seem to cover at all the agency general statements that are exempted from the definition of "rule" by section
15.0411(3). Section 15.0413(3), relating to the rules of exempt agencies, does not cover them. Nor are they covered by the judicial review
provisions of sections 15.0416 and 15.0417, for the reasons mentioned
in connection with general statements of exempt agencies.
Generally it would seem that there is greater reason to require
Attorney General approval of rules that may be adopted without
satisfying the rulemaking procedures prescribed by MAPA than of
rules that must satisfy these procedures. In the case of two specific
exclusions from MAPA, however, the requirement of Attorney General approval would be inappropriate: (1) rules of the legislature itself, the courts themselves, or the Governor exercising certain emergency powers,53 and (2) rules "concerning only the internal management of the agency or other agencies, and which do not directly affect
49. MiNN. STAT. § 15.0411(2) (Supp. 1977).
50. Id. § 15.0413(3).
51. Id.

52. Id.
53. MiNN. STAT. § 15.0411(2) (Supp. 1977) (items (a) and (b)); see text accompanying Appendix notes 3-8, infra.
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the rights of or procedure available to the public."5
Statutes other than MAPA should be examined to determine
whether the rules exempt from MAPA must be approved by the
Attorney General, and whether and how they are to be subjected to
judicial review. In the absence of an applicable statutory provision,
a suit for an injunction or declaratory judgment, or one of the prerogative writs, may be used to seek a determination of the validity of
these rules. 5
III.

AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE RULES

Prior to 1975, MAPA was itself a source of rulemaking authority.
Section 15.0412(1) provided, inter alia, that for "the purpose of carrying out the duties and powers imposed upon and granted to it, an
agency may promulgate reasonable substantive rules and regulations
and may amend, suspend or repeal the same, but such action shall
not exceed the powers vested in the agency by statute."' , It also
authorized each agency, in "addition to other rulemaking powers or
requirements provided by law," to "adopt rules governing the formal
or informal procedures prescribed or authorized" by MAPA for making rules or deciding contested cases. 57 These rules were to include
"rules of practice before the agency and . . . forms and instructions."58 Each agency was required, "so far as deemed practicable,"
to "supplement its rules with descriptive statements of its procedures, which shall be kept current."59 At the same time, MAPA's
definition section provided that, to be covered by it, an "agency"
must be "authorized by law to make rules."65 To give all these provisions some coherence, it must be assumed that this definitional
condition was satisfied by the provision quoted above, which made
MAPA itself an independent source of authority for each agency to
promulgate substantive, interpretative, procedural, and practice
rules-unless, of course, some other statute expressly denied the
agency any rulemaking authority. In any event, no agency was authorized to take any action by authority of MAPA that was inconsistent
with the statute it was implementing.61
54. MINN. STAT. § 15.0411(3)(a) (1976); see text accompanying Appendix notes
28-34, infra.
55. See generally W. GE.soRN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 150-67 (6th ed.
1974); see also Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Minnesota Environmental
Quality Council, 306 Minn. 370, 237 N.W.2d 375 (1975).
56. MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(1) (1974).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. § 15.0412(2) (Supp. 1977).
60. Id.
61. Id. § 15.0412(1).
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The 1975 amendments to MAPA 2 changed all this. They altered
section 15.0412(1) to provide that each agency "shall adopt, amend,
suspend or repeal its rules in accordance with the procedures specified in [MAPA] and only pursuant to authority delegated by law
and in full compliance with its duties and obligations. 6' 3 In 1977,
section 15.0412(1) was further amended" to add that "[e]xcept as
provided in [section 15.0412(3)]," MAPA "shall not be authority for
an agency to adopt, amend, suspend or repeal rules." 6 5
Before 1977, too-and apart from MAPA-the head of any department or other state agency, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, was empowered to "prescribe rules and regulations, not
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of his department or agency
and other matters within the scope of the functions thereof."66 This
provision, which was inconsistent with the intent of the 1975 amendments, seems to have been overlooked when the latter were enacted.
In 1977, however, the provision was deleted." The existing comparable provision now empowers a Commissioner, except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, to "prescribe procedures for the internal
management of his department or agency to the extent that the procedures do not directly affect the rights of or procedure available to
the public." 6 Such internal procedures are explicitly excluded from
the MAPA definition of "rule. 6 9
The only vestige of independent rulemaking authority remaining
in MAPA after the 1975 and 1977 amendments, therefore, lies in
section 15.0412(3), which requires that "[e]ach agency shall adopt
rules setting forth the nature and requirements of all formal and
informal procedures related to the administration of official agency
duties to the extent that those procedures directly affect the rights
of or procedures available to the public."7 Section 15.0412(2)"' requires each agency to "prepare a description of its organization, stating the process whereby the public may obtain information or make
submissions or requests," and provides that "the commissioner of
administration shall annually publish these descriptions in the state
register. 7 2 Such a description is not specifically excluded from the
62.

Act of June 4, 1975, ch. 380, 1975 Minn. Laws 1285.

63. MINN.
64.

65.
66.
67.

STAT.

§ 15.0412(1) (1976).

Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 443, § 2, 1977 Minn. Laws 1217.
MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(1) (Supp. 1977).
MINN. STAT. § 15.06(5) (1976) (amended 1977).
Act of May 27, 1977, ch. 305, 1977 Minn. Laws 575.
MINN. STAT. § 15.06(6)(4) (Supp. 1977).
MiN. STAT. § 15.0411(3)(a) (1976); see text accompanying Appendix notes

68.
69.
28-34, infra.
70.
71.
72.

Id. § 15.0412(3).
MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(2) (Supp. 1977).
Id. The State Register is published by the Commissioner of Administration
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broad MAPA definition of "rule. 7 3 If preparing an organizational
description under section 15.0412(2) amounts to rulemaking, then it
is rulemaking that MAPA does not authorize. This is so because the
only exception to the broad statement in 15.0412(1) which declares
that MAPA does not itself authorize rulemaking is 15.0412(3), not
15.0412(2). Some other statute, therefore, would have to be looked to
for agency authority to issue a description of its organization.
The express grant of authority in section 15.0412(3) was necessary only on the assumption that, without it, an agency, whether or
not expressly empowered by a statute other than MAPA to make
substantive rules, would have no authority to make procedural or
practice rules unless that authority was expressly granted by some
other statute. In other words, it was assumed that such authority, as
well as the authority to issue statements governing the organization
of the agency, was not inherent in the power to administer the statute.
Given this assumption, problems were created by the 1975
amendments which broadened the MAPA definition of "rule,"" the
issuance of which was no longer independently authorized by MAPA.
When this was done, there seems to have been no accompanying
review of the Minnesota Statutes to determine whether they expressly granted power to each agency to issue rules that are not substantive, that is, statements of general applicability and future effect
governing the agency's organization, its procedures, practice before
pursuant to Minnesota Statutes, section 15.051 (Supp. 1977). That provision requires
the State Register to contain: (1) all notices for hearings and the full text of the action
being proposed; (2) all rules and amendments, suspensions, or repeals of rules, pursuant to the provisions of MAPA; (3) executive orders issued by the Governor; and (4)
any other official notices which a state agency requests the Commissioner to publish
in the State Register, including notices of the date on which a new agency becomes
operational, the assumption of a new function by an existing state agency and the
appointment of Commissioners. The Commissioner is authorized to prescribe the form
and manner in which agencies must submit any material for public action in the State
Register and to withhold publication of any material not submitted according to the
prescribed form or procedures. The rules of the Commissioner governing the State
Register are set forth by the Department of Administration as part of the Minnesota
State Agency Rules, reproduced as part of the Minnesota Code of Agency Rules loose-

leaf series, assembling all agency regulations. This service is commonly referred to as
MCAR. See 9 MCAR § 3.
The Commissioner is directed to publish the State Register whenever he deems
necessary, but no material properly submitted to him for publication may remain
unpublished for more than ten working days. The Commissioner is expected to offer
the State Register for public sale at a price determined by him. He may also require
each agency to pay its proportionate cost of the State Register "unless other funds
are provided and are sufficient to cover" its costs. Each agency must pay for any
copies of the State Register it wishes to have.
73. MINN. STAT. § 15.0411(3) (1976).
74. See text accompanying notes 13-17 supra.
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it, its interpretation of the statute entrusted to its administration, its
enforcement policies, or any other of its policies.
It may be maintained that the 1975 and 1977 amendments to
MAPA were intended only to bar agencies from relying upon MAPA
as a source of authority to promulgate substantive rules and to require them to follow the prescribed rulemaking procedures when issuing any of the other statements falling within the expanded definition
of "rule." In other words, the amendments were not intended to
prohibit agencies from promulgating non-substantive rules unless
this, too, was expressly authorized by some other statute. Such a
reading of the 1975 and 1977 amendments would not advance the
public interest served by the issuance of such statements and by
public participation in their making.
Accordingly, it could be argued that every agency should be held
to have inherent power under its constitutive statute to issue such
statements, whether or not it has the requisite authority to promulgate substantive rules. This argument is untenable, however, since
MAPA does not generally distinguish between substantive and nonsubstantive rules, except to the extent indicated in section
15.0412(3). There is also no evidence that such a general distinction
was intended to be drawn by the drafters of the 1975 and 1977 amendments, or the Minnesota Legislature that enacted them. Quite the
contrary may be inferred from the reasons given for the expansion of
the definition of "rule." 5
In my judgment, it was a mistake to remove from MAPA the
general grant to all agencies of authority to make substantive rules
not inconsistent with their constitutive statutes. This authority is
necessary for effective administration and may be used in harmony
with an adjudicatory power in ways that can benefit all those subject
to the statutes. If the legislature, upon reconsideration, should refuse
to make such a general grant, it should at least amend MAPA to
authorize all agencies to adopt non-substantive rules.
IV.
A.

PRESCRIBED RULEMAKING PROCEDURES AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER MAPA

AUTHORIrrY TO PROMULGATE RULES IMPLEMENTING MAPA's

PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR RULEMAKING

As discussed above, 7 section 15.0412(3) of MAPA authorizes
each agency to "adopt rules setting forth the nature and requirements
of all formal and informal procedures related to the administration
of official agency duties to the extent that those procedures directly
75.
76.

See text accompanying note 15 supra.
See text accompanying notes 64-70 supra.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:151

affect the rights of or procedures available to the public."77 Pursuant
to this provision, each agency may promulgate rules implementing
the rulemaking requirements of MAPA.
In addition to the promulgating agency itself, there are two other
rulemakers that implement MAPA's procedural requirements: the
Chief Hearing Examiner and the Attorney General. The Chief Hearing Examiner, head of an independent State Office of Hearing Examiners, is empowered to "promulgate rules to govern the procedural
conduct of all hearings, relating to both rule adoption, amendment,
suspension or repeal hearings and contested case hearings."7" His
rules are to include (1) "provisions relating to recessing and reconvening new hearings when the proposed final rule of an agency is substantially different from that which was proposed at the public hearing"; and (2) "a procedure whereby the proposed final rule of an
agency shall be reviewed by the chief hearing examiner to determine
whether or not a new hearing is required because of substantial
changes or failure of the agency to meet the requirements of section
15.0412, subdivision 4."1 The rules promulgated by the Chief Hearing Examiner "shall be binding upon all agencies and shall supersede
any other agency procedural rules with which they may be in conflict."80
Because the Attorney General must approve agency rules covered by MAPA as to form and legality before they can become effective,8' he, too, has issued rules implementing MAPA's procedural
requirements that he regards as necessary to fulfill his responsibilities. His authority to issue such procedural rules stems from section
15.0412(3) of MAPA, granting all covered agencies such general authority. 2 In addition, MAPA expressly authorizes the Attorney General to issue rules prescribing the form and procedures for the submission, consideration, and disposition of petitions for the adoption of
rules.83
The Attorney General is an "agency" as defined by MAPA. 4 His
rulemaking, therefore, must also comply with MAPA's prescribed
procedures in which, as we shall see, hearing examiners play an important role. The Chief Hearing Examiner, too, is an "agency" as
defined by MAPA,8 and his rules must also comply with the procedural requirements of MAPA and be approved by the Attorney Gen77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

84.

§ 15.0412(3) (Supp. 1977).
Id. § 15.052(4).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 15.0412(4).
See text accompanying notes 64-70 supra.
MINN. STAT. § 15.0415 (1976).
Id. § 15.0411(2). See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
MINN. STAT.

85. Id.
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eral as to form and legality before they can become effective. In this
situation, cooperation among the agencies, the Chief Hearing Examiner, and the Attorney General is a necessity if conflict is to be
avoided. MAPA, however, does not assure such cooperation."
The Attorney General has not yet promulgated any rules regarding the "procedural conduct" of the public hearings on proposed
rules. But his procedural rulemaking authority is not restricted in any
way by MAPA. The "procedural conduct" of a public hearing-the
principal province of the Chief Hearing Examiner-may raise issues
as to "form and legality." The Attorney General might wish to issue
rules in this area to indicate what criteria he will use in determining
whether to approve or disapprove the rule finally adopted by the
agency.
In fact, the existing rules of the Attorney General and the Chief
Hearing Examiner cover some of the same subjects,"' but do not
always impose the same requirements upon the agencies. It may be
maintained that, in the event of conflict, the rules of the Chief Hearing Examiner should govern because they became effective only after
approval by the Attorney General as to form and legality. The Attorney General should not approve such rules if they are in conflict with
his own. Even so, problems of the application of the rules to particular situations would remain and the answers to these problems given
by the Chief Hearing Exaininer and the Attorney General may differ.
The fact remains that unless MAPA specifies the contrary in
particular instances, the Attorney General is the final arbiter of the
form and legality of rules that must be submitted to him for approval
or disapproval.u Eventually, of course, the courts may have to decide
conflicts between the Chief Hearing Examiner and the Attorney General in the process of determining the validity of the rule.89
It is unfortunate that the potential for conflict is not eliminated
by clear provisions in MAPA itself or in the rules of the Attorney
General. It would be even better if MAPA left the issuance of procedural rules implementing its requirements to the agencies alone. In
the eyes of the public, the legislature, and the Governor, the agencies
are ultimately responsible for the substantive rules they promulgate.
The agencies should have commensurate authority to prescribe the
procedures governing their issuance. The agencies are also in the best
position to know the kinds of procedures that would be most suited
to handling the different matters subject to their rulemaking.
86. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 234-59 infra.
87. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 227-33 infra.
88. MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(4) (Supp. 1977).
89. See text accompanying note 251 infra.
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INITIATION OF A RULEMAKING PROCEEDING

A rulemaking proceeding may begin in either of two ways under
MAPA: the agency may initiate it either on its own motion or following a petition of any interested person requesting the adoption, suspension, amendment, or repeal of a rule.9 ' Such a petition must be
"specific as to what action is requested and the need for the action.""
Section 15.0415 provides that within sixty days after it receives such
a petition, the agency must make "a specific and detailed reply in
writing as to its planned disposition of the request."' 2 If the agency
states its intention to hold a public hearing on the subject of the
request, it must comply with the procedures prescribed by MAPA for
such a hearing and the steps that follow it.3
MAPA's provisions regarding petitions for a rule are essentially
the same as those in the Revised Model Act and IAPA 4 Under IAPA,
an agency's failure, within sixty days, either "to deny the petition in
writing on the merits, stating its reasons for the denial" or to "initiate
rulemaking proceedings" is subject to judicial review." This is because IAPA subjects "final agency action" to judicial review and
defines "agency action" to include "the performance of any agency
duty or the failure to do so. ' ' 17 The same conclusion would not be

reached under MAPA or the Revised Model Act. MAPA, following
the Revised Model Act,98 provides only that the validity of "any
rule"99 or "final decision in a contested case" 31 may be determined
on judicial review. An agency's failure to conform to the requirements

of section 15.0415 constitutes neither a "rule" nor a "final decision
in a contested case." Nevertheless, the traditional writ of mandamus
90. MINN. STAT. § 15.0415 (1976).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. This provision should not be read as limiting the agency to only two
responses to a petition for the adoption of a rule: either to deny the petition or state
its intention to hold a public hearing on the subject of the request. For example, it
would be a proper reply to a petition if the agency stated its intention to publish notice
that it would seek to obtain information or opinions preparatory to proposing the
adoption, amendment, suspension, or repeal of the rule, pursuant to the provisions of
Minnesota Statutes, section 15.0412(6) (Supp. 1977). See text accompanying notes
115-20 infra.
94. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 6 (1961); IOWA CODE
§ 17A.7 (1973). The Model Act gives the agency thirty days to take action; IAPA, like
MAPA, gives it sixty days.
95.

IOWA CODE § 17A.7 (1977).

96.
97.

Id. § 17A.19.
Id. § 17A.2(9); see Bonfield, supra note 8, at 894-95.

98.

REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT §§ 7, 15 (1961).

99. MINN. STAT. § 15.0416 (1976).
100. Id. § 15.024(1).
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may be available in Minnesota to compel the agency to make the
reply called for by section 15.0415.1"1
Professor Bonfield points out that IAPA makes judicial review
available even if the agency denies the petition and gives written
reasons for the denial, but one or more of its reasons "are improper
or inadequate as a matter of law."''0 In such a case, the reviewing
court may order the agency to reconsider its action.' 3 In this situation, it is likely that a reviewing court in Minnesota would also issue
such an order in response to a petition for a writ of mandamus.
C.

PRE-PROPOSAL CONSULTATION AND DOCUMENTATION

The 1975 amendments added the following provision to MAPA:
When an agency seeks to obtain information or opinions in preparing to propose the adoption, amendment, suspension, or repeal of a
rule from sources outside of the agency, the agency shall publish
notice of its action in the State Register' 4 and shall afford all interested persons an opportunity to submit data or views on the subject
of concern in writing or orally. Such notice and any written material
received by the agency shall become a part of the hearing record to
be submitted to the attorney general under subdivision 4.,
Neither the Revised Model Act nor IAPA contains such a provision. Its commendable purpose is to enlarge the scope of public participation in agency rulemaking in still another way. It was apparently
feared that the process of agency consultation with affected interests
prior to the public hearing required by MAPA'I 6 might settle the
0
agency's views and minimize the significance of the hearing.'1
The
101. Minnesota Statutes, section 15.0424 (1976), regarding the judicial review of
contested cases, provides that nothing therein "shall be deemed to prevent resort to
other means of review, redress, relief, or trial de novo provided by law now or hereafter
enacted." There is no similar provision in section 15.0416 regarding the judicial review
of rules. But there is no reason to read MAPA as foreclosing resort to the prerogative
writs in situations in which they traditionally apply. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
102. Bonfield, supra note 8, at 895.
103. Id.
104. See note 72 supra.
105. MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(6) (Supp. 1977). In addition, Act of March 22, 1978,
ch. 510, § 4, 1978 Minn. Laws 127, provides that "all proposed rules of any state agency
which will have their primary effect on Spanish-speaking people shall be submitted
to the Council [on Affairs of Spanish-speaking People, created by ch. 510] for review
and recommendation at least 15 days prior tor. ..initial publication in the State
Register." If a proposed rule will be submitted to the Council, the agency must comply
simultaneously with the requirements of section 15.0412(6).
106.

MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(4) (Supp. 1977).

107. J. Nobles & T. Triplett, A Staff Report to the House and Senate Governmental Operations Committees on the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act and
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solution sought was not to prohibit such consultations, which were
useful because they could go far to "resolve potential debilitating
conflicts,"'' 8 but to try to bring the general public into the process of
prehearing consultation.
It is questionable, however, whether the means chosen are best
suited to achieve these ends. In the first place, it is not clear under
what circumstances an agency must publish notice that it is seeking
"to obtain information or opinions in preparing to propose the adoption, amendment, suspension, or repeal of a rule from sources outside
of the agency." Yet courts reviewing rules are directed to declare
invalid any rule that was adopted "without compliance with statutory rulemaking procedures."''0 A rule may thus be declared invalid
if an agency obtains such information or opinions without having
published notice of its intent to seek them.
Administrative agencies have been created and delegated authority to promulgate rules because, in part, they can be expected to
deal with particular subject matters on a day-to-day basis that puts
them in constant communication with the individuals and groups
affected or potentially affected by the agencies' rules or proposals.
This ability to engage in ex parte, pre-hearing conversations, conferences and investigations is essential if the agencies are to perform
their tasks fairly and effectively. To do their jobs satisfactorily and
comply with the pre-proposal notice provision of section 15.0412(6),
the agencies would need to publish standing notices in the State
Register stating that they are constantly seeking information or opinions that might lead them to propose the adoption, amendment,
suspension, or repeal of rules. Such notices, of course, would be of
little value.
After publishing the required notice, the agency must "afford all
interested persons an opportunity to submit data or views on the
subject of concern in writing or orally.""' Interested persons must
decide whether to take this opportunity seriously and duplicate the
presentations they will have the chance to make at the public hearing
on any rule actually proposed. It appears that MAPA now requires
that a FAPA-like notice-and-comment procedure precede an on-therecord rulemaking proceeding."' As a result, the cost to interested
persons wishing to participate in the two stages of rulemaking will
increase. The increased cost, in turn, may inhibit participation.
Its Current Application (Office of Legislative Research, Jan. 22, 1975) (unpublished
report).

108. Id.
109. MwN. STAT. § 15.0417 (Supp. 1977).
110. Id. § 15.0412(6).
111. For a description of FAPA's notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure, see
Auerbach, supra note 6, at 21-23.
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MAPA now also provides that the published notice "and any
written material received by the agency shall become a part of the
hearing record to be submitted to the attorney general" for his review
of the rule as to form and legality." '2 This provision was suggested by
the Attorney General.'
The rules of the Chief Hearing Examiner require the agency to
file copies of such written materials with him or his designee at least
25 days prior to the opening of the public hearing."' This is intended
to afford interested persons the opportunity to examine the materials
prior to the hearing. Moreover, the rules require the agency at the
public hearing to introduce the materials for the record." 5 This is
proper because all interested persons should have an opportunity to
comment on materials that the Attorney General may take into consideration in the course of his review. At the same time, participants
in the public hearing may feel compelled to comment on these materials even though they may not be significant or even relevant.
The requirement that these written materials become part of the
hearing record is of dubious value for another reason. A good deal of
the benefit of pre-hearing consultations comes precisely from making
them ex parte and off-the-record. Persons and groups interested in a
contemplated rule may be willing to indicate to the agency, informally and off-the-record, what they are prepared to live with, but
may not be willing to do so in writing for the record.
A possible consequence may be that no written material of significance will be received by the agency in the course of the notice and
informal comment stage. The oral expression of views "on the subject
of concern" need not be reduced to writing by the agency officials or
staff who hear them, nor made a part of the hearing record. This is
an unwise distinction because, obviously, agency representatives may
be influenced as much by oral as by written communications of interested persons. It would be better to treat oral and written comments
alike by not requiring written materials submitted in the course of the
notice-and-comment stage to be made part of the hearing record.
It would be even better to repeal section 15.0412(6) of MAPA.
The aim of assuring meaningful public participation during all
phases of agency rulemaking could be accomplished more effectively
by requiring each agency to create standing advisory committees that
would represent the broad interests affected by a particular agency's
work. The agencies should then be required to consult with their
advisory committees before instituting rulemaking proceedings, but
112.
113.
114.
115.

MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(6) (Supp. 1977).

See J. Nobles & T. Triplett, supra note 107, at 22.
9 MCAR § 2.105(G).
Id. § 2.106(F).
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they should not be precluded from consulting with other persons and
groups as well. This means of consultation would do more to enlarge
meaningful public participation in agency rulemaking than the preproposal notice provision of section 15.0412(6).'
D.

NOTIcE

OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING

No rule may be adopted by any agency unless it "first holds a
public hearing thereon, affording all affected interests an opportunity
"I" The agency must give "notice of its intention
to participate ....
to hold such a hearing at least thirty days prior to the date set for
the hearing . . . . ,,Is The notice must be published in the State
Register and sent by mail to representatives of associations or other
interested groups or persons who have registered their names with the
Secretary of State for that purpose."' The notice in the State Register
must include the full text of the rule proposed for adoption," ° and the
agency must make available at least one free copy of the proposed
rule to any person requesting it. 2 ' If the rule will require the expenditure of public moneys by local public bodies in the state and if the
agency estimates that the total cost to all local bodies to implement
the rule will exceed $100,000 in either of the two years immediately
following adoption of the rule, then the notice must be accompanied
by a written statement giving the agency's reasonable estimate of the
total cost for the two years.ln
Both the Chief Hearing Examiner and the Attorney General have
issued rules imposing upon the agencies detailed requirements implementing these statutory notice provisions.ln Although these two sets
116. See MrmN. STAT. § 15.059 (1976) (general provisions governing advisory committees).
117. MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(4) (Supp. 1977).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. If the Chief Hearing Examiner approves, the agency may incorporate by
reference provisions of federal law or rules, or other materials from sources that he
determines are conveniently available for viewing, copying, and acquisition by interested persons. Id. The Chief Hearing Examiner may not, however, approve incorporation by reference of materials that are less than 3000 words in length or would require
less than five pages of publication in the State Register. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. § 15.0412(7).
123. Compare 9 MCAR § 2.101-.112 (Office of Hearing Examiners' rulemaking
procedures) with Minn. Reg. Atty. Gen. 301-306, 401-421, 1 MCAR § 1.301-.306,
.401-.21 (Attorney General's rulemaking procedures). The rules of the Attorney General were promulgated prior to the enactment of MAPA's 1975 amendments. See note
60 supra.The Attorney General instituted a public proceeding in 1976 to amend these
rules, but no amendments have yet been made.
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of requirements overlap for the most part, there are some not insignificant variations between them. Since MAPA specifically directs the
hearing examiner to conduct only hearings for which proper notice
has been given," 4 it would seem that the Chief Hearing Officer may
impose his will in case of conflicting rules. He may refuse to assign a
hearing examiner to conduct a hearing for which notice was not given
in accordance with his rules. This would be an unseemly way of
resolving differences, which the general public might not appreciate.
It could also induce an agency to petition a court for a writ of mandamus directed against the Chief Hearing Examiner in order to decide
the issue of authority. The agency might avoid possible conflict by
complying with the notice requirements in the rules of both the Chief
Hearing Examiner and the Attorney General. This is possible and
would not be unduly burdensome.
MAPA's notice provisions are similar to those contained in the
Revised Model Act,'2 except that the latter requires only twenty, not
Attorney General Regulation 302(d) requires that the Notice of Hearing contain
the following information and statements:
(1) When and where the hearing is to be held.
(2) That all interested parties will have an opportunity to be heard.
(3) A statement or description of the subjects and issues involved. If the
proposed rules themselves are not included with the notice then the notice
must clearly show the nature and extent of the proposed rules.
(4) The manner in which interested parties may present their views.
Minn. Reg. Atty. Gen. 302(d), 1 MCAR § 1.302(d).
As indicated above, MAPA now requires the notice to include the full text of the rule
proposed for adoption. MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(4) (Supp. 1977); see text accompanying
note 120 supra.
The rules of the Chief Hearing Examiner cover the same ground as those of the
Attorney General, but differ significantly in some respects. Chief Hearing Examiner's
Rule 102(B) requires the Notice of Hearing to contain the following, inter alia:
1. A proposed time, date and place for the hearing to be held.
2. A statement that all interested or affected persons will have an opportunity to participate.
3. A statement or a description of the subjects and issues involved. If
the proposed rules themselves are not included with the Notice of Hearing,
then the Notice must clearly indicate the nature and extent of the proposed
rules and a statement shall be included announcing the availability and the
means of obtaining upon request at least one free copy of the proposed rules.
4. A citation to the agency's statutory authority to promulgate the proposed rules.
5. A statement describing the manner in which interested persons may
present their views.
6. A statement advising interested persons that lobbyists must register
with the State Ethical Practices Board, which statement shall contain the
statutory definition of a lobbyist and indicate that questions should be directed to the Board, giving the address and telephone number thereof. . ..
9 MCAR § 2.102(b).
124. MINN. STAT. § 15.052(3) (1976).
125. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 3 (1961).
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thirty days' notice and does not require the notice to include the full
text of the proposed rule. IAPA requires 35 days' notice to be given
only by publication in the biweekly Iowa Administrative Code.", It,
too, does not require the notice to include the full text of the proposed
rule.
Professor Bonfield comments that an agency under IAPA may be
expected to publish the full text of a proposed rule if it has such a
text, because such publication would eliminate any possible question
about the adequacy of the notice.2 7 IAPA did not impose the requirement found in MAPA, apparently, because an agency may not have
fixed the precise terms of the rule prior to the public proceedings or
the proposed rule may be so long as to make publication too cumbersome or too expensive.' 2 In this respect, MAPA's requirements seem
to be too rigid. Yet they are indispensable in light of the role of the
Office of Hearing Examiners in rulemaking, which will be considered
next. In all other respects, MAPA's notice requirements seem to be
satisfactory.

E. ROLE OF THE HEARING EXAMINERS
MAPA gives the independent Office of Hearing Examiners,
created by the 1975 amendments, a significant role in the process of
agency rulemaking. There is nothing like it in the Revised Model Act
or IAPA. FAPA, however, gives administrative law judges important
functions
in certain formal, or on-the-record, rulemaking proceed29
ings.
All agency hearings that are required to be held under MAPA
must be conducted by a hearing examiner assigned by the Chief
Hearing Examiner. 3 ' The Chief Hearing Examiner, "who shall be
learned in the law," is appointed for a six-year term by the Governor
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and may be removed only
for cause."' The Chief Hearing Examiner appoints the hearing examiners needed to discharge the responsibilities of the office.3 2 They
must be "learned in the law" to be assigned to contested case hearings but, otherwise, they "shall have demonstrated knowledge of
administrative procedures and shall be free of any political or economic association that would impair their ability to function officially in a fair and objective manner."' Because ninety percent of
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

IowA CODE § 17A.4(l)(a) (1977).
Bonfield, supra note 8, at 851.
Id.
See Auerbach, supra note 6, at 18-21.
MiNN. STAT. § 15.052(3) (1976).
Id. § 15.052(1).
Id.
Id. §§ 15.052(1), (3).
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the work of the hearing examiners is devoted to contested case hearings and only ten percent to public hearings on proposed rules, all the
hearing examiners are lawyers.' 4
In assigning hearing examiners to particular proceedings, the
Chief Hearing Examiner must "attempt to utilize personnel having
expertise in the subject to be dealt with in the hearing."' The following duties are imposed upon the hearing examiner conducting the
hearing:
(1) advise an agency as to the location at which and time during
which a hearing should be held so as to allow for participation by
all affected interests; (2) conduct only hearings for which proper
notice has been given; (3) see to it that all hearings are conducted
in a fair and impartial manner; and (4) make a report on each
proposed agency action in which the hearing examiner functioned
in an official capacity, stating his findings of fact and his conclusions and recommendations, taking notice of the degree to which the
agency has (i) documented its statutory authority to take the proposed action, (ii) fulfilled all relevant substantive and procedural
requirements of law or rule, and (iii) demonstrated the need for and
reasonableness of its proposed action with an affirmative presentation of facts.'36
F.

NATURE OF THE PUBLIC

HEARING

The public hearing is the principal means by which all interests
that may be affected by the proposed rule must be afforded an opportunity to participate in its making. MAPA, itself, does not set out in
134. There are, currently, twelve hearing examiners employed on a full-time
basis in the office. The hearing examiners are placed in the classified service of the
state; the Chief Hearing Examiner, in the unclassified service. Id. § 15.052(1). There
are three classes of hearing examiners. One hearing examiner is in class 1, with a salary
range of $17,539 to $21,924; eight are in class 2, with a salary range of $21,924 to
$29,629; three, with supervisory responsibilities, are in class 3, with a salary range of
$25,432 to $31,926. The Chief Hearing Examiner is paid $36,000 a year. The Chief
Hearing Examiner is also authorized to contract with qualified individuals to serve as
hearing examiners on specific assignments at a rate not to exceed $150 per day, if
regularly appointed hearing examiners are not available. Id. § 15.052(2). Twelve such
individuals are under contract for the current fiscal year. The Chief Hearing Examiner,
in consultation with the Commissioner of Administration, may assess agencies for the
cost of services rendered to them in the conduct of hearings. Id. § 15.052(6). The
agencies are directed to budget for such assessments. Id.
For the fiscal year, July 1, 1977 through June 30, 1978, state agencies were appropriated approximately $1.3 million to pay for the services of the Office of Hearing
Examiners. The office operates on a revolving fund, billing each agency for the services
rendered it. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1978, the agencies were billed a total
of $850,305. This information was supplied by Duane R. Harves, Chief Hearing Examiner. I wish to thank Mr. Harves for his cooperation and assistance.
135. MINN. STAT. § 15.052(3) (1976).
136. Id.
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detail how the affected interests shall take part. It gives only a few
guidelines for conducting the hearing. It refers repeatedly to the making of a "hearing record."' 37 An audiomagnetic recording device must
be used to keep the record, unless the Chief Hearing Examiner determines that the use of a court reporter is more appropriate. 3 If the
agency, the Chief Hearing Examiner, or the Attorney General requests, the hearing examiner must cause a transcript of the hearing
to be prepared.'39
At the hearing, the agency must "make an affirmative presentation of facts establishing the need for and reasonableness of the rule
proposed for adoption and fulfilling any relevant substantive or procedural requirements imposed on the agency by law or rule."'' 0 The
hearing examiner is directed to "see to it that all hearings are conducted in a fair and impartial manner. . . . "'4 To this end, MAPA
also gives the Chief Hearing Examiner the power to issue subpoenas.'
The hearing examiner must allow written material to be submitted and recorded in the "hearing record" for five working days or, on
order of the hearing examiner, up to twenty calendar days after the
public hearing ends.' The hearing record is to be closed upon the
expiration of the time fixed for the receipt of such written material.',
Within thirty days after the close of the hearing record, the hearing examiner who conducted the hearing must complete the required
report."5 The report must be available to all affected persons upon
137. MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(4) (Supp. 1977).
138. MINN. STAT. § 15.052(5) (1976).
139. MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(4) (Supp. 1977).
140. Id.
141. MINN. STAT. § 15.052(3) (1976).
142. MINN. STAT. § 15.052(4) (Supp. 1977). The Chief Hearing Examiner
[u]pon his own initiative or upon written request of an interested party...
may issue a subpoena for the attendance of a witness or the production of
such books, papers, records or other documents as are material to the matter
being heard. The subpoena shall be enforceable through the district court in
the district in which the subpoena is issued.

Id.
While this language seems most suited to a contested case proceeding, it is not so
limited and would apply to a rulemaking proceeding as well. The Chief Hearing Examiner has pointed out, however, that no party has yet requested a subpoena for rulemaking. Letter from Duane R. Harves, Chief Hearing Examiner, to Carl A. Auerbach (Oct.
26, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Harves Letter].
MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(4).
144. Id.
145. Id. Upon written request of the agency and the hearing examiner, the Chief
Hearing Examiner may order an extension of the time within which the hearing examiner must complete the report. An extension may not be granted if the Chief Hearing
Examiner determines that it "would prohibit a rule from being adopted or becoming
effective until after a date for adoption or effectiveness as required by statute." Id.
143.

1979]

MINNESOTA RULEMAKING

request for at least five working days before the agency takes any final
action on the rules."' The agency's final rule must be submitted to
the Chief Hearing Examiner so that he may determine whether a new
public hearing is required because the final rule is "substantially
different" from the proposed rule or because the agency failed to
comply with MAPA's rulemaking procedures.' Then, the final
agency rule must be submitted "with the complete hearing record"
to the Attorney General for review as to form and legality."' The
agency must give notice to all persons who requested to be informed
that the hearing record has been submitted to the Attorney General.'
These general guidelines set out in MAPA are implemented in
considerable detail by the rules of the Chief Hearing Examiner and
the Attorney General.IN The rules of both require that the agency's
notice of the public hearing contain a statement describing the manner in which interested parties may present their views.'51 The rules
of the Attorney General also require that the hearing record "shall
show that all interested parties were afforded an opportunity to speak
2
and otherwise present evidence to the agency.""
The Chief Hearing Examiner's rules go further. They require
that the agency's notice of the public hearing contain a separate
paragraph reading as follows:
Notice is hereby given that 25 days prior to the hearing, a Statement
of Need and Reasonableness will be available for review at the
agency and at the Office of Hearing Examiners. This Statement of
Need and Reasonableness will include a summary of all of the evidence which will be presented by the agency at the hearing justifying both the need for and the reasonableness of the proposed
rule/rules. Copies of the Statement of Need and Reasonableness
may be obtained from the Office of Hearing Examiners at a minimal
charge. ' u
At least 25 days prior to the opening of the public hearing, the agency
must file with the Chief Hearing Examiner copies of the Statement
of Need and Reasonableness, as well as of all materials received during the notice-and-informal comment process. 5' The Chief HearingExaminer has specified that the Statement of Need and Reasonableness must contain
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id. § 15.052(4).
Id. § 15.0412(4).
Id.
See note 123 supra.
9 MCAR § 2.102(C)(5); 1 MCAR § 1.302(d)(4).
Minn.Reg. Atty. Gen. 303(d), 1 MCAR § 1.303(d).
9 MCAR § 2.102(C)(9).
Id. § 2.105(E),(G).
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a summary of all of the evidence and argument which is anticipated
to be presented by the agency at the hearing justifying both the need
for and the reasonableness of the proposed rule/rules, including citations to any statutes or case law to be relied upon, citations to any
economic, scientific or other manuals or treatises to be utilized at
the hearing, and a list of any expert witnesses to be called to testify
on behalf of the agency, together with a brief summary of the expert
opinion to be elicited. The Statement need not contain evidence and
argument in rebuttal of evidence- and argument presented by the
public.
The Statement shall be prepared with sufficient specificity so
that interested persons will be able to fully prepare any testimony
or evidence in favor of or in opposition to the rule/rules as proposed. .

..

IS

The rules of the Attorney General do not contain these requirments. They state only that when an agency rule is submitted to the
Attorney General for review as to form and legality, the agency shall
also submit, inter alia, (1) a Statement of Need containing a recitation of the reasons supporting a finding of need for the rules;", and
(2) findings of fact supporting the reasons or need for the rules
adopted. 57 If the agency is acting pursuant to a petition for a rule and
the petition sets forth reasons for the rule, the agency may substitute
the petition for the Statement of Need.'
It cannot be said that the rules of the Chief Hearing Examiner
and those of the Attorney General conflict in these respects, because
it is possible for the agencies to comply with both sets of rules. But
155. Id. § 2.104. The rule goes on to provide:
Presentation of evidence or testimony (other than bona fide rebuttal) not
summarized in the Statement of Need and Reasonableness may result in the
Hearing Examiner, upon proper motion made at the hearing by any interested person, recessing the hearing to a future date in order to allow all
interested persons an opportunity to prepare testimony or evidence in opposition to such newly presented evidence or testimony, which recessing shall
be for a period not to exceed 25 calendar days, unless the 25th day is a
Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in which case, the next succeeding working day shall be the maximum date for the resumed hearing.
If the agency so desires, the Statement of Need and Reasonableness may
contain the verbatim affirmative presentation by the agency which may then
be either read at the hearing or, if all persons appearing at the hearing have
had an opportunity to review the Statement, may be introduced as an exhibit into the record as though read. In such instance, agency personnel or
other persons thoroughly familiar with the rules and the agency's Statement
shall be available at the hearing for questioning by the Hearing Examiner
and other interested persons.
Id.
156. Minn. Reg. Atty. Gen. 302(g), 1 MCAR § 1.302(g).
157. Minn. Reg. Atty. Gen. 302(h), 1 MCAR § 1.302(h).
158. Minn. Reg. Atty. Gen. 302(g), 1 MCAR § 1.302(g).
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obviously the views of these officials differ greatly as to what is proper
procedure. There is a great difference between requiring the agency
to submit a Statement of Need and Reasonableness in the detail
called for by the Chief Hearing Examiner before the public hearing
begins, and submitting such a statement after the public hearing
ends, which is all that the Attorney General requires. The views as
to what the statement should contain also differ. Yet the Attorney
General approved the rules of the Chief Hearing Examiner, and
MAPA, therefore, makes them binding upon the agencies.
The rules of the Attorney General do not deal with the conduct
of the public hearing itself, except to require the transcript of the
hearing to show that during its course, the agency recited the reasons
why the proposed rules are needed and that the "record" supports the
rule as adopted."5 ' The conduct of the hearing is a principal subject
of the Chief Hearing Examiner's rules. They provide, inter alia:
E. The agency shall make available copies of the proposed rule
at the hearing.
F. The agency shall introduce its exhibits relevant to the proposed rule including written material received prior to the hearing.
G. The agency shall make its affirmative presentation of facts
showing the need for and the reasonableness of the proposed rule
and shall present any other evidence it deems necessary to fulfill all
relevant, substantive and procedural, statutory or regulatory requirements.
H. Interested persons shall be given an opportunity to address
questions to the agency representatives or witnesses.
I. Interested persons shall be given an opportunity to be heard
on the proposed rule and/or to present written evidence. All interested persons submitting oral statements are subject to questioning
by representatives of the agency.
J. The Hearing Examiner may question all persons, including
the agency representatives.
K. The agency may present any further evidence that it deems
appropriate in response to statements made by interested persons.
Upon such presentation by the agency, interested persons may respond thereto.
L. Consistent with law, the Hearing Examiner shall be authorized to do all things necessary and proper to the performance of the
foregoing and to promote justice, fairness and economy, including
but not limited to, the power to:
1. Preside at the hearing;
2. Administer oaths or affirmations when he deems it
appropriate;
3. Hear and rule on objections and motions;
159.

Minn. Reg. Atty. Gen. 303(b)-(c), 1 MCAR § 1.303(b)-(c).
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4. Question witnesses where he deems it necessary to
make a complete record;
5. Rule on the admissibility of evidence and strike from
the record objectionable evidence.' 8
The Chief Hearing Examiner's rules also paraphrase the statutory provision that the hearing examiner must allow written material
to be submitted and recorded in the "hearing record" for five working
days or, on order of the hearing examiner, for a longer period not to
exceed twenty calendardays after the public hearing ends."' But the
Attorney General's rules require that the hearing record "shall show
that a reasonable time period, at least 20 days, was allowed subsequent to the hearing for interested parties to submit briefs or other
written material relative to the proposed rules" and that the "time
to be allowed must have been stated at the hearing.""'
Here the potential for conflict exists, for it is conceivable that a
hearing examiner may refuse to order an extension of as much as
twenty days. If MAPA is read as limiting the extension period to no
more than twenty days and giving the hearing examiner overriding
authority to order an extention of less than twenty days, the Attorney
General's rule is ultra vires. But it is doubtful that the legislature
intended to circumscribe the Attorney General's authority to state
the conditions he would exact in reviewing the final rule as to form
and legality. Perplexing, too, is the significance to be attached to the
Attorney General's approval of the Chief Hearing Examiner's rules
in this respect.
The rules of the Attorney General require that a transcript be
prepared of all hearings and that a copy of the transcript and all
exhibits accompany any rule submitted to the Attorney General for
review." 3 The Attorney General and the Chief Hearing Examiner
have both specified what shall constitute the "record."' 6 While not
identical, these requirements are not in conflict. Taken together, they
specify that the record include: (1) the rule that the agency requests
the Attorney General to approve; (2) the petition for a rule, if any;
(3) the written materials, if any, submitted during the notice-andinformal comment process; (4) the proposed rule; (5) the Notice of
Hearing; (6) the Order of Hearing;"' (7) the affidavit of receipt of the
160. 9 MCAR § 2.106.
161. Id. § 2.106(B).
162. Minn. Reg. Atty. Gen. 303(e), 1 MCAR § 1.303(e) (emphasis added).
163. Minn. Reg. Atty. Gen. 303(a), 1 MCAR § 1.303(a).
164. Minn. Reg. Atty. Gen. 302-303, 1 MCAR §§ 1.302-.303; 9 MCAR § 2.107.
165. The Order of Hearing must be issued by the agency and filed with the Chief
Hearing Examiner prior to the public hearing. 9 MCAR § 2.103. In slightly differing
language, the Attorney General and Chief Hearing Examiner rules require that the
Order of Hearing contain (a) the proposed time, date and place for the hearing to be
held; (b) a statement that the Notice of Hearing will be published in the State Register
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Secretary of State's list, showing that the list was obtained from the
Secretary of State within a reasonable period of time before the Notice of Hearing was nailed; (8) the affidavit of mailing the notice to
all persons on the Secretary of State's list; (9) the Statement of Need
and Reasonableness; (10) all written comments or other evidence
received prior to, during or subsequent to the hearing, but prior to
the close of the record; (11) the transcript of the hearing;'" (12) the
agency's findings of fact; and (13) the order adopting the rule which
shall recite (a) the time and place of the hearing; (b) that proper
notice was served; (c) that all parties were given the opportunity to
be heard; and (d) that the rule adopted is based on the record, applicable statutes, and an existing need. Neither the'Attorney General nor
the Chief Hearing Examiner has made the report of the hearing examiner a part of the "record."
Putting together the provisions of MAPA and the implementing
rules of the Attorney General and Chief Hearing Examiner, it seems
clear that the public hearing mandated is an "on-the-record" proceeding, in the sense that the agency is expected to adopt a rule only
if it can be supported by the oral and written evidence introduced at
the public hearing. Requests for the opportunity to make oral presentations are to be honored. Although there is no explicit requirement
that the public hearing be a "trial-type" or "evidentiary" hearing, in
the sense that all the oral and written evidence must be presented by
witnesses subject to cross-examination by all other participants in
the hearing, it may easily become one. All the participants will be
apprised of all the data on which the agency is relying to support the
rule. They will have the opportunity to submit their own data in
support of or in refutation of the agency's position and to "question"
the agency's representatives and witnesses. In turn, they will be subjected to questioning by the agency's representatives and by the hearing examiner, who may also question the agency's representatives
and witnesses. But they may not be able to question the representatives of other affected interests.
and be given to all persons who have registered with the Secretary of State for that
purpose; and (c) the signature of the agency official authorized to order a hearing.
Minn. Reg. Atty. Gen. 302(c), 1 MCAR § 1.302(c); 9 MCAR § 2.102(B).
166. The Chief Hearing Examiner's Rule 107, 9 MCAR § 2.107, ignores the fact
that Attorney General Regulation 303(a), 1 MCAR § 1.303(a), requires a transcript to
be prepared of every public hearing on a proposed rule. It provides that if a transcript
of the proceedings has been prepared, it shall be part of the record and copies shall be
available to persons requesting them at a charge fixed by the Chief Hearing Examiner.
Otherwise, Rule 107 makes a tape recording of the hearing part of the record, unless
the Chief Hearing Examiner determines that the use of a reporter is more appropriate.
MAPA requires a transcript only if the agency, the Chief Hearing Examiner, or
the Attorney General requests it. By his rule, however, the Attorney General has
requested one in every case.
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The Chief Hearing Examiner's rules, however, empower the
hearing examiner conducting the hearing "to do all things necessary
and proper

to promote justice, fairness and economy ....

This is a broad grant of power which is stated to include the authority
to administer oaths and affirmations, to hear and rule on objections
and motions, to rule on the admissibility of evidence, and to strike
objectionable evidence from the record. Pursuant to this authority,
the hearing examiner may decide, in a particular situation, to conduct a "trial-type" hearing, to permit questioning to become crossexamination, and even to allow the representatives of affected interests favoring and opposing the rule to question and cross-examine
each other. '
Neither the Revised Model Act nor IAPA provides for the kind
of "hearing" that takes place under MAPA. The Revised Model Act
prescribes a hearing at which all interested persons will be afforded
a "reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, or arguments, orally
or in writing."'6 9 Opportunity for "oral hearing" must be granted only
if a "substantive rule" is proposed by the agency and such opportunity is requested by twenty-five persons, by a governmental subdivision or agency, or by an association having not less than twenty-five
members.17 No mention is made of a "hearing record." The agency
need make no affirmative presentation of facts or present any Statement of Need and Reasonableness. It is required to "consider fully
all written and oral submissions respecting the proposed rule"; if it
adopts the rule and is so requested by an interested person, it must
"issue a concise statement of the principal reasons for and against its
adoption, incorporating therein its reasons for overruling the considerations urged against its adoption."''
IAPA is based upon the Revised Model Act in these respects but
differs from it in two important ways. First, it mandates oral proceedings when procedural, as well as substantive, rules are under consid167. 9 MCAR § 2.106(L).
168. For an example of public hearings on a set of proposed rules that had many
features of a "trial-type" proceeding, see In re Pollution Control Agency's Proposed
Adoption of Rules Governing the Identification, Labelling, Classification, Storage,
Collection, Transportation and Disposal of Hazardous Wastes and of Amendments to
Minnesota Regulations SW 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7, No. PCA-78-003-WS (Minn. Office
Hearing Examiners, May 25, 1978) (Report of Hearing Examiner) [hereinafter cited
as In re Hazardous Wastes].
The hearing examiner, as a routine part of the opening of a rulemaking hearing,
states that "speakers may agree to be questioned by other members of the public."
The Chief Hearing Examiner reports that to the best of his knowledge, no participant
has ever refused to answer questions from another participant. Harves Letter, supra
note 142.
169. REVISED MODEL STATE ADmINIsRATIvE PROcEDURE AcT § 3 (1961).
170. Id.
171. Id.
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eration.12 Professor Bonfield justifies this departure from the Revised
Model Act on the ground that "some procedural rules are so important that any wholesale exclusion of them from the opportunity to
make oral presentations thereon ...

is unjustified."1 3

Second, whereas the Revised Model Act describes the oral proceedings that may be required as an "oral hearing," IAPA describes
them as "oral presentations."'' Professor Bonfield explains that the
distinction is important. The term "oral presentation," rather than
"oral hearing," was used in order to assure that UAPA would not be
read as contemplating a "trial-type" or "evidentiary" hearing, with
"rights to confrontation, cross examination, and the making of a formal record on the exclusive basis of which the v;alidity of the rule will
later stand or fall in any judicial proceeding."1 5 Instead, IAPA envisages "informal rulemaking of the notice and comment variety where
the comment is usually made in writing and sometimes orally," that
is, when interested persons think their views can be communicated
more effectively orally than in writing. 7'
Professor Bonfield's fear of the Revised Model Act's provision
may be exaggerated since the Supreme Court has held that the requirement that a rule be made only after a "hearing" does not by
itself command a "trial-type" or "evidentiary" on-the-record proceeding.'" One would have good cause to fear that MAPA provisions
and implementing rules of the Attorney General and Chief Hearing
Examiner may be read as requiring an on-the-record, trial-type hearing.
G.

REPORT OF THE HEARING

ExAIw

Within thirty days after the close of the hearing record (or longer,
if the Chief Hearing Examiner so orders), the hearing examiner who
conducted the public hearing must write a report.178 The report must
state the hearing examiner's
findings of fact and ...

conclusions and recommendations, taking

notice of the degree to which the agency has (i) documented its
statutory authority to take the proposed action, (ii) fulfilled all rele172.

IOWA CODE § 17A.4(l)(b) (1977).
173. Bonfield, supra note 8, at 853.
174. IOWA CODE § 17.A.4(1)(b) (1977).
175. Bonfield, supra note 8, at 853.
176. Id. Formal rulemaking "on a record" is required in Iowa only if a statute
other than IAPA specifically commands it. Id.
IAPA authorizes the agency to issue rules governing the conduct of the oral presentations. IOWA CODE § 17A.4(1)(b) (1977). If it wishes, the agency may,-by rule, provide
for cross-examination and a verbatim transcript. Bonfield, supra note 8, at 854.
177. See United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 241-46 (1973).
178. MiNN. STAT. § 15.0412(4) (Supp. 1977).
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vant substantive and procedural requirments of law or rule, and (iii)
demonstrated the need for and reasonableness of its proposed action
with an affirmative presentation of facts.17'
By reading the reports of hearing examiners and discussing with
them their role in the rulemaking process, it becomes evident that
they are adopting the attitude and approaches of a judge reviewing
agency rules. 80 The provisions of MAPA and the rules of the Chief
Hearing Examiner encourage this posture. As already discussed, the
notice of the public hearing must include "the full text of the rule
proposed for adoption."' 8' Twenty-five days prior to the hearing, the
agency must make available to the public a detailed Statement of
Need and Reasonableness summarizing all the evidence and argument that it will rely upon to justify the proposed rule." 2 At the
hearing, the agency must "make an affirmative presentation of facts
establishing the need for and reasonableness of" the proposed rule.' U
In short, the agency is expected to have a settled position on the
proposed rule even before the public hearing starts, to assume the
burden of justifying the proposed rule at the hearing and to rebut the
evidence and argument presented by participants who oppose the
rule. The hearing is thus seen as not only "on-the-record," but as an
adversary proceeding over which the independent hearing examiner
will preside and express impartial judgment-as would a judge called
upon to determine the validity of the rule in a review proceeding.
This is a far cry from the principal purpose sought to be achieved
by public participation in the rulemaking process. On the federal
level and in other states, public participation is viewed not as a
means of trying a case, but of enlightening the agency and protecting
affected interests, as well as the agency, against action or inaction
which has been shown to be uninformed or unwise.'84 If this purpose
is to be accQmplished, the agency's representatives should come to
the public hearing with minds open to the information and views that
will be communicated to them by the public. This is difficult for the
agency representatives to do under MAPA, which expects them to
justify the agency action in the eyes of the hearing examiner who
comes between them and the participants in the hearing.
179. MINN. STAT. § 15.052(3) (1976).
180. In the preparation of this Article, a study was made of hearing examiner
reports, and interviews were carried on with four hearing examiners. The author was

assisted in this

study and interviewing by Mary L. Josephson, J.D. 1978, University

of Minnesota.
181.

MiNN.STAT. § 15.0412(4) (Supp. 1977).

182.
183.
184.

9 MCAR § 2.102(C)(9).
MINN.STAT. § 15.0412(4) (Supp. 1977); 9 MCAR § 2.106(G).
See Auerbach, supra note 6, at 17. See also Bonfield, supra note 8,at 845-
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Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the hearing
examiners think of themselves as administrative law judges and serve
to judicialize the rulemaking process. It is difficult to see how they
can take any other position. They are given no other role under
MAPA; they are not agency employees; they are not ultimately responsible for the rules promulgated; and the principal statutory standard that they are asked to follow in arriving at their conclusions and
recommendations is the "reasonableness""' of the agency's proposals. They are not asked to put themselves in the place of the agency
heads and recommend which of a number of ways of solving a particular problem is the preferred alternative.
Yet, as in the case of judicial review, "reasonableness" is an
elastic concept, and it cannot be said that hearing examiners never
reach conclusions nor make recommendations which reflect their own
independent judgments. In some cases, hearing examiners have expressed independent judgments even without invoking the standard
to interpret applicof "reasonableness."' 86 They often also undertake
87
independently.
provisions
able statutory
MINN. STAT. § 15.052(3) (1976).
186. See, e.g., In re the Proposed Adoption of Rules by the Insurance Division
[of the Minnesota Department of Commerce] Relating to Unfair Discrimination Practices Based Upon Sex or Marital Status, No. Ins.-77-003-SM (Minn. Office Hearing
Examiners, Dec. 15, 1976) (Hearing Examiner's Report). Hearing Examiner Steve M.
Mihalchick concluded that the proposed rule to eliminate sex discrimination in extending insurance coverage was "authorized, necessary and reasonable, and, thus,
proper for adoption." Id. at 19. Nevertheless, he recommended that the rule not be
adopted because it did not also deal with sex discrimination in premium rates. The
Hearing Examiner regarded the latter as inseparable from the availabilty of coverage
because rates could be fixed so high as to make coverage "effectively unavailable." Id.
Commissioner of Insurance Berton W. Heaton rejected this recommendation because "there are specific rating laws which prohibit differentiation of rates among like
risks" and it "would appear highly unlikely that discriminatory prohibitive rates such
as the Hearing Examiner suggests could be exacted without detection and subsequent
action by the Insurance Division under the existing insurance statutes." In re Proposed
Adoption of Rules by the Insurance Division Relating to Unfair Discrimination Practices Based Upon Sex or Marital Status, No. Ins.-77-003-SM (Minn. Office Hearing
Examiners, Feb. 18, 1977) (Findings of Fact of Commissioner of Insurance).
The rule in question never became effective because the Attorney General concluded that the Insurance Division had no statutory authority to promulgate it.
187. See, e.g., In re Proposed Adoption of Rules of the Minnesota Energy Agency
Governing Contents of Applications for Certificates of Need and Criteria for Assessment of Need for Large Oil Storage Facilities and Large Coal Storage Facilities for
Energy Users, Nos. EA-801-891 & EA-76-002-WS (Minn. Office Hearing Examiners,
Jan. 18, 1977) (Report of the Hearing Examiner) [hereinafter cited as In re Energy
Usersl. Hearing Examiner William Seltzer concluded that the Energy Agency had
misconstrued the definition of "Large Energy Facilities" in section 116H.02(5) (1976)
of the Minnesota Statutes and, consequently, the agency lacked statutory authority
to promulgate rules requiring a certificate of need for large coal storage facilities for
energy users because such facilities did not fall within the statutory definition as

185.
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MAPA seeks to specialize the hearing examiners by directing the
Chief Hearing Examiner, in assigning them, to "attempt to utilize
personnel having expertise in the subject to be dealt with in the
hearing."'' 8 But given the small number of hearing examiners and the
diversity of the relatively large number of rulemaking proceedings, it
is difficult for the Chief Hearing Examiner to succeed in this attempt.
An examination of the reports of the hearing examiners indicates that
each hearing examiner is assigned to rulemaking hearings dealing
with a great variety of subjects. For example, one hearing examiner,
in less than a year, was assigned to conduct hearings on proposed
rules of the Board of Dentistry, the Department of Corrections (relating to the implementation and operation of the Community Corrections Act), the Department of Public Safety (relating to the flame
resistance standards for tents and sleeping bags), the Attorney General (relating to peace officer training and the reimbursement program of the Minnesota Peace Officer Training Board), the Board of
Registration of Architecture, Engineering, Land Surveying and
Landscape Architecture, the Department of Administration's Building Code Division (relating to the installation of mobile home support
and tie-down systems), and the Minnesota Board of Teaching (relating to procedures for the issuance of life licenses, the issuance and
renewal of all license fees, and the registration and licensing of nurses
and coaches of interscholastic sports in the elementary and secondary
schools).
It appears that some progress has been made by the Chief Hearing Examiner in specializing hearing examiners in the areas of environmental, transport, and utility regulation. The same three hearing
examiners conduct hearings for the Pollution Control Agency, the
Environmental Quality Board, the Energy Agency, and the Department of Natural Resources. The same four hearing examiners handle
utility and transport matters." 9 Nevertheless, it cannot be said that
any hearing examiner is as expert on the subject matter of any proposed rule as the agency heads and staff members who worked on it.,"
construed by the hearing examiner. The Energy Agency accepted the interpretation
of the hearing examiner. See In re Energy Users, supra (Minn. Office Hearing Examin-

ers, March 24, 1977) (Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Decision of John P. Millhone,
Director of the Minnesota Energy Agency).
188. MiNN. STAT. § 15.052(3) (1976).
189.
190.

Harves Letter, supra note 142.
It may be that this and-other generalizations hazarded about the work of

the hearing examiners would have to be altered or qualified after a closer study of all
the reports of the hearing examiners. It would be interesting to know to what extent
the recommendations of the hearing examiners are being accepted by the agencies;
what types of recommendations are being accepted or rejected more or less readily; to
what extent agencies withdraw or modify rules on the basis of the hearing record, even
when the hearing examiner did not recommend such action; to what extent objections
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This discussion is not intended to suggest that the hearing examiners serve no useful purpose. In many cases, the hearing examiners
provide useful checks. The drafting changes they suggest are often
accepted by the agency, and the mistakes they point out are often
corrected."' I As a result, the final rules are improved.

H. FINAL ACTION BY THE AGENCY
MAPA requires that the hearing examiner's report shall be available to all affected persons upon request for at least five working days
before the agency takes final action on the rule. 12 Since the purpose
of this five-day period is not explained by the rules of either the
Attorney General or the Chief Hearing Examiner,"13 it is not entirely
clear how this period is meant to be employed. Although the affected
interests are able to secure the hearing examiner's report, they are
given no formal opportunity to comment on it or to make any further
formal appearances before the agency." '4 It is possible, of course, to
view the five-day interval as an invitation to informal, ex parte comments on the report."'5 Given the structure of MAPA, it would be
improper for any person or association to submit new evidence during
this period of time. But even comments which do not attempt to offer
voiced by the hearing examiner but not accepted by the agency constitute cause for
disapproval of the agency rules by the Attorney General; to what extent the Attorney
General approves the rules despite such objections; and to what extent the Attorney
General disapproves rules for reasons not suggested by the hearing examiner.
191. See, e.g., In re Proposed Adoption of Rules Amending the Rules of the State
Ethical Practices Board Relating to Campaign Financing (Statement of Need, EPB
1-39 and Statements of Economic Interest, EC 100 Mar. 31, 1976); Report of Hearing
Examiner William Seltzer on the Proposed Rules, No. EPB-76-001-WS (Minn. Office
Hearing Examiners, May 13, 1976) [hereinafter cited as In re Ethical Practices];
Letter from B. Allen Clutter, III, Executive Director, State Ethical Practices Board,
to then Acting Chief Examiner Duane R. Harves (May 26, 1976) (indicating acceptance of the hearing examiner's recommendations); Report of Acting Chief Hearing
Examiner Duane R. Harves, on the Rules Adopted by the Board, In re Ethical Practices, supra (May 28, 1976); 1 State Register 5-12 (July 13, 1976) (amended rules as
published in State Register).
192. MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(4) (Supp. 1977).
193. The rules of the Chief Hearing Examiner state only that the report must
be made available at a reasonable charge to any interested person upon request. 9
MCAR § 2.109.
194. By contrast, in dealing with contested cases, MAPA provides:
In all contested cases the decision of the officials of the agency who are to
render the final decision shall not be made until the report of the hearing
examiner as required by section 15.052, has been made available to parties
to the proceeding for at least ten days and an opportunity has been afforded
to each party adversely affected to file exceptions and present argument to
a majority of the officials who are to render the decision.
MINN. STAT. § 15.0421 (1976).
195. Id. § 15.0412(4) (Supp. 1977).
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new evidence would seem to be inappropriate unless all participants
in the proceeding are offered an opportunity to comment on the comments. Thus, one of the objectives apparently sought to be achieved
by the five-day provision may be inconsistent with the requirements
of an on-the-record proceeding.
The statutory provision in question may also serve to make it
appear that the agency will pay attention to the hearing examiner's
report. In fact, agencies do pay attention to the reports, though the
reports are not binding on them, in taking final action.
MAPA does not contain the explicit provision found in both the
Revised Model Act and IAPA that in coming to its final decision the
agency "shall consider fully all written and oral submissions respecting the proposed rule." 1" Professor Bonfield explains that this provision does not require the agency heads to preside at the oral presentations or to read all the written submissions; it does require that the
agency heads "be fully and adequately informed as to the content of
all written and oral submissions.""' For this purpose, "their subordinates may read the written submissions and preside at oral presentations and then summarize the materials for the agency heads who
may decide based upon an understanding derived from those summaries.""'
Under MAPA, agency representatives always attend and participate in the public hearing. Invariably, too, the agency heads read the
hearing examiner's report and in this way, at least, are acquainted
with the "hearing record." They also have the benefit of staff summaries and analyses. A recent decision by the Minnesota Supreme
Court,'" however, may indicate that this is not sufficient, and that
individual agency heads may be required to read the verbatim transcript of the "hearing record," as well as all the exhibits, before
taking final action.
People for Environmental Enlightenment and Responsibility
(PEER), Inc. v. Minnesota Environmental Quality Council
(MEQC), 2 °" involved a controversy over whether the MEQC, an
agency under MAPA, should grant a permit to Northern States
Power Company and Minnesota Power and Light Company for the
construction of a high voltage transmission line. Because the controversy before the MEQC constituted a "contested case" under MAPA,
a hearing was held before a hearing examiner pursuant to section
196. REVIsED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr § 3(a)(2) (1961); IowA
CODE § 17A.4(l)(b) (1977).
197. Bonfield, supra note 8, at 854-55.
198. Id. at 855.
199. People for Environmental Enlightenment & Responsibility (PEER), Inc. v.
Minnesota Environmental Quality Council, 266 N.W.2d 858 (Minn. 1978).

200. Id.
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15.0418 of MAPA.25 ' A record was made, exhibits introduced, and a
report produced.
After the MEQC made its final decision to grant the permit,
PEER sought judicial review. In doing so, PEER sent requests for
admission and then interrogatories to MEQC members, asking
whether they had read the Environmental Impact Statement, the
other exhibits introduced at the hearing, and the hearing examiner's
transcript of the testimony at the hearing. MEQC members refused
to answer the interrogatories.
On review, the district court affirmed the grant of the construction permit by the MEQC and found it unnecessary to determine
whether the MEQC members had properly refused to answer the
interrogatories, because it held that the MEQC decision was supported by substantial evidence."' The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for
further consideration by the MEQC.2 03 In an opinion for the court en
banc, Chief Justice Sheran held, inter alia, that the district court
erred in failing to require MEQC members to respond to PEER's
interrogatories.' The Chief Justice began this portion of the opinion
by stating that PEER's allegation on appeal-that all the MEQC
members were not familiar with the record made at the public hearings on the route selection-had to be considered by the supreme
court because it had concluded that the agency's findings of fact were
not sufficiently specific to permit judicial review on the merits. 5
Because the controversy over the selection of a route for the
power line was viewed as a "contested case," ' MAPA required the
decision to be that of "the officials of the agency who are to render
the final decision." ' 7 It became "extremely important," therefore, for
PEER "to discover whether the officials themselves actually made
the decision as [MAPA] requires or whether they simply rubberstamped the findings of fact, conclusions, and recommendations submitted to the MEQC by the hearing examiner."0 8 Citing the United
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

MirN. STAT. § 15.0418 (1976).
266 N.W.2d at 863-64.
Id. at 864.
Id. at 872-73.
Id. at 872.
"Any suggestion that route-selection hearings might not be contested cases

within the meaning of [MAPA] was laid to rest by the legislature in its 1977 revisions
of the PPSA [Power Plant Siting Act] .

. .

. which appears to be merely a codifica-

tion of existing MEQC practices." Id. at 873 (citation omitted). Act of June 2, 1977,
ch. 439, § 11, 1977 Minn. Laws 1195 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 116C.58 (Supp.
1977)), provides, inter aia, that "[a]ll hearings held for designating a site or route
or for exempting a route shall be conducted by a hearing examiner from the Office of
Hearing Examiners pursuant to the contested case procedures" of MAPA. Id.
207. MINN. STAT. § 15.0421 (1976); see 266 N.W.2d at 873.
208. 266 N.W.2d at 873.
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States Supreme Court opinion in United States v. Morgan (Morgan
IV), 209 the Chief Justice acknowledged that "it is generally not proper
to permit discovery of the mental processes by which an administrative decision is made,""' but decided to follow the Minnesota court's
previous holding in Mampel v. Eastern Heights State Bank."' In
Mampel, the supreme court allowed persons seeking judicial review
of agency decisionmaking to "make inquiry through discovery to determine whether the agency adhered to statutorily defined procedures
or the rules and regulations promulgated by the agency
itself which
2 12
enter into the fundamental decision-making process.
The Chief Justice concluded that the statutorily defined procedures required the agency in PEER to "come to an independent
decision" and reflected a clear legislative intent that "agency members read the material presented to [the agency] prior to reaching
their decision. 2 13' The court reasoned that in order "[t]o ensure that
agency actions comport with this legislative intent, parties must be
permitted to elicit from agency members sufficient information to
establish that the problem had been addressed and that agency functions have been performed properly." ' 4 The Chief Justice emphasized:
[T]he discovery we sanction is limited to information concerning
the procedural steps that may be required by law and does not
extend to inquiries into the mental processes of an administrator
which, being part of the judgmental processes, are not discoverable
under United States v. Morgan .... It should be clear that this
rule would similarly protect from discovery the process of judicial
decisionmaking
which is judgmental rather than procedural in na25
ture. 0
It must be pointed out, with all due respect, that the distinction
made by the Chief Justice between the "procedural" and "judgmental" aspects of the decisionmaking process cannot be found in
Morgan IV.216 In that case, a ratemaking decision by the Secretary
of Agriculture had been called into question. It was uncontested that
only the Secretary of Agriculture had authority to make this decision
and that, in doing so, the Secretary had been acting in a quasijudicial capacity and had the duty to come to an independent decision. Justice Frankfurter, writing for a unanimous Court, dealt with
the same issues raised in PEER:
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

313 U.S. 409 (1941).
266 N.W.2d at 873.
254 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1977). Mampel also involved a contested case.
Id. at 378.
266 N.W.2d at 873.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
313 U.S. 409 (1941).
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Over the Government's objection the district court authorized the
market agencies to take the deposition of the Secretary. The Secretary thereupon appeared in person at the trial. He was questioned
at length regarding the process by which he reached the conclusions
of his order, including the manner and extent of his study of the
record and his consultation with subordinates. His testimony shows
that he dealt with the enormous record in a manner not unlike the
practice of judges in similar situations, and that he held various
conferences with the examiner who heard the evidence. Much was
made of his disregard of a memorandum from one of his officials
who, on reading the proposed order, urged considerations favorable
to the market agencies. But the short of the business is that the
Secretary should never have been subjected to this examination.
The proceeding before the Secretary "has a quality resembling that
of a judicial proceeding" . . . . Such an examination of a judge
would be destructive of judicial responsibility. We have explicitly
held in this very litigation that "it was not the function of the court
to probe the mental processes of the Secretary.". . . Just as a judge
cannot be subjected to such a scrutiny, . . . so the integrity of the
administrative process must be equally respected. . . . It will bear
repeating that although the administrative process has had a different development and pursues somewhat different ways from those
of courts, they are to be deemed collaborative instrumentalities of
justice and the appropriate
independence of each should be re217
spected by the other.

Nothing in Justice Frankfurter's opinion indicates that the Court
was proscribing only the attempt to discover the judgmental process
by which the Secretary reached his decision, but not the attempt to
discover "the manner and extent of his study of the record"-a
"procedural" process. The integrity of the administrative process is
as threatened by court-ordered discovery to elicit the latter information as it is to elicit the former information. So would the integrity
of the judicial process be threatened if trial and appellate judges were
subjected to discovery procedures designed to determine the "manner
and extent" of their personal study of the records and briefs in the
cases before them-a possibility held out in the PEER-case.
The PEER opinion proceeds on an erronous assumptionnamely, that the agency officials responsible for making the decision
in a case cannot "come to an independent decision" unless they
themselves read and study all the material in the record of the
hearings conducted by the hearing examiner. But the heads of the
agency may be fully and adequately informed as to the content of a
hearing record by the hearing examiner's report and by summaries
and analyses prepared by their staffs. Decisions made on the basis of
such information may nonetheless be characterized as independent.
217. Id. at 421-22 (emphasis added).
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The court in PEER also disregarded the change in the applicable
provisions of MAPA between the times of the Mampel and PEER
decisions. When Mampel was decided, section 15.0421 of MAPA
made acceptable situations in which a majority of the agency members had not heard or read the evidence, provided that an intermediate decision was rendered to which the parties had an opportunity to
except, and about which they had an opportunity to argue before a
majority of the agency heads." 7" The agency in Mampel had not
rendered an intermediate decision, because it claimed it had consid1 7 .2
ered "all of the evidence, files, records and proceedings therein."
Prior to 1975, too, MAPA did not require a hearing examiner's
report in every contested case. An intermediate decision procedure
was required only when a majority of the agency members had not
heard or read the evidence. The 1975 amendments modified section
15.0421 to read:
In all contested cases the decision of the officials of the agency who
are to render the final decision shall not be made until the report of
the hearing examiner as required by section 15.052, has been made
available to parties to the proceeding for at least ten days and an
opportunity has been afforded to each party adversely affected to
file exceptions and present argument
to a majority of the officials
21 .3
who are to render the decision.
PEER was decided under the amended section 15.0421. By requiring a hearing examiner's report in every contested case, and by
eliminating the pre-1975 language feferring to the situation in which
a majority of the agency members "have not heard or read the evidence," the legislature, it is reasonable to conclude, assumed that the
hearing examiner's report would acquaint the agency members with
the evidence in every contested case. Therefore, the report would be
an acceptable alternative to a requirement that the majority of the
agency members hear or read the evidence. Certainly, the 1975
amendments cannot be read as mandating in every contested case
that there be a hearing examiner's report and that, in addition, all
the agency members hear or read the evidence.
217.1. At the time of Mampel, section 15.0421 read as follows:
Whenever in a contested case a majority of the officials of the agency who

are to render the final decision have not heard or read the evidence, the
decision, if adverse to a party to the proceeding other than the agency itself,
shall not be made until a proposal for decision, including the statement of
reasons therefor, has been served on the parties, and an opportunity has been
afforded to each party adversely affected to file exceptions and present
argument to a majority of the officials who are to render the decision.
§ 15.0421 (1974) (amended 1975).
217.2. 254 N.W.2d at 378.
217.3. MINN. STAT. § 15.0421 (1976).

MINN. STAT.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet indicated whether it
will apply PEER to the making of rules under MAPA as well as to
the decision of "contested cases." In PEER, it will be recalled, the
court relied upon the fact that MAPA requires the decision in a
contested case to be that "of the officials of the agency who are to
render the final decision." ' When dealing with rules, MAPA requires
the "agency"-not the agency heads-to take final action on the
rule."' This linguistic distinction is, however, of little consequence
since MAPA also speaks of the decision "rendered by an agency [not
the "officials of the agency"] in a contested case." ' 0 This fact was
not mentioned in PEER. Clearly MAPA's use of "agency" rather
than "agency officials" should not be taken to indicate a different
legislative intent on the issue raised by PEER. The agency heads
should be expected to come to an independent conclusion about a
rule just as they are expected to come to an independent decision
about a contested case.
Furthermore, rulemaking and contested case adjudication cannot always be distinguished on the ground that contested cases never
produce records as extensive as those in rulemaking. The burden
imposed upon agency heads by PEER in the decision of contested
cases will often be as great as the burden that will be imposed by
applying PEER to rulemaking. In fact, the contested case in PEER
involved matters as complicated, and a record as voluminous, as in
most rulemaking proceedings.
As indicated above, the court in PEER held that the question of
the propriety of requiring MEQC members to respond to PEER's
interrogatories could not be avoided on the ground that the agency's
findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence, because the
court concluded that they were not sufficiently specific to permit
judicial review.Y MAPA does not require findings of fact to accompany the adoption of rules. The Attorney General, hovever, requires
an agency submitting rules to him for approval as to form and legality, to include with its submission findings of fact supporting the
reasons or need for the rules adopted and an order adopting the rules
reciting, inter alia, that they "are based on the record, applicable
statutes and an existing need."m It is doubtful, therefore, that rulemaking may be distinguished from contested case adjudication, for
the purpose of applying PEER, on the ground that MAPA does not
require findings of fact to accompany the adoption of rules as it does
the adjudication of contested cases.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

MINN. STAT. § 15.0421 (1976); see 266 N.W.2d at 873.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(4) (Supp. 1977).
MINN. STAT. § 15.0422 (1976).
226 N.W.2d at 873.
Minn. Reg. Atty. Gen. 302(h),(i)(1), 1 MCAR §§ 2.302(h),(i)(1).
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In any case, the presence of findings of fact adequate to permit
judicial review of the validity of a rule (or decision in a contested
case) and sufficient data to support the findings, does not dispose of
the issue in PEER, because none of the reasons advanced by the court
as to why agency heads should personally read the record are affected
by the presence of such findings and data.m
I do not wish to maintain that agency heads should never be
present at the public hearings on their proposed rules or that they
should never personally read the transcript of the hearings and the
written submissions in their original form. They should, to the extent
it is possible and practical for them to do so. But it is unrealistic to
assume that this can be done in every instance of agency rulemaking-or even in every contested case-any more than it can be done
by every judge in every judicial proceeding. 4
Neither the Revised Model Act nor IAPA imposes any obligation upon the agency to make any presentation of facts justifying the
rule in the course of public proceedings. They do provide, however,
that upon the request of any interested person, the agency must issue
a concise statement of the principal reasons for and against the rule
it adopted, incorporating therein the reasons for overruling considerations urged against the rule. MAPA contains no such provision. The
rules of the Attorney General, as indicated above, require the agency
to accompany its adoption of a rule with a statement of need, findings
of fact, and an order adopting the rule reciting, among other things,
that the rule adopted is "based on the record, applicable statutes and
an existing need."1 These rules do not quite accomplish the objectives of the provisions of the Revised Model Act and IAPA referred
to above, namely, to require the agency to state all "the principal
reasons for and against the rule" and all of the reasons why the
agency rejected the arguments against it.m
223. See 266 N.W.2d at 873.
224. I respectfully disagree with Professor Bonfield's view that, "in most cases,"
agency heads should preside at the oral presentations in rulemaking proceedings and
personally read all written submissions in their original form, and with his suggestion
that when there is extrinsic evidence that they have not done so, they should be
subjected to cross-examination under oath to test their understanding of the contents
of the submissions. Bonfield, supra note 8, at 856. By "extrinsic evidence," Bonfield
means "all evidence other than the legally compelled testimony of the agency heads
themselves, and includ[ing] all of their voluntary admissions, testimony of other
persons, and all circumstantial evidence." Id. It is sufficient, in my view, that agency
heads take responsibility for the rules they issue and are held to public account for
them.
225. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEDuRE Acr § 3(a) (1961); IOWA
CODE § 17A.4(1)(b) (1977).
226. Minn. Reg. Atty. Gen. 302(i)(1), 1 MCAR § 1.302(i)(1).
227. Bonfield, supra note 8, at 857.
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VARIANCE BETWEEN PROPOSED RULE AND FINAL RULE
MAPA requires the Chief Hearing Examiner to include, as part

of his rules governing the conduct of the public hearing, provisions
"relating to recessing and reconvening new hearings when the proposed final rule of an agency is substantially different from that
which was proposed at the public hearing."'2' These provisions are
also to include "a procedure whereby the proposed final rule of an
agency shall be reviewed by the chief hearing examiner to determine
whether or not a new hearing is required because of substantial
changes or failure of the agency to meet [MAPA's other requirements]."1 Even before these provisions were enacted by the 1975
amendments to MAPA, the rules of the Attorney General provided,
as they still do, that "[i]f a change is made which goes either to
another subject matter or results in a rule fundamentally different
from that contained in the notice of hearing, a further hearing must
be held, at least on the rules insofar as they relate to another subject
matter or are fundamentally different from the Notice of Hearing."' o
Two questions arise when these provisions are juxtaposed. First,
can a final rule be "substantially" but not "fundamentally" different
from the proposed rule? Second, if there is a conflict between the
Chief Hearing Examiner and the Attorney General in determining
whether the final rule is different from the proposed rule, how is that
conflict to be resolved?
In his Rule 111,2' the Chief Hearing Examiner has articulated
the procedures and criteria used to guide his determination of these
questions. The agency is to submit the rules in both their proposed
and final forms to the Chief Hearing Examiner prior to any review
by the Attorney General. Within ten calendar days, the Chief Hearing Examiner will complete his review, and submit his report to the
agency on the variance question and on whether the agency has complied with the other requirements of MAPA.n2 If he finds that the
final rules are "substantially different" from the proposed rules, or
that the agency failed to meet MAPA's other requirements, the
agency must either withdraw the final rules or reconvene the rule
hearing. Rule 111 goes on to provide:
In determining whether the proposed final rule is substantially different, the Chief Hearing Examiner shall consider the degree to

which it:
A. Affects classes of persons not represented at the previous
hearing; or
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

MINN. STAT. § 15.052(4) (Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
Id.
Minn. Reg. Atty. Gen. 304, 1 MCAR § 1.304 (emphasis added).
9 MCAR § 2.111.
MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(4) (Supp. 1977).
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B. Goes to a new subject matter of significant substantive effect; or
C. Makes a major substantive change that was not raised by the
original Notice of Hearing in such a way as to invite reaction at the
hearing; or
D. Results in a rule fundamentally different from that contained in the Notice of Hearing.23
On the basis of these rules, it would appear that the Chief Hearing Examiner believes that the 1975 amendments, which he is implementing, impose more severe strictures against a variancd between
the proposed rule and the final rule than those imposed by the Attorney General. Thus, the final rule may be "substantially different"
from the proposed rule under Rule 111(A), (B), or (C) without being
"fundamentally different" under alternative criterion (D). Otherwise, there would be no reason to specify them as alternative considerations.24
Furthermore, a final rule that is "substantially different" under
Rule 111(A) because it "affects classes of persons not represented at
the previous hearing" may not be "fundamentally different" from
the proposed rule. The Chief Hearing Examiner has applied this criterion broadly to find variances between proposed and final rules. For
example, in reviewing the Pollution Control Agency's (PCA) final
rules governing hazardous waste, the Chief Hearing Examiner found
substantial changes because certain rules were more stringent, and
others less stringent, than their counterparts in the originally proposed rules.m The Chief Hearing Examiner assumes that everyone
should be able to rely on the text of the proposed rules accompanying
the notice of the public hearing published in the State Register.
Any subsequent changes in that text, about which it is reasonable to
expect that affected classes of persons would wish to be heaid, are
"substantial" and must be preceded by a new notice and public
hearing. In reviewing the PCA's final hazardous wastes rules, the
Chief Hearing Examiner emphasized that the persons who could be
expected to object to the change from the less to the more stringent
rules "would have had no reason to attend the hearings for the
original rules as published did not contain them";e those who could
be expected to object to the change from the more to the less stringent
233. 9 MCAR § 2.111 (emphasis added).
234. Hearing Examiner's Rule 111(D) would seem to be an unnecessary appendage, since any final rule that is "fundamentally different" from the rule proposed in
the Notice of Hearing would certainly make a "major substantive change that was not
raised by the original Notice of Hearing in such a way as to invite reaction at the
hearing," under Rule 111(C). 9 MCAR § 2.111(C).
235. In re Hazardous Wastes, supra note 168, at 5-6 (findings 9 and 11).
236. Id. at 5.

19791

MINNESOTA RULEMAKING

rules "would have [had] no notice."' ?
The PCA objected to these conclusions, calling attention to the
notice of hearing it had published together with the text of the proposed rules. The caption of this notice stated that the hearing would
involve "the identification, labeling, classification, storage, collection, transportation and disposal of hazardous wastes."M The notice
"indicated that the proposed rules would establish criteria for determining whether a waste is hazardous, require producers of most
wastes to evaluate their wastes, and require handling and disposal of
all hazardous wastes in accordance with the proposed rules."'
In effect, the PCA argued, whether the final rules are substantially different from the proposed rules should be determined not only
by comparing the respective texts but also by determining whether
the original notice of hearing was adequate to inform industry, government, environmental groups, and the public of the general scope
of the proposed rulemaking proceeding. 40 The PCA maintained that
affected classes of persons did not have a "justifiable right to rely on
the immutable nature of the rules as originally proposed.

12

1

It was

sufficient that they "had notice that their interests would be affected
in this proceeding."2
The Chief Hearing Examiner regards his determination of
whether an agency's final rule is "substantially" or "fundamentally"
different from its proposdd rule as binding on the Attorney General
as well as the agency. It should be noted in this connection that the
applicable MAPA provision also requires the Chief Hearing Examiner "to determine whether or not a new hearing is required because
of

. .

. failure of the agency to meet the requirements of section

237. Id. at 6. The PCA replied that "obviously whether a change is less stringent
or more stringent than the original proposal is not what determines whether a change
is substantial." Memorandum of Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, In re Hazardous Wastes, supra note 168 (Minn. Office Hearing Examiner, Sept. 7, 1978) at 19
(PCA Memorandum in Support of Adoption of Rules) [hereinafter cited as PCA
Memorandum]. While the PCA agreed with the general criteria of substantiality set
forth in 9 MCAR § 2.111, it disagreed with the Chief Hearing Examiner's application
of these criteria to its hazardous waste rules.
238. The notice was published in the State Register on September 16, 1977. See
2 State Register 421 (1977).
239. PCA Memorandum, supranote 237, at 22-23. The Pollution Control Agency
indicated that it had not only published the September 16, 1977 notice, id. at 23, but
that on July 13, 1976, it had given notice in 2 State Register 23 (1976), that public
meetings would be held to discuss hazardous waste management rules. PCA Memorandum, supra note 237, at 22. Such meetings were held before the proposed rules were
drafted. Id.
240. Id. at 23.
241. Id. at 27.
242. Id. at 30.
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15.0412, subdivision 4,"43 that is, the basic rulemaking procedures
prescribed by MAPA. If the Chief Hearing Examiner has the authority conclusively to determine whether the final rule is substantially
different from the proposed rule, he also has the authority conclusively to determine whether the agency met all "the requirements of
section 15.0412, subdivision 4." Indeed, the rules of the Chief Hearing
Examiner assert this authority, at least to the extent of keeping a rule
from the Attorney General in the event the Chief Hearing Examiner
finds that the agency failed to meet MAPA's requirements." The
Chief Hearing Examiner sought to exercise this authority when he
ordered the PCA either to reconvene the rulemaking hearing or withdraw its hazardous wastes rules, because he also determined that the
agency failed to make an affirmative presentation of facts establishing the need for and reasonableness of some of the rules."'
To read MAPA as conferring authority upon the Chief Hearing
Examiner to bind the agency and the Attorney General by such determinations would have strange consequences. The hearing examiner
who conducted the public hearing must take notice in his report of
the degree to which the agency demonstrated the need for and reasonableness of its proposed rules with an affirmative presentation of
facts. Yet the conclusions of the hearing examiner in this respect are
only advisory and not binding on the agency. It would be inconsistent
with the statutory scheme as a whole if the Chief Hearing Examiner,
reviewing the agency's action following its consideration of the hearing examiner's report, could make binding determinations. As the
PCA maintained, this would give him "a veto authority which usurps
the agency's decisionmaking power," as well as the Attorney General's prerogatives."' Furthermore, if the Chief Hearing Examiner's
negative determinations are binding on the agency and the Attorney
General, so are his affirmative determinations that the agency satisfied the requirements of section 15.0412(4) and that the final rules are
not substantially different from the proposed rules. MAPA does not
distinguish between "negative" and "affirmative" determinations of
the Chief Hearing Examiner. Yet a reading of MAPA that would
produce the results argued for by the Chief Hearing Examiner, in his
memorandum " regarding the PCA's hazardous waste rules, would
243. MINN. STAT. § 15.052(5) (1976).
244. 9 MCAR §§ 2.110-.111.
245. In re Hazardous Wastes, supra note 168, at 7.
246. PCA Memorandum, supra note 237, at 4-5, 8. The PCA also objected on the
ground that the Chief Hearing Examiner's determinations were inconsistent with the
findings of the hearing examiner who conducted the hearing. Id. at 5, 9, 11, 24-28. In
any case, the PCA maintained, the Chief Hearing Examiner was claiming authority
to convert a hearing examiner's recommendation into a determination binding on the
agency and the Attorney General. Id. at 24-28.
247. In re Hazardous Wastes, supra note 168, at 8-10.
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supersede the Attorney General's responsibility and authority to review final agency rules as to form and legality-a consequence the
legislature could hardly have intended, since MAPA still requires
such review.
What significance should be attached to the fact that the Attorney General approved the Chief Hearing Examiner's rules? Certainly,
it would be rash to view this approval as reflecting an intent by the
Attorney General to yield his authority and shift his responsibility in
these matters to the Chief Hearing Examiner. It is questionable
248
whether MAPA would permit this.
What remains, then, is the potential for conflict. The Chief Hearing Examiner may determine that the final rule is not substantially
different from the proposed rule, but on reviewing the rule as to form
and legality, the Attorney General may decide otherwise and thus
compel a new hearing. If the Chief Hearing Examiner determines
that the final rule is substantially different from the proposed rule,
he may direct the agency to withdraw the rule or to reconvene a new
hearing. But the agency may disagree with the Chief Hearing Examiner and submit the final rule to the Attorney General for review, and
the Attorney General may approve it.
This is precisely what happened in the case of the PCA's hazardous waste rules. The PCA disagreed with the Chief Hearing Examiner's determinations and, over his objections, submitted the final
rules to the Attorney General for approval.2 41 The Attorney General
agreed with the PCA that the Chief Hearing Examiner's determinations are advisory only and, with certain exceptions, approved the
final rules as to form and legality.20 The reasons for not approving
certain of the rules were not those advanced by the Chief Hearing
Examiner.2' The Attorney General indicated that the PCA might
248. J. Michael Miles, the Special Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
operation within the Attorney General's Office to review agency rules, is reported as
admitting that "perhaps we made an error" in approving the Chief Hearing Examiner's rules in question, which he now views as "ultra vires." MiNN. Gov'T REP., Oct.
12, 1978, at 4.
249. PCA Memorandum, supra note 237, at 1.
250. Memorandum to the PCA from the Attorney General, Special Assistant
Attorney General Alan R. Mitchell and Special Assistant Attorney General Lee E.
Sheehy on the Final Hazardous Wastes Rules (Sept. 27, 1978) (unpublished document)
[hereinafter cited as Attorney General Memorandum].
251. The Attorney General refused to approve certain rules that appeared "to
contain incorporations by reference which must be [but had not been] approved by
the Chief Hearing Examiner" under section 15.0412(4) of the Minnesota Statutes. The
Attorney General refused to approve another rule because it used the word "may"
instead of the word "shall," and another because its language was vague. Attorney
General Memorandum, supra note 250, at 1. In the latter case, the Attorney General
suggested clarifying language. Id. The Attorney General refused to approve a particular rule because he had concluded that the agency had failed to make any affirmative
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resubmit these latter rules for his approval after considering the matters raised in his memorandum and taking appropriate action. The
PCA took appropriate action and resubmitted the rules with the required modifications, and the Attorney General approved them. They
were filed with the Secretary of State and published in the State
Register.2 1 The possibility exists, of course, that the courts may be
asked to decide whether the adopted rules are valid in view of the
Chief Hearing Examiner's determinations and'thus settle the question of the respective powers of the Chief Hearing Examiner and the
Attorney General. In the meantime, the validity of the hazardous
wastes rules, now more than two years in the making, may still be in
doubt.
This unresolved conflict between the Chief Hearing Examiner
and the Attorney General is obviously a detriment to efficient rulemaking. But even if the legislature or the Minnesota Supreme Court
should decide who has final authority to determine variances, the
question of variance is bound to provoke disagreement and encourage
litigation, which may result in delaying the effectiveness of the rules.
MAPA's provision requiring new hearings if the final rule is substantially different from the proposed rule is itself most unwise. No such
requirement is to be found in FAPA, the Revised Model Act, or IAPA.
Arguments that new proceedings should be instituted when the final
rule is substantially different from the proposed rule have been made
under FAPA and rejected by the Circuit Courts of Appeal. In South
Terminal Corporation v. Environmental Protection Agency,2 3 the
First Circuit emphasized that a rulemaking proceeding under FAPA
"is intended to educate an agency to approaches different from its
own; in shaping the final rule it may and should draw on the comments tendered. . . .Parties have no right to insist that a rule remain frozen in its vestigal form."' 4 In InternationalHarvesterCompany v. Ruckelshaus,21 Judge Leventhal of the District of Columbia
Circuit reiterated that the "requirement of submission of a proposed
rule for comment does not automatically generate a new opportunity
for comment merely because the rule promulgated by the agency
differs from the rule it proposed, partly at least in response to submispresentation of facts "on the record" establishing the need for, and reasonableness of,
the rule. Id. The Chief Hearing Examiner objected to that rule on the ground that it
was a substantial change from the proposed rule. In re Hazardous Waste, supra note
168, at 4. The objections of the Chief Hearing Examiner and the Attorney General were
to rules that were acceptable to representatives of both industry and environmental
groups. Letter from Sandra S. Gardebring, Executive Director, Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency, to Carl A. Auerbach (Dec. 20, 1978).
252. 3 State Register 0000 (1979).
253. 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974).
254. Id. at 659.
255. 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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sions. '" 1 Judge Leventhal added that "[a] contrary rule would lead
to the absurdity that in rule-making under the APA the agency can
learn from the comments on its proposals only at the peril of starting
a new procedural round of commentary.""' In that event, as an earlier panel of the District of Columbia Circuit aptly stated, "the proceedings might never be terminated."""
Indeed, there are instances under MAPA in which hearing examiners have recommended that warranted changes in a proposed rule
not be made for fear they would be regarded as substantial and trigger a new hearing."' Such an outcome of a public hearing completely
subverts its purpose.
Of course, the notice of proposed rulemaking should adequately
inform the public of the subjects and issues involved in the rulemaking hearing, so that there can be meaningful public participation. But
this requirement can be satisfied even in a case in which the agency
makes substantial changes in the proposed rules as a result of what
it learns at the public hearing. In other words, it cannot be assumed
under MAPA that the notice was inadequate in every case in which
one or more of the factors are present by which the Chief Hearing
Examiner is guided in determining whether the final rule is
"substantially different" from the proposed rule.
A special difficulty arises under MAPA because of the fact that
the hearing record must justify the final rule. If substantial changes
are made in the proposed rule, it is possible that they may not be
supported by the hearing record. Therefore, if judicial review is
sought of a final rule that is different from the proposed rule, the
parties seeking review should be afforded an opportunity to introduce
data challenging the final rule that they could not reasonably have
been expected to introduce against the proposed rule. The adoption
of the protest procedure recommended in this Article would make it
possible for such data to be introduced before the agency prior to
judicial review.
J.

REVIEW BY THE ATrORNEY GENERAL AS TO FORM AND LEGALITY

A final agency rule must be "submitted with the complete hearing record to the attorney general, who shall review the rule as to form
256. Id. at 632.
257. Id. at 632 n.51.
258. Logansport Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 210 F.2d 24, 28 (D.C. Cir.
1954). See also Owensboro on the Air v. United States, 262 F.2d 702, 708 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
259. See, e.g., In re Minnesota State Board of Health's Regulation of Health
Maintenance Organizations, No. HLTH-76-0130-SM (Minn. Office Hearing Examiners, Sept. 22, 1976) (Report of Hearing Examiner).
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and legality. '260 The agency must give "notice to all persons who
requested to be informed that the hearing record has been submitted
to the attorney general." ' ' MAPA does not require that such persons,
or other interested persons, be afforded an opportunity to make any
presentation to the Attorney General. But the rules of the Attorney
General provide:
If a person or association advises the Attorney General that he
wishes to question the legality of the rules, he shall be permitted to
do so by submitting a further brief or making an oral argument,
whichever the Attorney General deems appropriate in the particular
case. This must be done
within 10 days after receipt of the rules by
22
the Attorney General.
Although persons or associations will occasionally submit written
briefs to the Attorney General pursuant to this rule, the Attorney
General has never deemed oral argument appropriate in any case, but
has permitted individuals to discuss rules being reviewed with his
2
staff.
Within twenty days after the hearing record has been submitted
to him, the Attorney General must either approve or disapprove the
rule. 2 4 If he approves, he must file the rule promptly in the Office of
the Secretary of State. If he disapproves, he must "state in writing
his reasons therefor, and the rule shall not be filed in the office of the
secretary, nor published."26 5Although MAPA is silent on the question,2 6' the rules of the Attorney General provide that if he fails to
approve or disapprove a rule within the twenty-day period, "the
agency may file the 7rule in the Office of the Secretary of State and
26
publish the same.
260. MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(4) (Supp. 1977).
261. Id.
262. Minn. Reg. Atty. Gen. 305(c), 1 MCAR § 1.305(c).
263. Interviews with Lee E. Sheehy, Special Assistant Attorney General, in Minneapolis, Minnesota (Oct., 1978).
264. MwN. STAT. § 15.0412(4) (Supp. 1977).
265. Id. MAPA does not state who must arrange for the publication of an approved rule in the State Register. It may be inferred, however, from section 15.047(1)
of the Minnesota Statutes, which directs the Commissioner of Administration to
"require each agency which has adopted and published rules in the state register to
pay its proportionate cost of publishing those rules" in the Manual of State Agency
Rules, that it is the agency itself that must do so. MwN. STAT. 15.047(1) (1976). This
accords with current practice.
The Manual of State Agency Rules is now published as the Minnesota Code of
Agency Rules (MCAR). See note 72 supra.
266. In contrast, MAPA expressly provides that temporary rules, which must be
approved by the Attorney General within five working days after they are submitted
to him, will be deemed approved if the Attorney General fails to act within those five
days. MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(5) (Supp. 1977).
267. Minn. Reg. Atty. Gen. 305(a)(4) provides that if the Attorney General
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MAPA does not set forth the criteria to guide the Attorney General's review as to "form and legality." The Attorney General, however, has specified that he will be guided by the following considerations:
(1) Regarding form, the rule may be disapproved if the rules, record
and supporting documents do not demonstrate compliance with
these regulations and regulations of the Minnesota State Publications Board.
(2) Regarding legality, the rule shall be disapproved if it:
(aa) Exceeds the statutory authority conferred or the
required conditions have not been met.
(bb) Conflicts with the governing statute or other relevant law.
(cc) Has no reasonable relationship to statutory purposes.
(dd) Is unconstitutional, arbitrary or unreasonable .2

From January 1, 1976, the effective date of MAPA's 1975 amendments requiring the use of hearing examiners in rulemaking proceedings, until August 28, 1978, the agencies submitted to the Attorney
.General for review as to form and legality 176 sets of rules adopted
pursuant to MAPA section 15.0412(4).211 Of these, 108 (61%) were
approved on initial submission; 68 (39%) were disapproved on initial
submission and returned to the submitting agency. Of the 68, 56
(82%) were approved on subsequent submissions; 12 (18%) were either not resubmitted or not approved on resubmission. Thus, of the
176 submitted, 164 (93%) were ultimately approved; 12 (7%) were
either not resubmitted or not approved on resubmission.
During the same period of time, 65 sets of rules were submitted
"returns a rule to an agency for revision, the 20-day period is terminated and he shall
have another 10 days when the rules are resubmitted." Minn. Reg. Atty. Gen.
305(a)(4), 1 MCAR § 1.305(a)(4).
268. Minn. Reg. Atty. Gen. 305(b), 1 MCAR § 1.305(b). The 1975 amendments
to MAPA, Act of June 15, 1975, ch. 380, § 8, 1975 Minn. Laws 1285, abolished the
Minnesota Publications Board. In its place, the amendment created a Publications
Advisory Board, consisting of the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Director of the Legislative Reference Library, the Revisor of Statutes, and the Chief Hearing
Examiner. This Board was to advise the Commissioner of Administration on matters
relating to the publication of the State Register and the Manual of State Agency Rules.
The statute authorizing the creation of the original Minnesota Publications Board
had, however, already been repealed by a prior 1975 act, Act of April 30, 1975, ch. 61,
§ 26, 1975 Minn. Laws 295. The confusion was finally eliminated by the repeal of sec.
tion 15.046-the law creating both the former and the purportedly new Board-by the
1976 legislature. Act of April 3, 1976, ch. 149, § 63, 1976 Minn. Laws 444. Hence, the
Publications Board is dead, and the Publications Advisory Board never came to life.
269. These data are based on a study of the Attorney General's files for this
period. The author is indebted to Lee E. Sheehy, Special Assistant to the Attorney
General, and Michael T. Nilan, University of Minnesota Law School, class of 1979,
for their valuable assistance in this study.
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for the Attorney General's review in the making of which hearing
examiners did not participate because the rulemaking proceedings
were instituted prior to January 1, 1976. Of these, 43 (66%) were
approved on initial submission; 22 (34%) were disapproved on initial
submission and returned to the submitting agency. Of the 22 that
were disapproved, 19 (86%) were approved on subsequent submissions; 3 (14%) were either not resubmitted or not approved on resubmission. Thus, of the 65 submitted, 62 (95%) were ultimately approved; 3 (5%) were either not resubmitted or not approved on resubmission.
During the same period of time, the agencies submitted for the
Attorney General's review 24 sets of temporary rules adopted pursuant to MAPA section 15.0412(5), which does not require the participation of hearing examiners. Of these, 9 (38%) were approved on
initial submission; 15 (62%) were disapproved on initial submission
and returned to the submitting agency. Fourteen (93%) of these 15
were approved on subsequent submissions; 1 (7%) was not resubmitted. Thus, of the 24, 23 (96%) were ultimately approved; 1 (4%) was
not resubmitted.
It is not clear what, if any, conclusions should be drawn from
these figures. They show that during the period in question, the Attorney General approved a slightly greater percentage of permanent
rules in the making of which hearing examiners did not participate,
than of rules in the making of which hearing examiners did participate. This is true of approval both on initial submission (66% and
61%, respectively) and ultimately (95% and 93%, respectively).Y
More insight may be gained into the role the Attorney. General
plays in MAPA by looking at the reasons for disapproval that have
appeared in Attorney General memoranda sent to agencies. An examination of the Attorney General's memoranda disapproving rules initially submitted to him during the period January 1, 1976 to August
28, 1978 reveals the following categories of reasons for disapproval:2I
270. These figures would be more meaningful if one compared the reasons for
disapproval in each of the sets of rules mentioned in the text. We were unable to do
so. It was also not ascertained to what extent the Attorney General initially approved
or disapproved provisions of rules submitted to him by agencies in accordance with or
against the recommendations of hearing examiners. However, it is somewhat surprising that the Attorney General has approved only a relatively small percentage (38%)
of the temporary rules initially submitted to him, in the making of which the hearing
examiners did not participate. Yet, temporary rules have the highest percentage (96%)
of ultimate approval.
271. These disapproving memoranda are not very revealing. They are short and
terse, stating but not explaining the reasons for disapproval. The reason for this is that
these memoranda are written only after substantial discussion between members of the
Attorney General's staff charged with the review function and members of his staff
assigned to the promulgating agencies. Since the agency has been fully informed of the
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1. Technical defects in the submission. For example, rules were
disapproved because the agency failed to submit one or more of the
documents called for by the rules of the Attorney General.
2. Defective drafting. This category is the most numerous of all.
The defects pointed out by the Attorney General include misspellings; grammatical errors; typographical errors; poor word usage; unnecessary verbiage; ambiguity; vagueness; duplication in the rule of
language contained in the Minnesota Statutes without the necessary
determination by the hearing examiner that duplication "is crucial
to the ability of a person affected by a rule to comprehend its meaning
and effect"; 12 and the incorporation by reference in the notice of
the proposed rule of other materials without the required approval of
the Chief Hearing Examiner. The Attorney General has frequent occasion to object to the use of "should" when the discretionary "may"
or mandatory "shall" is intended; to the use of "shall" when the
statute intends the agency to exercise discretion; to "may" when the
statute imposes a mandate to act upon the agency; and to the failure
to accompany the proper use of "may" with standards to guide the
exercise of the agency's discretion.
3. Defective notice. The Attorney General has disapproved a
final rule because the agency did not give notice thirty days prior to
the date set for the hearing of its intention to3 hold a public hearing
on the proposed rule, as required by MAPA.
4. Substantive reasons. Although his substantive review approximates and sometimes is broader than that of a reviewing court, the
Attorney General does not seek to substitute his judgment for that
of the agency with respect to the wisdom of the rule itself. He may
communicate his views on the advisability of a rule to the agency
informally.
The Attorney General has disapproved rules for the following
substantive reasons: (a) the agency did not document its statutory
authority to issue them; (b) the rule failed to comply, or conflicted,
with applicable statutory provisions; (c) the rules submitted were
internally inconsistent; (d) the findings of fact (including those related to need) did not support the rule; (e) the public hearing record
did not support the findings of fact; (f) the findings of fact did not
refer specifically to the data in the hearing record; (g) at the public
Attorney General's reasons during the course of these discussions, the memoranda
themselves do not purport to be fully informative. Lee E. Sheehy, Special Assistant
to the Attorney General, informs the author that the Attorney General has recently
begun to elaborate his reasons for disapproval so that any interested reader will be able
to understand them fully. Letter from Lee E. Sheehy, Special Assistant to the Attorney
General, to Carl A. Auerbach (Aug. 14, 1978) (on file at the Minnesota Law Review).
272. MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(1) (Supp. 1977).
273. Id. § 15.0412(4).
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hearing, the agency failed to make an affirmative presentation of
facts establishing the need for and reasonableness of the rule; (h) the
agency failed to explain why it rejected the recommendations of the
hearing examiner; (i) the rule was overly broad; or (j)any other
reason the Attorney General deems sufficient.
The Revised Model Act does not contain a provision for review
of agency rules by the State Attorney General. IAPA gives the Attorney General such a responsibility but no authority to prevent a rule
from becoming effective. It provides that if "the attorney general
finds objection to all or some portion of a proposed rule because that
rule is deemed to be unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or otherwise
beyond the authority delegated to the agency," the Attorney General
may, in writing, notify the agency of the objection prior to the effective date of such a rule. The Attorney General "shall also file a
certified copy of such an objection in the office of the secretary of
state. . . and a notice to the effect that an objection has been filed
shall be published in the next supplement to the 'Iowa Administrative Code.' "25 In that event, the "burden of proof shall . . . be on
the agency in any proceeding for judicial review or for enforcement
of the rule heard subsequent to the filing to establish that the rule or
portion of the rule timely objected to according to the above procedure is not unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or otherwise beyond
the authority delegated to it."' ' If the agency fails to meet this burden of proof, "the court shall declare the rule or portion of the rule
objected to invalid and judgment shall be rendered against the
agency for court costs," including "a reasonable attorney fee . . .
appropriations of
payable by the state comptroller from the support
''
the agency which issued the rule in question. 7
Professor Bonfield justifies such review by the Attorney General
on the ground that persons dealing with agencies should not have to
undergo the great expense of seeking judicial review in order to protect themselves against "improper exercises of agency rulemaking
authority." ' In addition, Bonfield points out, "the agencies themselves may benefit from such external review because it gives them
an additional means by which they may discover and cure deficiencies in a rule before it becomes effective or before it is invalidated by
the courts."' 9
These are weighty arguments for review by the Attorney General,
274. IOWA CODE § 17A.4(a) (1977).
275. Id. The Iowa Administrative Code is the equivalent of the Minnesota State
Register and Minnesota Code of Agency Rules (MCAR). See also note 72 supra.
276. IOWA CODE § 17A.4(a) (1977).
277. Id. § 17A.4(b).
278. Bonfield, supra note 8, at 896.
279. Id. at 896-97.
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but there are countervailing considerations.Y° Agencies were created
to become experts in their respective fields. The Attorney General is
not an expert in any other agency's area. Agencies have more time
to analyze the problems rules are meant to solve. Consideration by
the Attorney General is also "usually in private and ex parte; it is
therefore likely to be very one sided," as well as "brief and superficial." 211Professor Bonfield adds:
Perfunctory approval is likely, for example, when an assistant attorney general reviews a rule drawn up by a co-worker. And there
remains a serious danger of rejection by an Attorney General on
policy rather than legal grounds, no matter how clear the law is on
the more limited role of the Attorney General in reviewing agency
rules. . . . It should also be noted that although the legal opinion
of the Attorney General may not necessarily be better than that of
the legal advisor to the agency, a formal affirmative opinion of the
Attorney General as to a rule's propriety may, nevertheless, make
it harder for the ordinary citizen to overturn the rule in a judicial
proceeding. ' 2
IAPA seeks, therefore, to obtain the benefits of review by the Attorney General, but minimizes its dangers by not empowering the Attorney General to prohibit an agency rule from becoming effective.
Some of the objections to Attorney General review mentioned by
Professor Bonfield may also be raised to such review under MAPA.
It is fair to say that the Minnesota Attorney General seeks to avoid
disapproving a rule for policy rather than legal reasons, but this is
more difficult to avoid under MAPA than under IAPA. Professor
Bonfield reads IAPA criteria guiding Attorney General review as authorizing objection only on two grounds: (1) the rule "so lacks a
rational basis as to be a violation of the due process clause of the state
or federal constitution"; and (2) "a rational agency could [not] believe that an otherwise fair rule was within the scope of the express
or implied statutory power granted the agency."m These are narrow
grounds indeed.
By contrast, under MAPA, the Attorney General reviews the rule
not only on these grounds but also to determine whether the agency's
findings of fact demonstrate need for the rule and whether the hearing record supports the findings of fact. These determinations edge
the Attorney General closer to making policy determinations.
280. See id. at 897-98.

281. Id. at 898. The Minnesota Attorney General occasionally permits written
briefs or statements to be submitted to him before he decides to approve or disapprove
an agency rule. See text accompanying note 262 supra.
282. Bonfield, supra note 8, at 898.
283. Id. at 909.
284. See MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(4) (Supp. 1977).
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Provision for external review of agency rules-other than in a
judicial proceeding-reflects legislative distrust of the administrative
agencies. It cannot be said that this distrust is entirely unwarranted.
But it is doubtful whether external review by a state Attorney General will dissipate this mistrust. Such review dilutes agency authority
and responsibility and contributes to making agency employment
less attractive to the most qualified persons.
If there is to be review of agency rules by the Attorney General,
the MAPA system of review is preferable to that of IAPA. Professor
Bonfield recognizes that "[p]ractically speaking, the filing of a proper timely objection to a rule [by the Attorney General] places the
issuing agency in a bind."' If it does not modify the rule to satisfy
the Attorney General's objections, it invites judicial review in which
it will have to bear the burden of demonstrating the rule's validity
and run the risk of a judgment against it for court costs and a reasonable attorney fee. Until such review, uncertainty will hang over the
rule and compliance with its requirements is not very likely. The
judicial review proceeding itself will be complicated by the fact that
the court will be reviewing not only the validity of the rule but also
the validity of the Attorney General's objections to it in order to
determine whether the agency must carry the burden of proving the
rule valid or the parties seeking review must carry the burden of
proving it invalid. 21 In such a proceeding, the Attorney General
would not be able to represent the agency that is challenging his
objections to its rule; the agency would have to employ and pay for
counsel independent of the Attorney General's office.27
Under these circumstances, agencies will probably hesitate to
proceed with a rule to which the Attorney General objected. If so, it
is better to empower the Attorney General to prevent an agency rule
from becoming effective. In that way he must take full responsibility
for the consequences of his action and would exercise his review function in a more deliberative fashion.
The Minnesota system of Attorney General review cannot be
evaluated without taking into consideration the fact that members of
the Attorney General's staff also act as legal advisers to the agencies.
Almost always, the review process takes the form of an oral and
written dialogue between these staff members and the staff members
entrusted with the review function. 5 A 1976 survey, based on a ques285. Bonfield, supra note 8,at 914.
286. Id. at 916.
287. Id. at 924.
288. Of all the Attorney General's memoranda disapproving agency rules which
were examined, see note 269 supra, only one was not addressed to a member of his staff
assigned to a particular agency. The one exception was a memorandum addressed to
a practitioner employed as attorney for a state board.
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tionnaire submitted to 87 state agencies, revealed that in only 5 (12%)
of the 42 agencies that responded was initial drafting of rules exclusively the responsibility of the Attorney General's staff person assigned to the agency.2' In 13 (31%), the Attorney General's staff
person collaborated with other agency staff in the initial drafting. In
24 (58%), the initial drafting was done by agency members and
agency staff (including attorneys) other than the Attorney General's
staff person assigned to the agency. In 20 (48%), the latter reviewed
the rules after initial drafting by others.
Most of the objections to the agency rules made in the Attorney
General's disapproving memoranda could and should have been obviated by careful drafting. Since the Attorney General is the final
arbiter of the form and legality of the rules, it would make sense for
the agencies to give his staff persons assigned to them a central role
in the drafting of the rules. Certainly, too, the Attorney General's
staff persons assigned to the agencies should be in a position to advise
effectively against the submission to the Attorney General for review
of rules that are either unconstitutional or ultra vires. In turn, the
Attorney General should supervise the work of these staff persons
more closely so that the rules initially submitted to him will be approved. In time, such working relationships may make formal Attorney General review unnecessary. Until they are established, however,
the statutory requirement of Attorney General approval of agency
rules may accomplish not only the desirable objectives mentioned
above, but also impel the agencies to solicit and take seriously the
legal assistance and advice of the Attorney General staff assigned to
them.
K.

TmE

CONSUMED BY RULEMAKING PROCEDURES-EFFECTIVE DATE OF

RULES

IAPA requires that within 180 days following publication of the
notice of proposed rulemaking or the last date of the oral presentations on the proposed rule, whichever is later, the agency must adopt
a rule or terminate the proceeding." If it decides subsequently to
289.

The questionnaire was entitled "Implementation of 1975 Amendments to

the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act (APA)." It was distributed to the agencies on October 21, 1976, by James Nobles, Legislative Analyst for the House of Representatives, and Thomas J. Triplett, Senate Counsel, acting on behalf of Representative
Harry Sieben, Chairman of the House Governmental Operations Committee, and Senator Winston Borden, a member of the Senate Governmental Operations Committee.
These committees handled the bill which became MAPA's 1975 amendments, Act of
June 4, 1975, ch. 380, 1975 Minn. Laws 1285. The results were summarized in a report
dated January 10, 1977, prepared and distributed by Messrs. Nobles and Triplett. T.
Triplett & J. Nobles, Report re Administrative Procedure Act Questionnaire (Jan. 10,
1977) (unpublished memorandum).
290. IOWA CODE § 17A.4(1)(b) (1977).
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proceed with the rule, the agency must start all over again. Neither
the Revised Model Act, FAPA, nor MAPA contains such a provision.
Professor Bonfield explains that it is intended to preclude the situation in which
an agency operating under those laws [the Revised Model Act and
FAPA] issued a notice of rulemaking that was met by a public furor.
The agency then waited a year or two until the furor died down and
people forgot about its controversial proposal. Then, to everyone's
surprise, the agency suddenly issued a rule based on the long forgotten notice.2'
It seems unlikely that such a situation would occur frequently
under MAPA because of the existence of Attorney General review.
There are, however, a number of instances in which the Minnesota
Attorney General has disapproved an agency rule which, to date, has
not been resubmitted to him for approval.2 92 The public has no way
of knowing whether the agency has decided to withdraw the rule or
whether it will resubmit the rule to the Attorney General at a future
date. No "statute of limitations" bars the latter possibility.
The IAPA provision gives agencies an incentive not to prolong
the rulemaking process for any reason. But the excessive time consumed by the rulemaking process under MAPA, in most cases, cannot be attributed primarily to agency delaying tactics, but to the
statutory rulemaking structure itself. It has been estimated that it
takes a minimum of 234 days to promulgate a set of simple rules that
require no more than a day of public hearing and are approved by the
Attorney General on initial submission.2 3 This estimate assumes, too,
291. Bonfield, supra note 8, at 857-58.
292. See text accompanying notes 269-70 supra.
293. T. TipLzrr, RULE-MAKING BY MINNESOTA STATE AGENCIES: PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 6, 11 n.43 (1976). This estimate was made prior to the 1977 amendments
to MAPA which, among other things, sought to reduce the time consumed by the
rulemaking process by (1) requiring the hearing record to remain open for five, instead
of twenty days, but authorizing the hearing examiner to keep the record open for up
to twenty days; (2) making a rule effective five working days, instead of twenty calendar days, after its publication in the State Register; and (3) requiring the hearing
examiner to complete his report within thirty days, instead of "as promptly as possible," after the close of the hearing record, unless the Chief Hearing Examiner, upon
written request of the agency and the hearing examiner, orders an extension. Act of
June 2, 1977, ch. 443, 1977 Minn. Laws 1217 (amending MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(4)
(Supp. 1977)).

The Legislative Commission to Review Administrative Rules has estimated that
during the period of August 1, 1977 to August 1, 1978, "the average time between the
date that an agency forwards the proposed rules and notice to the hearing examiner
and the State Register and the date that the adopted rules take effect is approximately
198 days, or six and one-half months.'"M. Whitlock, Report of Legislative Commission
to Review Administrative Rules on Rule Promulgation Time under the 1977 Administrative Procedures (A.P.A.) Act Amendments (Aug. 14, 1978) (unpublished report).
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that the Chief Hearing Examiner has determined that the final
agency rule is not "substantially different" from the proposed rule.
Until MAPA's rulemaking procedures are modified, incorporation of
an IAPA-type "statute of limitations" may impose an impossible
deadline upon agencies. By requiring agencies that did not meet the
deadline to start all over again, such a limitation could actually serve
to increase the time it takes to promulgate a rule.
The discrepancy in MAPA as to when an adopted rule becomes
effective-five or twenty days after publication in the State Register-has already been pointed out. "4 When the legislature acts to
eliminate this discrepancy, it should also make some provision to
allow rules to become effective sooner than the generally specified
time."' Both the Revised Model Act and IAPA contain such exemptions from the delayed effectiveness requirement. The Revised Model
Act, which makes the adopted rule effective twenty days after filing
with the Secretary of State, provides:
[S]ubject to applicable constitutional or statutory provisions, an
emergency rule becomes effective immediately upon filing with the
[Secretary of State], or at a stated date less than 20 days thereafter, if the agency finds that this effective date is necessary because
of imminent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare. The
agency's finding and a brief statement of the reasons therefor shall
be filed with the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures
to make emergency rules known to the persons who may be affected
by them."'
IAPA has a similar provision but, unlike the Revised Model Act,
also exempts from the delayed effectiveness requirement any rule
which "confers a benefit or removes a restriction on the public or
some segment thereof." '
In making this estimate, however, the Commission staff did not include cases in which

the rules were proposed but not adopted during that one-year period. Of the 55 sets of
proposed rules selected for the Commission's study, 18 were not adopted within this
period. Nor did the Commission staff include the time taken to obtain information or
opinions in preparing to propose a rule, pursuant to section 15.0412(6) of the Minnesota

Statutes.
The Commission's estimate, therefore, is not comparable with Mr. Triplett's. It
should also be noted that the Chief Hearing Examiner's office maintains that it takes

no more than 180 days to promulgate a set of simple rules. Harves Letter, supra note
142.
294. See note 3 supraand accompanying text.
295.

Temporary rules become effective upon approval of the Attorney General

or his failure to approve or disapprove within five working days after the rules are
submitted to him. MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(5) (Supp. 1977). Exigencies may require that
temporary rules become effective even sooner and this should also be permitted by

MAPA.
296. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINSTATIVE PROCEDURE Acr § 4(b)(2) (1961).
297. IOWA CODE § 17A.5(2)(b)(2) (1977). AnotherIAPA provision not found in the
Revised Model Act requires that in "any subsequent action contesting the effective
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As Professor Bonfield explains, the objectives of the general delayed effectiveness requirement are to give the parties subject to the
rule, and the general public, fair notice of its existence and "a reasonable opportunity to make final objections to it or to prepare their
affairs for its impact.' '2 " In "the case of a rule conferring a benefit or
removing a restriction, however, the parties who are the direct beneficiaries are not likely to object to the rule and, indeed, will want the
rule to be effective as soon as possible." ' " Since those who are not the
direct beneficiaries of the rule, the general public, "will normally
already have had a chance to make whatever input they desired in
opposition to the rule during" the rulemaking process, "a required
deferred effectiveness period will normally not be of any special benefit to them." 3"
One may question why representatives of affected interests,
other than the direct beneficiaries of such a rule, should not have a
"reasonable opportunity to make final objections to it." But on the
whole, the exemption in question makes sense.
L.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULES

The validity of any rule may be determined by an appropriate
district court upon a petition for a declaratory judgment if "it appears that the rule, or its threatened application, interferes with or
impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair the legal rights or
privileges of the petitioner.""5 ' Any party to the review proceedings,
including the agency, may appeal an adverse decision of the district
court to the Minnesota Supreme Court.3 2 The reviewing court is directed to declare the rule invalid "if it finds that it violates constitutional provisions or exceeds the statutory authority of the agency or
was adopted without compliance with statutory rule-making procedures."3" 3 The latter standard directs the court's inquiry to whether
the applicable requirements of all the other provisions of MAPA have
been satisfied, including the requirement that the agency shall have
made an affirmative presentation of facts establishing the need for
and reasonableness of the proposed rule.
Except for some differences that will be pointed out, MAPA's
date of a rule [exempt from general delayed effectiveness requirement], the burden
of proof shall be on the agency to justify its finding." Id. § 17A.5(2)(b)(3).
For examples of the type of rules that may become effective immediately under
the IAPA "imminent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare" standard, see
Bonfield, supra note 8, at 888.
298. Bonfield, supra note 8, at 885.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. MINN. STAT. § 15.0416 (1976).
302. Id. § 15.0417 (Supp. 1977).
303. Id.
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judicial review provisions parallel those of the Revised Model Act.
The Revised Model Act authorizes direct review by declaratory judgment of the "applicability" as well as "validity" of the rule. It is
difficult to know whether the omission of "applicability" in MAPA
is intended to imply that questions of the applicability or coverage
of a rule may be determined only in the course of a proceeding
brought by the agency to enforce the rule. It seems reasonable to say
that a party threatened with the application of a rule which it claims
does not cover it, should be able to bring a declaratory judgment or
injunction suit to decide the issue. But there are significant latent
problems in the Revised Model Act's provision which involve the
allocation of decisional responsibilities between courts and agencies. 5 The Minnesota Supreme Court should proceed with caution
if asked to allow such declaratory judgment or injunction suits. In any
case, the protest procedure recommended in this Article could be
used to raise issues of rule applicability in a manner that would avoid
the difficulties of the Revised Model Act provision.
The Revised Model Act states that a rule, to be valid, must be
adopted in "substantial" compliance with its procedural requirements. MAPA does not make this qualification. Nevertheless, it
would undoubtedly be read into MAPA by a reviewing court applying
the harmless error doctrine. Professor Bonfield explains that this provision, which appears in IAPA as well, requires the reviewing court
to examine the extent to which the agency deviated from the statutory requirements, whether the deviation was inadvertent or a part
of a purposeful scheme to avoid compliance, and the extent to which
that noncompliance disabled those who might have wanted to from
participating in the rulemaking or structuring their affairs to take
account of its existence.m
A reviewing court should consider similar factors in determining compliance with statutory rulemaking procedures under MAPA.
The Revised Model Act and IAPA also require that a proceeding
to contest any rule on the ground of substantial noncompliance with
procedural requirements must be commenced within two years from
the effective date of the rule.m MAPA contains no such requirement.
The draftsmen of the Revised Model Act justified this provision on
304.

REvisED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

contains a similar provision. IOWA CODE

Acr §

7 (1961). IAPA

§ 17A.19 (1977).

305. See Gifford, DeclaratoryJudgments under the Model State Administrative ProcedureActs, 13 HOUsTON L. Rsv. 825 (1976).
306. REVIsED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACr § 3(c) (1961). See also
IOWA CODE § 17A.4(3) (1977).
307. Bonfield, supra note 8, at 874.
308. REVIsED MODEL STATE ADMiNIsTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr
CODE § 17A.4(3) (1977).

§ 3(c) (1961);

IOWA
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the ground that without it, "a rule which had been in effect for many
years might be upset on some technical ground, and the setting aside
of a rule under such circumstances might cause substantial mischief." '' This justification seems sound and a similar provision
should be added to MAPA, taking care that no limit is placed inadvertently on the time when the validity of a rule may be challenged
on the ground that it is unconstitutional, ultra vires, or in violation
of some statute other than MAPA.
The Revised Model Act does not set forth any standards to guide
the courts in determining the substantive validity of agency rules.
IAPA authorizes the court reviewing an agency rule or decision in a
contested case to declare the agency action invalid
if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because
the agency action is: (a) In violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions; (b) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c)
In violation of an agency rule; (d) Made upon unlawful procedures;
(e)Affected by other error of law; . . .(g) Unreasonable, arbitrary

or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.31
These specific standards are to be preferred over the more general
ones contained in MAPA because they foreclose disputes about the
meaning of the latter. For example, it is not specified in MAPA that
the court may declare a rule invalid because the agency violated its
own rules or the rules of the Chief Hearing Examiner which are binding upon it."' Read literally, only a rule adopted without compliance
with "statutory" rulemaking procedures may be invalidated. It may
be argued that the "statutory" procedures include the procedures
prescribed by rules promulgated under the authority of the statute.
But there is no reason MAPA should not say so and forestall litigation
on the question.
The judicial review sections of MAPA are silent on one very
important question: whether review must be based exclusively on the
"hearing record" made in the course of the rulemaking proceedings.
By contrast, in the case of the judicial review of agency decisions in
309. F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 207 (1965). See also Bonfield, supra
note 8, at 875.
310. IOWA CODE § 17A.19(8) (1977). Section 17A.19(8)(f) adds the following
ground in the review of contested cases: "In a contested case, unsupported by substantial evidence in the record made before the agency when that record is viewed as a
whole."
311. A violation of a rule of the Attorney General, of course, may lead him to
disapprove a proposed rule before it can ever be challenged in a court. See also Minnesota State Bankers Ass'n v. Commissioner, No. 397933 (Dist. Ct. Ramsey County,
Minn., Apr. 1, 1975) at 4 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Judgment); Id. (Mar. 3, 1975) at 14, 15 (Memorandum Opinion), discussed in text accompanying notes 322-32 infra.
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contested cases, MAPA expressly provides that review is to proceed
exclusively on the basis of the record of the agency proceeding under
review except in certain limited circumstances.' 2 The fact that these
express statutory provisions are not to be found in connection with
the review of rules, however, should not preclude a court from holding
that MAPA's detailed rulemaking requirements in their entirety
(particularly since the 1975 amendments) imply that judicial review
of the validity of a rule shall proceed exclusively on the basis of the
"hearing record" made in the course of the rulemaking proceeding.
Neither the Revised Model Act nor IAPA specifies the components of the "record" on which judicial review of agency rules is to
be based. The administrative rulemaking record is not the exclusive
basis of review under either of these statutes. IAPA removes any
possible doubt about this by providing that the court reviewing the
validity of a rule "may hear and consider such evidence as it deems
appropriate." '
Of course, a reviewing court in Iowa would pay careful attention
to the agency's statement that accompanies the adoption of the rule,
setting forth the reasons for and against the rule and why the agency
was not persuaded by the considerations urged against the rule. Furthermore, the agency is not permitted to advance in the reviewing
court reasons in defense of the legality of the rule that are not contained in the statement of reasons. 31' Nevertheless, a party seeking
review of a rule to which the Attorney General has not objected has
the burden of coming forward in the reviewing court with data challenging its validity, and bears the ultimate burden of demonstrating
invalidity. The agency has an opportunity to respond to the data thus
adduced and introduce any other data supporting the reasons contained in the statement accompanying the adoption of the rule. 2 5 In
312. Section 15.0424(6) (1976) of the Minnesota Statutes provides that the review conducted by the court "shall be confined to the record." Section 15.0424(4)
requires the agency to transmit to the reviewing court "the entire record of the proceeding under review," or a shortened record to which all the parties have stipulated.
Sections 15.0424(5) and (6) state the circumstances under which the reviewing court
may permit additional evidence to be taken before the agency or in the court. Section
15.0425(e) authorizes the reviewing court to reverse or modify the agency decision or
remand the case to the agency for further proceedings if the decision is
"[u]nsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted."
Like MAPA, the Revised Model Act and IAPA require review of decisions in
contested cases to proceed exclusively on the basis of the record of the agency proceeding under review. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMmTRATIvE PRocEDURE AcT § 15(d), (e),
(f), (g)(5) (1961); IOWA CODE §§ 17A.12(6), (8), 17A.19(6), (7), (8)(f) (1977).
313. IOWA CODE § 17A.19(7) (1977).

314. Bonfield, supra note 8, at 857.
315. If a rule to which the Attorney General has objected is under review, the
agency has the burden of coming forward in the reviewing court with data supporting
its validity-and ultimately the burden of demonstrating validity. IOWA CODE §
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short, the issue of the rule's validity is to be "tried" in the reviewing
court.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet been called upon to
decide whether the "hearing record" produced under MAPA procedures should be the exclusive basis for judicial review of a rule's
validity. State district courts have had differing views on the
"exclusivity" of the administrative record prior to MAPA's 1975
amendments. In Can Manufacturers, Inc. v: Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency,3"' for example, a group of manufacturers and trade
associations in the packaging industry brought suit for declaratory
judgment against the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (PCA) to
determine the constitutionality of section 116F.06 of the Minnesota
Statutes"t 7 and the validity of rules promulgated by the PCA pursuant thereto.
In an effort to reduce the volume of solid waste produced in
Minnesota, the statute in question authorizes the PCA to review new
or revised packages or containers sold at retail in the state after May
25, 1973, except when a revision involves only color, size, shape or
printing. If the PCA determines that any new or revised package or
container would create a solid waste disposal problem or conflict with
state environmental policies, it may, by order and following notice
and hearing, prohibit the sale of the package or container in Minnesota. The prohibition will continue until revoked by the PCA or,
unless extended by legislative enactment, until the last day of the
next following legislative session. The statute directs the PCA to
adopt "guidelines identifying the types of new or revised containers
and packaging that are subject to its review after notice and hearing
as provided in section 15.0412, subdivision 4" of MAPA.31 The PCA
rules in question implement the packaging review program, identifying those packages subject to review and setting out the procedures
to be followed by the PCA and the criteria by which alternative forms
of packaging are to be judged.
The parties challenging the PCA's rules alleged, among other
things, that the rules were not supported by substantial evidence in
the record of the rulemaking hearings. " ' District Court Judge Harold
17A.4(4)(a) (1977). The statement of reasons accompanying the adoption of the rule
may be sufficient to support the burden of coming forward. The parties challenging
the validity of the rule will have an opportunity to respond to the data introduced by
the agency and offer other data supporting their position.
316. No. 404697 (Dist. Ct. Hennepin County, Minn., Dec. 29, 1976) (Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Declaratory Judgment).
317. MwN. STAT. § 116F.06 (1976).
318. Id. § 116F.06(3). Since the rules in question were issued prior to January 1,
1976, they were not promulgated under the 1975 amendments to MAPA.
319. Under MAPA, the "substantial evidence" test applies only to the judicial
review of agency decisions in contested cases, not rules. Compare Min*. STAT. §
15.0425(e) (1976) with MiNN. STAT. § 15.0417 (Supp. 1977).

1979]

MINNESOTA RULEMAKING

W. Schultz did not deal with this question. His memorandum begins
by stating that the matter "came on for trial before" him on May 17
through May 24, 1976.32 o Witnesses testified and written data were
introduced in court. The "record" made during the public hearings
on the rules seems not to have been regarded as exclusive by any
party to the judicial proceeding, including the PCA and the State of
Minnesota. On the basis of the evidence introduced during the week
of trial, Judge Schultz concluded that the rules were "supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole,"3 ' and upheld the
constitutionality of the statute and the validity of the rules.
An examination of another district court opinion, Minnesota
State Bankers Association v. Commissionerof Insurance,3 21 suggests
a different answer to the question of the "record" on review. In that
case, a group of bankers sued to enjoin the Commissioner of Insurance
from enforcing Rule 11632 promulgated by him. Rule 116, like the
PCA rules in Can Manufacturers,had been issued prior to MAPA's
1975 amendments. The rule made it an unfair trade practice for
insurers who issue credit life insurance or credit accident and health
insurance to (1) deposit their money or securities in a bank without
interest or at a lower rate of interest than that currently paid other
depositors on similar deposits, (2) deposit in a bank money or securities which would otherwise be required by the creditor of the bank
as a compensating balance or offsetting deposit for a loan, or (3)
engage in any other practice involving the use of their financial resources for the benefit of the bank as an inducement to it to purchase
credit insurance from them.2 4
District Court Judge John W. Graff concluded, inter alia, that
Rule 116 had not been validly adopted primarily because the agency
had not complied with the rules of the Attorney General that "the
3
record [of the public hearing] must support the rules as adopted"; 2
that the Statement of Need "shall contain a recitation of the reasons
which support a finding of need for the rules"; 21 and that the
320. Can Manufacturers, Inc. v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, No.
404697 (Dist. Ct. Hennepin County, Minn., Dec. 29, 1976) (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Declaratory Judgment), at 1, argument heard, No. 48349
(Minn. S. Ct., Nov. 1, 1978).
321. Id. at 12.
322. No. 397933 (Dist. Ct. Ramsey County, Minn., Apr. 1, 1975) (Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Judgment); id. (Mar. 3, 1975) (Memorandum
Opinion).
323. Minn. Reg. Ins. 116, 4 MCAR § 1.9116.

324. Minnesota State Bankers Ass'n v. Commissioner, No. 397933 (Dist. Ct.
Ramsey County, Minn., Apr. 1, 1975) (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
for Judgment); id. (Mar. 3, 1975) (Memorandum Opinion).

325. Minn. Reg. Atty. Gen. 303(c), 1 MCAR § 1.303(c).
326. Minn. Reg. Atty. Gen. 302(b), 1 MCAR § 1.302(b).
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"Findings of Fact must contain that which the agency finds to be fact
which supports the reasons or need for the rules adopted."' ,, "After
a complete review of the record, the Statement of Need, [and] the
Finding[s] of Fact," explained Judge Graff, "it appears there was a
deficiency of evidence to support the adoption of the rule."'3, He
noted:
Other than the opening statement by the Commissioner about the
proposed rule ...

the record is meager, sparse and inadequate to

support the proposed rule. The Findings of Fact must be based upon
the record. Here the Findings of Fact consists of a brief conclusionary statement. The Statement of Need is a restatement of the findings plus a statement that this practice is considered to be an unfair
method of competition22 '
Judge Graff went so far as to say that procedural due process was
denied the banks challenging the validity of the rules because they
were given no opportunity "to confront the defendant's officers"
(their request to question the officials of the agency who presided at
the hearing was denied) and because the Commissioner did not show
that "meaningful consideration was given to the submission of information by the opponents of the rule." ' Also, Judge Graff found,
there "is nothing in the record that indicates what evidence was
relied upon by the [defendants] in making the Findings of Fact and
the Statement of Need. ' ' I
The 1975 amendments to MAPA did not alter the standards for
judicial review of a rule. Even before then, a rule was to be declared
invalid only if the reviewing court found that "it violates constitutional provisions or exceeds the statutory authority of the agency or
was adopted without compliance with statutory rule-making procedures.'

332

Judge Graff's reliance upon agency violations of the Attor-

ney General's rules as grounds for invalidating a rule would seem to
be misplaced with respect to a rule that has been approved by the
Attorney General. Judge Graff did not point to any statutory rulemaking procedure that had been violated.
At the time the Can Manufacturers and Bankers Association
cases were decided, MAPA itself did not speak of a "hearing record."
It required agencies to hold public hearings on proposed rules and
provided that every rule, "before being adopted," must be "based
upon a showing of need for" it.an Judge Graff construed even these
327. Id.
328. Minnesota State Bankers Ass'n v. Commissioner, No. 397933 (Dist. Ct.
Ramsey County, Minn., Mar. 3, 1975) at 15 (Memorandum Opinion).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331.

Id.

332.
333.

MINN. STAT.

§ 15.0417 (1974).
Id. § 15.0412(4).
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requirements as mandating on-the-record, trial-type rulemaking proceedings. "A rule adopted, based upon an inadequate record," he
concluded, "is not in compliance with required rulemaking procedures."' 4 Judge Graff thus appears to have assumed that the rulemaking record was the exclusive basis on which the reviewing court
would determine the validity of the rule. This assumption, however,
was never made an issue because neither party requested the opportunity to introduce evidence in the district court. The case was submitted on the briefs and oral arguments.
Given the existing MAPA requirements for rulemaking, neither
a holding by the Minnesota Supreme Court that the administrative
"hearing record" is the exclusive basis for judicial review of the validity of a rule nor a holding that the rule's validity may be "tried" in
the reviewing court would be satisfactory. To allow the record for
review to be made or even supplemented in the reviewing court is to
force the agency and the affected parties to repeat, or supplement and
amplify, what was done at the public hearing. Such a "trial" runs the
risk of enlarging the scope of review and tempting the reviewing court
to usurp the agency's decision-making authority. Furthermore, if new
data are introduced in the reviewing court, the agency may be reluctant to reconsider its action and possibly modify it in light of the new
data, for it is in an adversary position seeking to defend the validity
of its rule. To encourage reexamination, the reviewing court may
exercise its discretion to remand the matter to the agency to receive
and consider the additional data."
On the other hand, requiring judicial review to proceed exclusively on the basis of the "hearing record" would also have unfortunate consequences. Once it is understood that all persons and
groups that may be affected by a proposed rule will be limited to the
"hearing record" in any judicial proceeding challenging the validity
of the rule, the parties participating in the public hearing would
multiply-and so would the issues. Only by participation would they
be able to affect the contents of the record and preserve the issues
they may wish to present to a reviewing court.
The agency's "affirmative presentation" at the public hearing
"of facts establishing the need for and reasonableness" of the pro334. Minnesota State Bankers Ass'n v. Commissioner, No. 397933 (Dist. Ct.
Ramsey County, Minn., Mar. 3, 1975) at 15-16 (Memorandum Opinion).

335. If a court, reviewing an agency decision in a contested case, decides that
additional evidence should be received because it is "material" and "there were good
reasons for failure to present it in the proceeding before the agency," the court must
remand the case to the agency to take the evidence and reconsider its decision in light
of it. MINN. STAT. § 15.0424(5) (1976). On the assumption that a rulemaking "hearing
record" is not exclusive, the parties seeking to introduce data in the reviewing court
would have to show that they are "material" but not that there were good reasons for
failure to present the data in the course of the rulemaking proceeding.
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posed rule would have to include a presentation of all the significant
data, inferences, and conclusions upon which it relies to support the
rule. Representatives of the affected interests participating in the
public hearing would have to be given an opportunity to challenge the
agency presentation and produce rebuttal or countervailing data.
The agency would be obliged to respond to all significant challenges
supported by data. Every participant would have to be given the
opportunity to respond to the data, inferences, and conclusions presented by every other participant.
Because a reviewing court would refuse to hear any objection to
a rule not made during the public hearing, participants opposing the
proposed rule would voice all possible objections and introduce data
to support them. Since it could not know which of these objections
might eventually become the basis of a challenge to the rule's validity, the agency would have no choice but to respond-for the "hearing
record"-to each objection with its own data and arguments.
All these factors would operate to produce large and diffuse records that the agencies and reviewing courts would find cumbersome
to manage. Finally, the agency would be required to conduct such an
on-the-record rulemaking proceeding before issuing any rule,-" regardless of its importance and even though it is probable that only a
small percentage of any agency's rules will be subjected to judicial
review.
It is quite clear that such on-the-record rulemaking proceedings
would lack the flexibility, efficiency, and informality that should
characterize the exercise of the most important means available to
an agency to implement statutory policy. Yet, such proceedings seem
to be contemplated by MAPA's prescribed rulemaking procedures as
elaborated by the rules of the Attorney General and the Chief Hearing Examiner. Since that is the case, the "hearing record" should
become the exclusive basis for judicial determination of the validity
of the adopted rule.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCERNING MAPA'S PRESCRIBED RULEMAKING
PROCEDURES
It may be that MAPA's prescribed rulemaking procedures, despite the criticisms levelled at them in this Article, produce "better"
substantive rules than would eventuate without them. It is not apparent, however, how one would test such a hypothesis. The views of the
336. Non-controversial rules are not excepted. The Chief Hearing Examiner has
expressed the opinion, which is probably correct, that "merely reaching an agreement
with the public does not relieve the agency from the burden of making an affirmative
presentation of facts at the hearing." In re Hazardous Wastes, supra note 168, at 8.
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agencies themselves may be of some interest on this issue, though
hardly dispositive.
In response to the expressions of concern by some agency heads,
former Governor Perpich requested his Legislative Counsel and the
Executive Director of the Pollution Control Agency to initiate a study
of the impact of MAPA's procedures on the operations of state agencies.: 7 Mr. Triplett and Ms. Gardebring solicited the views of the
agencies. Twenty-nine agencies responded to various parts of their
questionnaire.
Fourteen agencies replied that the high cost of complying with
MAPA's requirements was not balanced by increased protection to
the public. For five agencies, these procedures imposed additional
cost burdens that were not unreasonable in light of the increased
protection they afforded the public. Two agencies were unsure
whether the additional cost burdens provided further protection to
the public.
Twelve agencies replied that the rulemaking procedures were
unreasonably time-consuming, without substantial benefit to the
public. Three agencies concluded that these procedures imposed difficult time burdens, but resulted in better protection for the public.
One agency was of the view that these procedures did not impose
substantial time burdens on it.
Ten agencies expressed concern over the conflict between the
Attorney General and the Chief Hearing Examiner. Nine agencies
were generally satisfied with the performance of the Office of Hearing
Examiners. Three agencies questioned whether the Office of Hearing
Examiners made a positive contribution to their activities.
In this section of the Article, I do not attempt to bring together
the various suggestions offered for modification of MAPA. Instead, I
present some conclusions and recommendations concerning the basic
features of MAPA's prescribed rulemaking procedures.
It is "the consensus of judges, legislators, administrators and
practitioners," as Professor Davis has written, that "trial procedures
• . .are not good for making rules of general applicability. '"M MAPA
does not expressly mandate trial procedures, characterized by oral
testimony and the confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses.
But its requirement of a "public hearing" to be conducted by a hearing examiner independent of the agency, its references to the
"hearing record," the "transcript" of the hearing which may be requested by the agency, the Chief Hearing Examiner, or the Attorney
General, and the "findings of fact" of the hearing examiner, as well
337.

See T. Triplett & S. Gardebring, Survey of Agency Opinions on the Admin-

istrative Procedure Act (APA) (Nov. 2, 1978) (unpublished report to the Governor).
338. K. DAvis, ADMIsTRATivE LAW TREATisE § 6:8, at 475 (2d ed. 1978).
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as the implementing rules of the Chief Hearing Examiner, seem to
contemplate trial-type proceedings. MAPA should be amended to
make it clear that trial-type proceedings are not intended and that
oral testimony and cross-examination will be allowed only if it is
shown that a particular issue of fact in controversy can best be illuminated in that manner.3
The role of the Office of Hearing Examiners in rulemaking
should be reconsidered. The potential conflicts between the Chief
Hearing Examiner and the Attorney General should be resolved. So
long as the Attorney General has the statutory authority and responsibility to review the final agency rule as to form and legality, and to
prevent it from becoming effective, he should have the final say with
respect to the matters on which the Chief Hearing Examiner may also
express himself.
But more needs to be done. The functions that MAPA now gives
to the hearing examiners tend to overwhelm the legislative aspects of
rulemaking by imposing judicial norms upon it. Agencies must now
come to the public hearings prepared to defend their proposed rules
before unbiased "judges" who will render their non-binding judgments on the "hearing record." The hearings themselves are conducted under rules promulgated by the Chief Hearing Examiner and
binding on the agencies. These rules give the hearing examiners great
discretion in the conduct of the public hearings. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for the agency representatives to approach the
hearing with inquiring minds and readiness to engage in the informal
exchange of data and views with affected interests that might lead
them to modify, or possibly withdraw, the rules.
Based on the hearing record, the hearing examiners write their
reports, stating their findings of fact, conclusions, and recommendations. In the performance of this function, too, they act like judges.
They do not consult with the agency heads or agency staff about the
issues of fact, law, or policy raised in the hearings. They do not
attempt lto give the agencies the benefit of their insights and judgments in any informal manner. The agencies must await the reports
in order to ascertain the views of the hearing examiners.
Although these reports are not binding, the agencies dare not
ignore them, for then they run the risk of provoking disapproval by
the Attorney General or the institution of a judicial review proceeding. At the same time, the affected interests participating in the
339. The Administrative Conference of the United States has recommended that
trial-type procedures are appropriate in rulemaking only "on issues of specific fact"
and "never ... for resolving questions of policy or of broad or general fact." Recommendation 72-5, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability, 1
C.F.R. § 305.72-5(3) (1977). For a critique of this formulation, see Auerbach, supra
note 6, at 51-55.
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public hearings, though able to see the hearing examiners' reports,
are not able to comment on them before the agencies finally act on
the rules.
If hearing examiners are to play an important part in the rulemaking process, they should forsake the judicial model. They should
discuss issues of fact, law, and policy with the members and staff of
the agencies. This might encourage desirable modifications in the
proposed rules which could then be incorporated in the hearing examiners' reports. In any case, these reports should seek to embody the
agencies' views and tentative conclusions on the issues. The participants in the public hearings should then be given the opportunity to
comment on the hearing examiners' reports before final agency action
is taken. If the "independence" of the hearing examiners is sought to
be preserved, the reports could continue to contain their own conclusions and recommendations, even when they disagree with the agencies' views and tentative conclusions.
To discharge their duties adequately, the hearing examiners
would need a staff of experts to advise them. Since state agencies
have a difficult time attracting such experts, it is not likely that the
Office of Hearing Examiners would succeed in doing so, even if the
legislature were to countenance such a duplication of personnel. In
any case, the hearing examiner should not be given the kind of role
in the rulemaking process envisaged by MAPA, even with the modifications I have suggested. If the public hearing is to include oral presentations, they should be made, to the extent practicable, before
one or more agency members or the head of the agency division most
directly concerned. Such a practice would increase the significance
of the oral presentations but it may not always be feasible. The
agency, therefore, should be given the option of assigning one or more
staff members, or a hearing examiner, to the task of presiding over
the public hearing. A hearing examiner so assigned should have no
other function.
Instead of a hearing examiner's report, it may be advisable to
require the agency, before it takes final action, to issue a statement
indicating the final action it proposes to take and its reactions to the
data and arguments presented by the affected interests during the
course of the rulemaking proceeding. The affected interests should
then have a final opportunity to submit written comments on this
statement to the agency. It is possible that such a requirement may
concentrate hitherto dispersed opposition to the final action the
agency proposes to take and, therefore, may not always serve the
public interest. Yet, experimentation with the requirement may be
worthwhile.
Even if all these recommendations were to be adopted by the
Minnesota Legislature, the basic difficulty with the existing, as well
as modified, rulemaking process would remain. It would still be an
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"on-the-record" proceeding: one intended to produce an administrative "hearing record"-or "rulemaking record"-upon which, exclusively, the agency must base its final action and the courts must
determine the validity of the rule. While I share the consensus that
trial procedures, generally, are not good for making rules, I am also
persuaded that "on-the-record" procedures, generally, are not good
for making rules or for creating the exclusive records on the basis of
which the validity of the rules will subsequently be determined.1Y
To avoid on-the-record rulemaking, I would urge adoption of the
basic rulemaking provisions of TAPA which prescribe a notice-andcomment procedure essentially similar to that originally contemplated under FAPA. 4'1 I do not think it desirable, however, to "try"
the validity of the rule in the reviewing court, as provided in IAPA.
It is better, for the reasons outlined above, to have the record for
review made before the agency and not the reviewing court. Accordingly, it is proposed that any person seeking judicial review of an
agency rule should first be required to file a protest against the rule
with the agency. This protest could attack the validity of the rule
either as a whole or as applied to the party protesting. The agency
would then conduct an on-the-record proceeding with such trial-type
procedures as the protesting party shows are necessary to develop
fully the issues of fact raised by the protest. Protests raising the same
issues of fact, law, or policy would be consolidated in a single proceeding for joint disposition. The agency staff members most involved
with the rule being protested should preside over the protest proceeding. Here again, the agency should have the option of using a hearing
examiner for this purpose. The agency's disposition of the protest
would be subject to direct review exclusively on the basis of the record
made in the protest proceeding. 42
Professor Davis has objected to the proposed protest procedure
for federal rulemaking on the following grounds:
[Tihe heart of the idea is, in its most unfavorable aspect, that an
agency need not follow good procedure unless a challenge forces it
to; if a rule based on inadequate procedure is substantively faulty,
it may nevertheless be effective for ten or twenty or fifty years unless
someone challenges it, but the facts available at the time of challenge may be altogether different from the facts the agency used in
formulating the rule.
340. For a contrary view, see K. DAvis, supra note 338, at 447-634.
341. See Auerbach, supra note 6, at 16.
342. See id. at 61-68. The recommended protest procedure is modeled after the
statutory system created for the promulgation and judicial review of price and rent
regulations during World War II. The features of this system that were determined by
the exigencies of economic stabilization during wartime are not incorporated in the
recommended protest procedure.
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When an agency of the government is making law that affects
private interests, the law made by Congress and by the courts should
impose on the agency an obligation to use procedure that is designed
to protect against unsound rulemaking, whether or not any affected
person goes to court to challenge the rule. The best protection
against administrative injustice is not judicial review; the best protection is proper administrative action in the first place. To exempt
an agency from good rulemaking procedure unless the agency's action is challenged in court may have little or no effect on the best
administrators, but it may have the wrong effect on administrators
who are less than the best.
The procedure that Professor Davis criticizes and regards as less
than "good," and even as an "inadequate procedure" that will not
"protect against unsound rulemaking," is the same notice-andcomment rulemaking procedure that he described in 1970 as "one of
the greatest inventions of modern government. 3" Davis agrees that
this procedure "was about the same in 1970 as it was in 1946,"111 when
it was embodied in FAPA, but he thinks it has been "vastly improved" 346 during the 1970s by the concept of an administrative rulemaking record upon which, exclusively, the agency must base its rule
and support the rule's validity in a reviewing court.347
It is only with this latter judgment of Professor Davis that I
respectfully disagree. I join his praise of notice-and-comment rulemaking as it existed for almost 25 years. It was the dominant rulemaking procedure used by federal agencies. Judging by the relative
paucity of cases in which they were subjected to judicial review, let
alone declared invalid by appellate courts, rules promulgated under
these procedures were not, on the whole, "substantively faulty."
It is possible that adoption of the proposed protest procedure
may encourage agencies to make a notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedure, such as that embodied in IAPA, a perfunctory one. This
could happen under notice-and-comment procedure even if unaccompanied by the recommended protest procedure. But it need not hap343. K. DAvis, supra note 338, § 6:32, at 283.
344. Id.
345. Id. § 6:39, at 628.
346. Id. § 6:1, at 448.
347. This is the principal thrust of the entire Chapter 6 on Rulemaking
Procedurein K. DAvis, supra note 338, at 447-634. Professor Davis implies that the
improvements during the 1970s may have been impelled by the burgeoning of rulemaking during that period. But he overstates his case when he says that "until the late
1960s, the agencies' main reliance for working out their policies was adjudication
of one case at a time." Id. § 6:39, at 627. In 1965, the Code of Federal Regulations
occupied 44,800 pages. The entire body of federal agency adjudication could hardly
have had as much impact on policy as these regulations. In 1975, the Code of Federal
Regulations occupied 88,100 pages. The situation on the state level in this respect is
likely to parallel that on the federal level.
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pen. Worry about "administrators who are less than the best" should
not lead us to make it very difficult for the "best administrators" to
accomplish their purposes. There is warrant for general skepticism
about what "good" rulemaking procedures, however defined, can do
for mediocre administrators.
I agree with Professor Davis that the "determination of what is
necessary [rulemaking procedure] should depend upon the issues in
the proceeding, not on judicial review or lack of it."" 8 To illuminate
particular issues of fact even under IAPA-type rulemaking, the
agency may find it necessary to allow evidence to be presented by oral
testimony and the witnesses to be cross-examined. But the agency
should have the authority to determine what is procedurally useful
in particular situations. The point is that all agencies should not be
compelled to devise procedures so as to produce administrative rulemaking records which will also become the exclusive bases for determining the validity of rules by reviewing courts.
Professor Davis seems to assume that under the proposed protest
procedure, a protest against a rule will not be allowed unless and until
the protesting party seeks judicial review. This would not be the case.
While no one, under the proposal, may seek judicial review without
having first filed a protest against the rule, anyone affected by the
rule may file a protest against it without subsequently seeking judicial review. Whenever a protest is filed, the agency would consider
de novo all the issues raised by the protesting party. As a result, the
rule might be amended, or even withdrawn; the rule might be held
not to be applicable to the protesting party; the protesting party
might be granted an exception or adjustment; or the protest might
be denied in its entirety. The party protesting would decide whether
to seek judicial review only in light of the disposition of the protest.
Thus, in Professor Davis' terms, "good procedure" will be employed even in the absence of judicial review. Professor Davis also
argues, in opposition to the protest procedure, that "if a rule based
on inadequate procedure is substantively faulty, it may nevertheless
be effective for ten, twenty, or fifty years unless someone challenges
it, but the facts available at the time of challenge may be altogether
different from the facts the agency used in formulating the rule."34' I
agree that rules based on "inadequate" procedure are more likely to
be "substantively faulty" than rules based on "adequate" procedure
and that the availability of judicial review should not excuse
"inadequate" procedure. But I do not agree that the IAPA-type procedure is inadequate. Nor do I agree that it will be rendered
"inadequate" by the requirement that a protest proceeding must
348.
349.

Id. § 6:32, at 601.
Id. at 600.
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precede judicial review of the validity of the rule instead of having
the issue of validity "tried" in the reviewing court.
Whether the rulemaking procedure is adequate or inadequate
according to Professor Davis, the possibility always exists that the
facts at the time of judicial review may be different from what they
were during the rulemaking proceeding. If this is so, it would make
no sense for the reviewing court to determine the validity of the rule
on the basis of the old administrative rulemaking record. Even when
the rulemaking record must be the exclusive basis for judicial review,
this contingency is allowed for by permitting the party seeking review
to request the court's permission to introduce additional evidence
that could not reasonably have been offered during the rulemaking
proceeding. A court granting such permission will normally remand
the matter to the agency to receive the additional evidence and reconsider its action in light of it. This is precisely the function that the
protest procedure will perform for the parties, the agency, and the
reviewing court.
Furthermore, it is not necessarily true that the protest proceedings will always be conducted while the rule being protested is in
effect. The agency itself may decide to stay the effective date of the
rule pending the disposition of the protest. Or a reviewing court may
issue such a stay. Even so, the protest procedure is advisable because
it would relieve the ageicy of the necessity of conducting on-therecord rulemaking proceedings in connection with most promulgated
rules against which, experience teaches, there will be no objections.
It would also facilitate judicial review of a rule by focusing the issues
for review more sharply on a concrete factual situation than is possible when the pre-issuance rulemaking record is the exclusive basis for
review." 0
VI.

LEGISLATIVE AND GUBERNATORIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES

A.

LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION TO REVIEW ADMINISTRATIVE RULES

In 1974, the Minnesota Legislature created a Legislative Joint
Committee to review administrative rules as defined by MAPA.1'
The Joint Committee, which became the Legislative Commission to
Review Administrative Rules in 1975,352 is composed of five senators
appointed by the Senate Committee on Committees and five repre350. See Auerbach, supra note 6, at 61-62.
351. Act of March 30, 1974, ch. 355, § 69, 1974 Minn. Laws 629 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 3.965 (1976)). It is difficult to know why rules exempt from MAPA were not
subjected to review by the joint committee.
352. Act of June 2, 1975, ch. 271, §§ 3(15), 6, 1975 Minn. Laws 744, 747.
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sentatives appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives."3
The Commission is authorized to "hold public hearings to investigate complaints with respect to rules if it considers the complaints
meritorious and worthy of attention [and] on the basis of the testimony received at . . . public hearings, [to] suspend any rule complained of by the affirmative vote of at least six members."' " Before
suspending a rule, however, the Commission must "request the
Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate to refer the
question of suspension of the given rule or rules to the appropriate
committee or committees of the respective houses for the committees'
'
recommendation."355
The suspension may not take effect until the
recommendation, which is advisory only, is received by the Commission or sixty days have elapsed after referral of the question of suspension to the committees and no recommendation has been received.,"
If it suspends a rule, the Commission must
as soon as possible place before the legislature, at the next year's
session, a bill to repeal the suspended rule. If the bill is defeated, or
fails of enactment in that year's session, the rule shall stand and the
Commission may not suspend it again. If the bill becomes law, the
rule is repealed and shall not be enacted again unless a law specifically authorizes the adoption of that rule.-7
The Commission is required to make a biennial report to the
legislature and Governor of its activities and to include therein its
recommendations. 38 A majority of the Commission may request any
department issuing rules to hold a public hearing on the recommendations contained in its biennial report."' The hearing must then be
conducted in accordance with the provisions of MAPA.38 °
The Revised Model Act does not provide for such legislative
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

MINN. STAT. §

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

3.965(1) (1976).

§ 3.965(2).
§ 3.965(4).
§ 3.965(2).
§ 3.965(3). The language in subdivision 3 is ambiguous for it authorizes

public hearings "in respect to recommendations made pursuant to subdivision 2."
Such recommendations include the recommendations under subdivision 4 (incorporated by reference in subdivision 2) made by the appropriate legislative committees
on the question of the suspension of a given rule or rules. But it would seem that such
recommendations were not intended to be included by subdivision 3. It also seems
anomalous that subdivision 3 should apply only to departments-and not other agencies-issuing rules.
360. The significance of this provision is also not clear since it was not reconsidered by the legislature in light of the 1975 amendments to MAPA. Act of June 4,
1975, ch. 380, 1975 Minn. Laws 1285.
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committee review of administrative rules. IAPA creates a Bipartisan
Administrative Rules Review Committee composed of three senators
appointed by the President of the Senate and three representatives
appointed by the Speaker of the House."' The Committee is given
authority, parallel to that of the Iowa Attorney General, to object to
any rule prior to its effective date. 2 An objection filed by the Committee has the same effect as one filed by the Attorney General. It
imposes upon the agency the burden of demonstrating the rule's validity when that is questioned in any subsequent judicial proceeding.
The criticism directed at the IAPA scheme of Attorney General review is also applicable to this aspect of review by the legislative
committee. 3
As originally enacted, IAPA also authorized the Administrative
Rules Review Committee to refer any rule in effect, for any reason it'
chose, to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate,
who were then required to refer the rule to the appropriate standing
committees of the legislature. " The referral could be accompanied
with a recommendation that the "rule be overcome by statute" or
that any other action be taken. 6 5 But the rule was to remain in effect
until "overcome by statute."
IAPA was recently amended to give the Administrative Rules
Review Committee the additional authority, upon a two-thirds vote
of its members, to delay the effective date of any rule, other than a
rule exempt from the delayed effectiveness requirement, "until the
expiration of forty-five calendar days, excluding legal holidays, during which the [Iowa] general assembly is in regular session." ' If at
the expiration of that period, the General Assembly has not disapproved of the rule by a joint resolution approved by the Governor, the
rule becomes effective. 67 If the rule is disapproved, it may not become
effective and the agency must withdraw the rule.3 8 These provisions
are similar to those governing the powers of the Minnesota Legislative
Commission to Review Administrative Rules. Both sets of provisions
authorize a milder form of "legislative veto" than exists in a number
of other states.3 69
361. IOWA CODE § 17A.8(1) (1977).
362. Id. § 17A.8(8); see text accompanying notes 274-77 supra.
363. See text accompanying notes 285-87 supra.
364. IowA CODE § 17A.8(7) (1977).
365. Id. § 17A.8(8). "Other reasons for referral might be that the rule is of such
importance that it should be embodied in a statute; or that the rule illustrates a
problem with the agency's enabling statute which should be modified in a specified

way." Bonfield, supra note 8, at 904.
366. Act of June 28, 1978, S.F. 244, § 19, 1978 Iowa Legis. Serv. 482 (West)
(amending IowA CODE § 17A.8 (1977)) (effective January 1, 1979).
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. See Bonfield, supra note 8, at 904 n.681.
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Nevertheless, even these provisions raise questions of constitutionality under the state constitutions of Iowa and Minnesota. Professor Bonfield has expressed the opinion that the Iowa Constitution
precludes the legislature from undercutting "the rulemaking power
delegated by statute to the agency without going through the exact
same process by which the original delegation was made."""a While
he was addressing the proposal that the legislature be allowed to
repeal a rule by joint or concurrent resolution without approval by the
Governor, the case for constitutionality is not made stronger by the
fact that the legislative committees in Iowa and Minnesota may only
suspend the effectiveness of a rule for a limited period of time. By so
doing, the committees alone will have rendered ineffective, for the
specified period of time, a rule which would otherwise have the force
3
of law. 1'
The constitutionality of various forms of legislative veto of administrative and executive actions on the federal and state levels is
currently a matter of great debate. I shall not enter the debate here,
except to hazard the judgment that the legislative veto is not unconstitutional either under the United States or the Minnesota Constitution.
Whether the Minnesota Legislature is wise to resort to the legislative veto or suspension of agency rules is another matter. The argument in favor of such legislative oversight is that it is the most effective means by which the legislature can be informed of the policies
being translated into law by the agencies and can hold the agencies
accountable. As a result, the public is expected to be better protected
against agency action that is unreasonable or exceeds its statutory
authority.
These are important considerations, but so are the countervailing ones. Legislatures have delegated rulemaking authority to executive and administrative agencies because they are unable to perform
this function themselves. As the problems of our society become more
complex and technical, the need for such delegation becomes greater.
By reserving the power to veto or suspend agency rules, the legislature
embroils itself in the complexity and detail it sought to avoid by the
original delegation of rulemaking authority. Furthermore, neither the
legislature as a wh6le nor a legislative joint committee can devote the
time necessary to become familiar with, or expert in, all of the areas
covered by agency rules. To the extent that the legislative review
committee must rely on staff for guidance, it defeats the purpose for
its existence, namely, to bring to bear the judgment of legislators on
the desirability of particular agency rules.
370. Id. at 904.
371. See id. at 918-19.
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No standards are laid down in the Minnesota or Iowa legislation
to guide the legislative committee in exercising its suspension power.
To prescribe such standards would be inadvisable because the purpose of the legislative review of agency rules is to empower the legislature to substitute its judgment on policy for that of the agencyhowever that judgment is made. There can be no valid objection
to the exercise of "political" judgment by the legislative review
committee because rulemaking is political, in the sense that the
policies it embodies reflect an authoritative choice of values.
A major problem with legislative committee veto or suspension
of rules is that it lends itself to undemocratic political decisions. Only
six legislators in Minnesota need to be persuaded and a rule will be
suspended. Groups that unsuccessfully opposed the policies embodied in the basic legislation may, therefore, be encouraged to try to
turn their defeat into victory by exerting pressure on the legislative
review committee to suspend agency rules implementing the legislation. This concern is obviated somewhat by the fact that in both
Minnesota and Iowa, the rule goes back into effect unless a statute
is passed repealing or modifying it. But in Minnesota, the suspension
may be effective for as long as a full year. In the interim, the public
may be deprived of the benefits of the rule, and the uncertainty about
its future may make it impossible for both the agency and affected
interests to plan their affairs.
The Legislative Commission to Review Administrative Rules in
Minnesota has been in existence for more than four years. Its experience should be evaluated before deciding whether the Minnesota
scheme of legislative review is desirable. The Commission was not
very active during the first three years of its existence. It met once
in 1974, three times in 1975, and once in 1976. During these three
years, it received a total of four complaints against agency rules. It
held hearings in three of these cases. No rule was formally suspended.
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372. Letter from Marshall R. Whitlock, Executive Secretary, Legislative Commission to Review Administrative Rules, to Carl A. Auerbach (Sept. 26, 1978)(statistical enclosure) [hereinafter cited as Whitlock Letter]. The author is indebted to Mr.
Whitlock for his help in gathering this information.
In one case, after a hearing, the Commission decided that the complaint was not
sufficiently meritorious to warrant further attention. This case involved a complaint
by an electric cable company that a rule of the Cable Communications Board requiring
cable companies to have equipment for live broadcasts was unreasonable.
A second complaint, involving a claim by the Minnesota-Dakotas Retail Hardware
Association that rules on unfair trade practices issued by the Commerce Department's
Consumer Services Division were unreasonable, was withdrawn and the agency was
sued instead. In Minnesota-Dakotas Retail Hardware Ass'n v. Minnesota, File No.
406422 (Dist. Ct. Hennepin County, Minn., Jan. 27, 1977), District Judge Otis H.
Godfrey, Jr. granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, holding that the
Consumer Services Division had no statutory authority to issue the rules in question.
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In 1977, the Commission, which was without staff until that
time, employed a full-time Executive Secretary. Two attorneys employed by the Revisor of Statutes have also been assigned as legal
advisors to the Commission. In addition, the Commission calls upon
the services of other legislative staff for needed investigation and
research. It now acts only after receiving a report from its staff.
I Since January 1, 1977, the Commission has received 29 complaints against agency rules.3 13 It met eleven times in 1977 and five
times in 1978 as of this writing. In the last year, seventy percent of
the complaints received by the Commission came from legislators,
fifteen percent from Commission and legislative staff, ten percent
from individual citizens, and five percent from representatives of
interest groups. 31 Complaints from legislators receive first claim on
the Commission's attention.
In the third complaint, the Commission, after hearing, reported to the legislature
on the problem raised. This case involved a question that the Southeast Minnesota
Regional Arts Commission put to the Commission as to whether the creation of the
State Arts Board was intended to centralize grant-making authority in the Board and
deprive regional arts groups of funds with which they could make grants to artists and
arts organizations.
In the fourth, the result of the Commission's intervention was the same as if it
had suspended the rule in question. In that case, private hospitals complained about
being covered by a Department of Public Welfare rule requiring the licensing of facilities for the care of the mentally ill. After hearing, the Commission received assurances
from the Department that it would not enforce the rule against the private hospitals
until the legislature had a chance to resolve the issue. At its next session, the legislature excluded private hospitals that meet certain conditions from the licensing requirement. Act of April 13, 1976, ch. 243, § 5, 1976 Minn. Laws 907 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 245.791 (Supp. 1977)).
373. Six involved the Department of Education; five, the Department of Public
Welfare; three, the Department of Natural Resources; three, the Department of
Health; two, the Pollution Control Agency; and one each, the Arts Board, the Energy
Agency, the Department of Human Rights, the Public Service Commission, the Cable
Communications Board, the Department of Corrections, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Transportation, the Commerce Department's Insurance Division, and the State Auditor. Whitlock Letter, supra note 372 (statistical enclosure).
Mr. Whitlock points out that the same complaint may have been received from
more than one person, in which case it is counted as a single complaint. In all, complaints from 38 persons were received since January 1, 1977.
The complaint against the State Auditor was that he had not promulgated any
rules on allowable administrative expenses in connection with the administration of
the fire and police pension fund, which is under the State Auditor's supervision. It was
explained to the complainants that the State Auditor did not have rulemaking authority. The Commission took the initiative in calling this matter to the attention of the
appropriate legislative committees and a law was passed specifying the criteria by
which such administrative expenses were to be allowed. Act of March 28, 1978, ch. 690,
1978 Minn. Laws 540.
374. It is not possible to say how many of the complaints submitted by legislators
and legislative staff were, in turn, initiated by individual citizens and representatives
of interest groups.
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The grounds for complaint have been categorized as follows: 35%
of the complaints charged that the rules in question violated legislative intent; 25% that they were unreasonable; 14% that rules as defined by MAPA were issued as guidelines without following MAPA's
rulemaking procedures; and 11% that rules were not promulgated.
75
The remaining 15% were based on miscellaneous grounds.
No rule involved in these 29 complaints has been formally suspended, but Commission intervention has resulted in rule changes.
In one case, for example, the Commission threatened to suspend five
Arts Board rules specifying criteria for accepting or rejecting applications for grants unless the Arts Board redrafted these rules, within a
specified time, to meet the Commission's objections. The Arts Board
redrafted the rules to embody all the changes suggested by the Commission. These rules are now in the final stages of adoption.
The Commission found that more than half of the complaints it
received were without foundation. As of this writing, about one-third
were still under investigation.
It is probably too early to come to any definitive conclusions
about the experience of the Commission. No pattern seems to be
emerging with respect to the agencies complained against or the nature of the complaints. The total number of complaints do not seem
to indicate general dissatisfaction with agency rulemaking.176 The
Commission's intervention has undoubtedly resulted in the improvement of some rules and the passage of desirable pieces of legislation.
Whether its intervention has always had a good effect cannot be
determined without a closer examination of particular cases. It is
interesting to learn, however, that the Commission is prepared to
review proposed rules, as well as rules in effect, even though the
77
statute limits its authority to the suspension of adopted rules.
At least one concern expressed about the wisdom of legislative
committee review seems to be confirmed by the Commission's limited
experience to date. The threat of suspension of an agency's rules,
when made by legislators who will vote on legislation and appropriations affecting the agency, seems to be enough to induce the agency
to satisfy the Commission's objections. This frustrates the statutory
intent that the Commission have the power only to suspend agency
375. Whitlock Letter, supra note 372 (statistical enclosure).
376. Mr. Whitlock estimates that as of October 17, 1977, approximately 6,240
agency rules were set forth in the Minnesota Code of Agency Rules. This count may
not be entirely accurate because, as Mr. Whitlock points out, "while ... the Department of Public Welfare includes large numbers of things within each rule, the Department of Agriculture has a rule for virtually every product on the market." M. Whitlock,
Report of Executive Secretary on behalf of the Legislative Commission to Review
Administrative Rules on Numbers of Administrative Rules by Department or Agency
(Oct. 18, 1977) (unpublished report of Commission to Review Administrative Rules).
377. MINN. STAT. § 3.965 (1976).
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rules and that only the legislature, with the approval of the Governor,
have the authority to repeal or modify them.
Possibly, the Commission's power is no greater than that of other
standing committees that have been known to express displeasure
with particular agency rules from time to time and with effect. But
agencies have also been known to withstand such legislative committee pressure in the expectation that they would be supported by the
legislature as a whole. A standing joint committee with the power to
suspend rules is a formidable adversary. It concentrates power to an
undesirable degree. In time, too, there will be a tendency for a measure of this power to be exercised by the Commission's staff.378
B.

REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE RuLEs BY THE GOVERNOR

The 1978 amendments to IAPA also gave the Governor of Iowa
authority to object to agency rules before they become effective, with
the same consequences as an objection by the Attorney General or the
Administrative Rules Review Committee.379 They also empowered the
Governor to rescind an adopted rule by executive order within thirtyfive days of the publication of the rule.n ° To assist the Governor in
this task, the Governor was required to establish, as part of the Governor's Office, an Office of the Administrative Rules Coordinator and
to appoint its staff.38' The Coordinator was also empowered to pre82
scribe the style and form of agency rules.
No such authority is granted the Governor by the Revised Model
Act or MAPA. I would express the same doubts about the desirability
of giving the Governor the power to object to rules as I did to giving
such power to the Attorney General or a legislative review coiamittee.
But the idea of giving the Governor the authority to rescind an
adopted rule by executive order within a specified time is worthy of
serious consideration. If there is to be external review of agency
rules-in addition to judicial review-it is more fitting to entrust it
378. The Commission is also required by statute to "promote adequate and
proper rules by agencies and an understanding upon the part of the public respecting
them." Id. § 3.965(2). In discharge of this responsibility, Commission staff has worked
with staff of the State Register and the Minnesota Code of Agency Rules to change
the format of these documents so as to make them more understandable. In addition,
Commission staff carried out the study mentioned above, see note 293 supra,to ascertain the length of time it takes for agencies to promulgate rules. However commendable these efforts may be, they would seem to be tasks more properly within the domain
of the Executive Branch.
379. Act of June 27, 1978, S.F. 244, § 2, 1978 Iowa Legis. Serv. 479 (West) (adding a new section to IowA CODE, ch. 7); id. §§ 12-14 (amending IowA CODE §§ 17A.4
(1)(a), 17A.4(2), 17A.4(4)(a)).
380. Id. § 15 (adding a new subsection to IowA CODE § 17A.4).
381. Id. § 2 (adding a new section to Iowa CODE, ch. 7).
382. Id.
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to the head of the Executive Branch than to the Attorney General or
a legislative review committee.
Such authority may give the Governor an important means of
advancing state policies and objectives and coordinating the work of
the various state agencies. Whether this authority is needed in Minnesota may, in turn, depend upon whether the Governor's power to
appoint and remove department heads, who serve at his pleasure, is
sufficient to give him effective control over departmental policies,
and whether the "independent" agencies, the members of which do
not serve at the Governor's pleasure, are important enough to warrant
this kind of gubernatorial supervision.
If such authority is granted the Governor, it should be expanded
to include the power to modify an agency rule, as well as to direct an
agency to propose a particular rule for public consideration under
MAPA. Furthermore, if the Governor is to exercise such authority by
executive order within a specified time-a condition necessary to
eliminate uncertainty about the status of agency rules-the promulgation of the executive order should itself be exempt from MAPA.
But the Governor should be required to provide for the expression of
public views on the action he proposes to take in some other way-by
a notice-and-comment procedure, for example, unaccompanied by a
public hearing.
It should be recognized that the Governor would be unable to
exercise such authority personally. He would have to rely on staff for
the purpose, as IAPA explicitly recognizes. But the action taken in
his name would be embodied in an executive order for which he would
be held personally responsible by the people of the state. This would
be different, therefore, from the authority exercised in the name of
the anonymous Legislative Commission to Review Administrative
Rules, which is not accountable to the general public.
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APPENDIX
EXCLUSIONS FROM MAPA'S DEFINITION OF
"AGENCY" AND "RULE"
I. EXCLUDED AGENCIES
IAPA excludes from the definition of "agency" only "the General
Assembly, the courts, the Governor, or a political subdivision of the
State or its officers and units."' The Revised Model Act excludes only
the legislature and the courts.2 MAPA follows neither IAPA nor the
Revised Model Act in this respect. MAPA excludes:
1. Agencies directly in the legislative orjudicialbranches.3 This
is a broader exclusion than one for the "legislature" or the "courts,"
for it also exempts bodies subordinate to, yet distinct from, the legislature itself or the courts themselves.' To the extent that separation
of powers doctrines permit, there is no reason to exclude such bodies
when they perform functions otherwise covered by MAPA.
2. Emergency powers that the Governor may exercise under the
Minnesota Civil Defense Act of 1951.1 The Governor's exercise of
these powers in the event of an actual enemy attack upon the United
States, or the occurrence within Minnesota of a major disaster from
enemy sabotage or other hostile action, is excluded from MAPA's
requirements. The Governor's personal actions are not otherwise excluded from MAPA if they amount to rulemaking or the adjudication
of contested cases. In this respect MAPA differs from IAPA.
Although Professor Bonfield thinks that a state legislature may
impose an administrative procedure act upon a Governor "for most
of the functions he performs without breaching the separation of
powers concept,"6 he questions the wisdom of doing so. The need to
impose administrative procedures upon the Governor is far less than
the need to impose them upon other executive agencies. The Governor has "greater visibility and more direct and clear political accountability" and "in at least many cases," the Governor's actions,
like those of the legislature, are expected "to be based solely or primarily on ad hoc political considerations rather than on the kind of
1.

2.

IOWA CODE § 17A.2(1) (1977).
REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEDURE

AcT § 1(1) (1961).

§ 15.0411(2)(a) (Supp. 1977).
4. See Bonfield, The Iowa AdministrativeProcedureAct: Background, Construction,Applicability, PublicAccess to Agency Law, the Rulemaking Process, 60 IowA L.
Rav. 731, 765-66 (1975).
5. MiNN. STAT. § 15.0411(2)(b) (Supp. 1977). The Minnesota Civil Defense Act
of 1951 is codified at Minnesota Statutes, sections 12.31-.37 (1976).
6. Bonfield, supra note 4, at 764.
3.

MINN. STAT.
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dispassionate principled bases toward which the requirements of" an
administrative procedure act are directed. 7 But Bonfield points out
that only personal actions of "the Governor" are exempt from IAPA,
not the acts of any subordinate and distinct administrative unit
within the "office of the Governor." 8
3. The Corrections Board and Pardon Board.' The Commissioner of Corrections has justified the exemption of the Corrections
Board on two grounds, which he thinks also apply to the Pardon
Board." First, the rules of the Corrections Board," which deal only
with the granting and revocation of parole and the supervision of
parolees, "affect a very limited 'public,' and to a large extent affect
only the internal management of the [Board] as an agency.' 2 Second, the granting and revocation of parole and the decision to discharge from parole, or to order confinement in an institution, are all
acts involving the exercise of discretion. They are substantive decisions based upon factors not subject to objective measurement by
3
hard and fast rules.
The two grounds advanced by the Commissioner do not justify
the exemption. If particular parole and probation decisions call for
the exercise of discretion that cannot be controlled by "hard and fast
rules," they should not be the subject of rulemaking. But if the
Corrections Board or Pardon Board decides to promulgate rules, it
should be required to comply with the rulemaking procedures prescribed by MAPA.
The Commissioner of Corrections may also be underestimating
the public interest in rules governing probation and parole, which
determine the circumstances under which persons convicted of crime
will be returned to the society at large. Even if only "a very limited
'public'" is interested, that public, as well as the convicted persons
themselves, should have an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process. Finally, to the extent that the rules of any agency
concern "only the internal management of the agency. . . and...
7. Id. at 764-65.
8. Id. at 766.
MimN. STAT. § 15.0411(2)(c), (h) (Supp. 1977).
10. Letter from Kenneth F. Schoen, Commissioner of Corrections, to James No-

9.

bles, Legislative Analyst, House Research Division (Sept. 10, 1974) [hereinafter cited
as Schoen Letter] (on file at the Minnesota Law Review).
11. The corrections board promulgates rules pursuant to Minnesota Statutes,
section 243.12 (1976).
12. Schoen Letter, supra note 10.

13. To the extent there are no hard and fast rules by which a court
would exercise its discretion to conditionally release a person on probation,
the equally judgmental function of deciding when one may be conditionally
released from confinement or discharged from field supervision is not and

cannot be made the subject of hard and fast rules.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:151

do not directly affect the rights of or procedure available to4 the public," they are excluded from MAPA's definition of "rule."'

4. The unemployment insuranceprogram in the Department of
Economic Security.15This exemption has been justified because of
the perceived adequacy of other procedures governing the administration of the state's unemployment insurance program. 6 This justification is not very persuasive. To the extent that the other procedures
do not include the requirements imposed by MAPA, the reasons for
subjecting programs covered by MAPA to these requirements also
apply to the unemployment insurance program.' 7 If the latter program is subject to more stringent requirements than those imposed
by MAPA, they would need to be satisfied even if the unemployment
insurance program was subject to MAPA.
5. The Directorof Mediation Services.'8 It is difficult to justify
this exemption when it is noted that the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 9 is not exempt from MAPA. The Director of
Mediation Services is authorized to "adopt reasonable and proper
rules and regulations relative to and regulating the forms of petitions,
notices, orders and the conduct of hearings and elections" under the
Public Employment Labor Relations Act, subject to PERB's final
approval." Must these rules, which otherwise fall within MAPA's
definition of "rule," be made only in accordance with MAPA prescribed procedures? PERB has taken the position that the exemption
of the Director governs, even though the Director's rules do not become effective until approved by it. It would seem, however, that the
process of approving rules is itself a rulemaking process.
6. The Workers Compensation Division in the Department of
Labor and Industry and the Workers Compensation Court of
Appeals.2" These exemptions have been justified on the ground that
14.

MINN. STAT. § 15.0411(3)(a) (1976); see text accompanying notes 28-34 infra.

There may be good reason to continue to exempt the corrections board and the board
of pardons from MAPA's requirements for the handling of contested cases as opposed
to rules, but this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
15. MINN. STAT. § 15.0411(2)(d) (Supp. 1977).
16. Letter from Emmet J. Cushing, Commissioner of Manpower Services, to the
House Governmental Operations Committee (May 28, 1974) (on file at the Minnesota
Law Review).
17. The other procedures referred to are codified at Minnesota Statutes, sections
268.05-.36 (1976 & Supp. 1977).
18. MiNN. STAT. § 15.0411(2)(e) (Supp. 1977). The Director of Mediation Services
is authorized to "adopt reasonable and proper rules and regulations relative to and
regulating the conduct of hearings" in connection with matters under the Director's
jurisdiction. MINN. STAT. § 179.05 (1976).
19. The powers and duties of PERB are set out in Minnesota Statutes, section
179.72 (1976).
20. Id. § 179.71(5)(g).
21. MiNN. STAT. § 15.0411(2)(f), (g) (Supp. 1977).
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the procedures governing these agencies have been working well for
more than half a century and there is no discernible need for
change.2 2 The above comments on the exclusion of the unemployment insurance program in the Department of Economic Security are
also applicable here.
7. The Department of Military Affairs.23 The Department was
excluded because of "the complexity and continuous relationship [it
has] with federal military agencies having substantial authority to
establish rules and regulations governing [the Department's] activities. ' 2 The question here is whether the relationship with federal
military agencies justifies an exemption of the Department in all its
activities. An interesting provision of IAPA takes care of such a situation without resorting to a blanket exemption.n As Professor Bonfield
explains it, if the Iowa Attorney General
determines that a provision of the 1APA (1) would cause a denial of
federal funds or services that otherwise would be available to an
Iowa agency or (2) would in any way be inconsistent with the requirements of federal law, the provision will be suspended to the
2
extent necessary to avoid that consequence. '
II.

EXEMPT RULES

MAPA excludes from the general definition of "rule" five categories of statements that might otherwise be included. 27 The Revised
Model Act excludes three categories, and IAPA excludes eleven.
MAPA excludes:
1. "[R]ules concerning only the internal management of the
agency or other agencies, and which do not directly affect the rights
of or procedureavailable to the public."28 This exclusion is similar to
that contained in the Revised Model Act and IAPA.29 It is justified
22. Letter from E. I. "Bud" Malone, Commissioner of the Department of Labor
and Industry, to Representative E. W. "Bill" Quirin (May 29, 1974) (on file at the
Minnesota Law Review). The procedures governing these agencies are set out in
Minnesota Statutes, sections 176.011-.82 (1976 & Supp. 1977).
23. MINN. STAT. § 15.0411(2)(i) (Supp. 1977).
24. Memorandum from Chester J. Moeglein, Adjutant General, to James Nobles, Legislative Analyst, House Research Division (Sept. 13, 1974) (unpublished)
(on file at the Minnesota Law Review).
25. IOWA CODE § 17A.2(1) (1977).
26. Bonfield, supra note 4, at 771. Minnesota Statutes, section 15.0412(5) (Supp.
1977), is directed, in part, at a similar problem. See text accompanying Article notes
40-41 supra.
27. MINN. STAT. § 15.0411(3) (Supp. 1977).
28. Id. § 15.0411(3)(a).
29. See REVISED MODEL STATE AnMNisTRATIvE PRocEDuRE Acr § 1(7)(A) (1961)
(excluding "[s]tatements concerning only the internal management of an agency and
not affecting private rights or procedures available to the public"); IOWA CODE § 17A.2

(7)(a) (1977).
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"because of the undue burden on the agencies and small public benefit to be gained from utilization of [the prescribed] procedures" for
rulemaking in this area.3"
Professor Bonfield thinks there are some important differences
between the Revised Model Act and IAPA in defining the scope of
this exclusion. Unlike the Revised Model Act, IAPA excludes this
category of statements only if they do not "substantially affect the
legal rights of, or procedures available to, the public or any segment
thereof." 3' Bonfield maintains that unless the word "substantially"
is added, "the exclusion would be meaningless because almost all
internal agency procedures eventually affect the public in some
way."32 This is probably what the drafters of MAPA had in mind in
adding to the Revised Model Act definition the word "directly."
The word "legal" was added by IAPA to clarify the type of
"rights" contemplated, that is, "rights which are normally enforceable against the agency or other parties through legal processes."
Though MAPA does not contain this clarification, undoubtedly it
uses "rights" in the same sense.
TAPA also makes certain that it covers agency statements concerning internal management that substantially affect the legal
rights of only a segment of the public. This variation from the Revised
Model Act again reflects the careful draftsmanship of IAPA. But it
is reasonable to read "public" in MAPA as referring to any portion
of the public, as well as the public as a whole.
To illustrate the application of IAPA's exclusion, Professor Bonfield states that agency "statements specifying employee vacation
policies, work schedules, work standards, promotion policies, grievance procedures, and staff benefits are within the exclusion," but not
"statements of general applicability defining agency law or policy in
relation to job applicants."'"
2. "[R]ules of the Commissioner of Corrections relating to the
internalmanagement of institutionsunder his control and those rules
governing the inmates thereof prescribed pursuant to section
609.105. "3 Section 169.10511 of the Minnesota Statutes requires the
Commissioner of Corrections to determine the places of confinement
of convicted persons and "prescribe reasonable conditions, rules, and
regulations for their employment, conduct, instruction, and discipline within or without" these places. In substance, this exclusion
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Bonfield, supra note 4, at 834.
IOWA CODE § 17A.2(7)(a) (1977).
Bonfield, supra note 4, at 834.
Id.
Id.
MnN. STAT. § 15.0411(3)(b) (1976).
Id. § 609.105.
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was contained in MAPA prior to 1975.11 The 1975 amendments deleted it despite a plea from the Commissioner that it was both "wise
and expedient" to continue the exclusion because the rules in question did not affect the "general public."' The exemption was restored
in 1976.1'
The Revised Model Act contains no such exclusion. But IAPA
excludes statements "concerning only inmates of a penal institution"
and, in addition, statements concerning only "students enrolled in an
educational institution, or patients admitted to a hospital," but only
when such a statement is issued by the institution itself."
In one respect, IAPA's exclusion is narrower than MAPA's. Emphasizing the word "only," which is not contained in MAPA's exclusion, Professor Bonfield explains that if the agency statement is addressed to others in addition to prison inmates, students, or hospital
patients, it is not exempted." Thus, for example, statements prescribing visiting hours at a prison would not be exempt under IAPA.12
Professor Bonfield must be assuming that such statements are not
excluded by the internal management provision discussed above,
because they substantially affect the legal rights of, or procedures
available to, a segment of the public, in the sense that the right of
visitation is enforceable against the prison administration through
legal processes.4 3 In any case, the "conditions, rules and regulations"
37. MINN. STAT. § 15.0411(3)(b) (1974). The pre-1975 exemption was for "rules
and regulations relating to the management, discipline, or release of any person committed to any state penal institution." Id. The pre-1975 MAPA definition of "agency"
also exempted the Minnesota Corrections Authority. Id. § 15.0411(2)(c) (1974).
38. Letter from Kenneth F. Schoen, Commissioner of Corrections, to James
Nobles, Legislative Analyst, House Research Division (June 26, 1974) (on file at the
Minnesota Law Review).
39. Act of March 24, 1976, Ch. 68, 1976 Minn. Laws 187 (codified at MWN. STAT.
§ 15.0411(3)(b) (1976)).
40. IOWA CODE § 17A.2(7)(k) (1977).
41. Bonfield, supra note 4, at 843.
42. Id. Similarly, "[s]tatements about admission policies at the state universities or state hospitals are not exempt since they are directed at non-students and
nonpatients." Id. at 844.
43. See, e.g., Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119
(1977). In Jones, first amendment and equal protection challenges were made against
rules of the North Carolina Department of Correction that prohibited prisoners from
soliciting other inmates to join the North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union and barred
Union meetings in the prisons, as well as bulk mailings concerning the Union from
outside sources. The Supreme Court upheld the rules, holding that the prisoners' first
amendment right of association "may be curtailed whenever the institution's officials,
in the exercise of their informed discretion, reasonably conclude" that the claimed
association possesses "the likelihood of disruption to prison order or stability," or
otherwise interferes "with the legitimate penological objectives of the prison environment." 433 U.S. at 132. A flat ban on visitation from family, friends, and other outside individuals would not meet these tests.
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that the Commissioner may prescribe under section 609.105 of the
Minnesota Statutes are exempt from MAPA's rulemaking procedures
even if they affect, directly and substantially, persons other than
prison inmates.
In other respects, IAPA's exclusion is broader than MAPA's.
Rules concerning students enrolled in educational institutions or patients admitted to hospitals would seem to be covered by MAPA,
because they may not concern "only the internal management" of the
institution and they do "directly affect the rights of or procedure
available to the public""-namely, at least, that segment of the public consisting of students, patients, and all those concerned about
their welfare."
Professor Bonfield justifies the broader IAPA exemption on
practical grounds: "The sheer burden of subjecting all of the thousands of statements concerning the details of these agencies' daily
relationships with inmates, students, and patients to public rulemaking procedures would be intolerable."" Furthermore, the public at
large is not directly affected; its interest is "general, peripheral, and
remote, if at all."'" Bonfield argues that,
if anyone should have a fair opportunity to participate in the making
of policy concerning those persons, it should be the inmates, students, and patients themselves, through appropriate internal
agency procedures devised especially for this purpose, rather than
through the rulemaking procedures of the IAPA which are geared for
input by the public at large. 8
These are weighty arguments, but they do not justify the exception. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that
prison inmates, students, and hospital patients have certain constitutional rights." In addition, they may have statutory or common law
rights. To the extent that the institutions decide to affect these rights
by promulgating rules, there is great public interest in the rules, and
the public should be afforded an opportunity to participate in their
making. There is little likelihood, moreover, that even inmates, students, and patients will be ensured such an opportunity unless the
44. MINN. STAT. § 15.0411(3)(a) (1976).
45. Rules affecting students at the University of Minnesota would not be subject
to MAPA because the University is not a state "agency" within its definition. See State
ex rel. Sholes v. University of Minn., 236 Minn. 452, 455-57, 54 N.W.2d 122, 125-26
(1952).
46. Bonfield, supra note 4, at 844.

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Coffin v. Reichond, 143 F.2d
443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944). But see Jones v. North Carolina Prisoner's Labor Union, Inc.,
433 U.S. 119 (1977).
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making of these rules is subject to a state administrative procedure
act. Public understanding and acceptance of these rules, which may
be important to the accomplishment of the institution's mission, will
be enforced by the possibility of public participation in their making.
Furthermore, inmates, students, and patients may be more likely to
respect and, if required, to abide by rules affecting their lives if they
have participated in their making. 0 For these reasons, the special
exemption of rules of the Commissioner of Corrections should be
repealed. His rules should be exempt only if they fall within the larger
exempt category of internal management rules."
3. "[Rlules of the [Department of Natural Resources] division of game and fish published in accordance-withsection 97.53. "52
Section 97.53 merely requires the Commissioner of Natural Resources
to publish promulgated orders, rules, and regulations in qualified
legal newspapers, and provides that no order, rule, or regulation shall
be effective until seven days after the required publication." It contains no general requirement that the public be afforded an opportunity to participate in the making of the rules.
Other statutory provisions, however, require certain fish and
wildlife rules to be preceded by notice and hearing. Only after notice
and public hearing may the Commissioner (1) "designate and manage public waters for their primary wildlife use and benefit"; 5 (2)
designate as experimental waters all or part of any lake or stream to
which the public has free access;55 (3) declare lands as a state game
refuge upon the petition of fifty or more residents of the county or
counties in which the lands are situated;- and (4) designate muskie
lakes and make special rules for the management of fishing therein.
In addition, rules designating any species of wild animal as either
endangered or threatened may be adopted only after following MAPA
procedures. 58
The Commissioner of Natural Resources justified this exclusion
on a number of grounds. 9 First, one-half or more of the Division's
50. See, e.g., Pickus v. United States Board of Parole, 543 F.2d 240, 246 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (involving parole regulations).
51. MiN. STAT. § 15.0411(3)(a) (1976). This assumes that rules concerning the
internal management of the Department of Corrections (the "agency") include rules
of the Commissioner of Corrections relating to the internal management of institutions
under his control. This would appear to be a reasonable assumption, but if it is at all
questionable, MAPA should be amended to ensure this result.
52. MiNN. STAT. § 15.0411(3)(c) (1976).
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. § 97.53.
Id. § 97.48(11).
Id. § 97.48(26).
Id. § 99.25(4).

57. Id. § 101.475(1).
58. Id. § 97.488(2).
59. Memorandum from Robert L. Herbst, Commissioner of Natural Resources,
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rules issued each year must be promulgated under severe time constraints that make compliance with MAPA impossible. These rules
fix seasons and limits that must be modified every year to reflect the
latest field analyses of stock size, distribution, health, reproduction
success, etc. They must often be changed quickly as the wild animal
population changes. A large number of these rules-for example,
those affecting migratory birds-must be made during a very few
weeks in midsummer; if MAPA had to be followed, the fall hunting
season would be over before the rules could be promulgated. Second,
compliance with MAPA would also preclude a reasonable working
relationship with adjoining states and provinces of Canada in the
regulation of sport and commercial fishing in boundary waters.
Finally, the Commissioner explained that his department does
not operate in isolation but that "there is a wealth of public input.""
The Department receives many letters of advice from concerned citizens and holds public meetings even when not required to do so. At
the same time, the Commissioner emphasized that the public is not
in a position to contribute much data of use to the Department. Fish
and wildlife supervisors have university degrees in fish- and wildliferelated fields. Public hearings might make these experts too sensitive
to public pressures and induce them to make decisions more expedient than professional, "just in order to reduce the clamor of vocal but
possibly unrepresentative or irrational segments of the public."'"
None of these justifications is very persuasive. The argument
about the importance of expertise and the inability of the public to
contribute much data of use to the Department could surely be made
in connection with other state agencies. It misses the point that members of the public should be afforded an opportunity to participate
to the extent of their ability in the making of rules that will affect
them. Increasingly, different segments of the public are becoming
more and more knowledgeable about particular matters subject to an
agency's jurisdiction. The art of administration consists, essentially,
of accommodating knowledge and politics, even "the clamor of vocal
but possibly unrepresentative or irrational segments of the public."
This is not to question the validity of the argument that the time
constraints under which the Department of Natural Resources must
operate often do not allow for compliance with MAPA rulemaking
procedures. But then the Department may resort to the adoption of
temporary rules authorized by MAPA. 2 If temporary rules would not
to James Nobles, Legislative Analyst, House Research Division (June 27, 1974) (unpublished) (on file at the Minnesota Law Review).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(5) (Supp. 1977); see text accompanying Article notes
38-41 supra.
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fully satisfy the needs of the Department in this respect, MAPA
should be amended so that they do.
Neither the Revised Model Act nor IAPA contains an exclusion
for rules concerning fish or wildlife.
4. "[R~ules relating to weight limitations on the use of highways when the substance of such rules is indicated to the public by
means of signs."' The Commissioner of Transportation is empowered
to impose prohibitions or restrictions relating to the weight of vehicles
operated upon any highway under his jurisdiction whenever the highway, "by reason of deterioration, rain, snow, or other climatic conditions, will be seriously damaged or destroyed unless the use of vehicles thereon is prohibited or the permissible weights thereof reduced." 4 The restrictions imposed by the Commissioner "shall be
effective when signs giving notice thereof are erected upon the highway or portion of any highway affected" by them."
Presumably, the justifications for the exclusion are the need for
speedy action to prevent serious damage to or destruction of a particular highway and the temporary nature of the administrative action
taken. But if the need for speedy action to prevent serious damage is
the reason for this exemption, why is the exclusion limited to weight
restrictions, and not extended to rules prohibiting the use of particular highways? Moreover, since these rules are temporary in nature,
it would seen that temporary rulemaking could take care of the situation."
The Revised Model Act does not contain an exclusion similar to
MAPA's. But IAPA excludes statements "relating to the use of a
particular publicly owned or operated facility or property, the substance of which is indicated to the public by means of signs or signals." 7 This is a broader exclusion than MAPA's because it refers to
all publicly owned or operated facilities and property and not just to
the use of highways.
Professor Bonfield justifies the broader exclusion on the ground
that it would be impractical "to apply rulemaking procedures to the
tens of thousands of specific commands relating to the use of specific
state facilities that are communicated to the public by signs posted
at those facilities." 8 This justification is most persuasive, except with
regard to weight limitations and prohibitions on the use of the high63. MINN. STAT. § 15.0411(3)(d) (1976).
64. Id. § 169.87(1).
65. Id.
66. See text accompanying Article notes 38-41 supra.
67. IowA CODE § 17A.2(7)(i) (1977).
68. Bonfield, supra note 4, at 842. Examples of such signs would include such
mundane commands as "camping prohibited here," "throw litter there," or "no smoking in this room." Id.
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ways that are not of an emergency nature. The latter restrictions,
among other things, may affect the economic well-being of the trucking industry, which should be given an opportunity to comment on
the proposed restrictions. MAPA would seem to exclude what should
be covered and to cover what should be excluded.
5. Opinions of the Attorney General.9 IAPA, though not the
Revised Model Act, also contains such an exclusion." Professor Bonfield justifies the exemption on a.number of grounds." First, it is
important to encourage the Attorney General to issue such opinions,
and requiring adherence to rulemaking procedures would be discouraging. Second, "it should be poisible for [opinions of the Attorney
'
General] to be issued expeditiously and inexpensively."72
Finally, the
value of rulemaking procedures is questionable since the Attorney
General "is supposed to exercise
his independent legal judgment
13
when he issues an opinion.
As Bonfield recognizes, these arguments are equally applicable
to interpretative rules issued by other agencies. The Attorney General, of course, may exercise his independent legal judgment, as he
should when he issues an opinion, even after hearing the information
and views that members of the public may wish to offer him. Consistency may be achieved by subjecting the opinions of the Attorney
General to MAPA's rulemaking requirements or excluding from these
requirements the interpretative rules and policy statements of all
other agencies. So long as the latter alternative is not adopted, the
opinions of the'Attorney General should not be exempted. The need
for a speedy opinion by the Attorney General could be met by the
issuance of temporary rules.
The Revised Model Act and IAPA also contain certain express
exclusions from the definition of "rule" that are not set forth in
MAPA.
1. Botli the Revised Model Act and IAPA, unlike MAPA, exclude from the definition of "rule" declaratory rulings as to the applicability of any statutory provision or of any rule or order of an
agency. 4 IAPA also excludes "an interpretation issued by an agency
with respect to a specific set of facts and intended to apply only to
that specific set of facts."75
It seems clear that the declaratory rulings referred to by the
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

MiNN. STAT. § 15.0411(3)(e) (1976).
IowA CODE § 17A.2(7)(e) (1977).

Bonfield, supra note 4, at 839.
Id.
Id.

REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Aar §§ 1(7)-(8) (1961);
IOWA CODE §§ 17A.2(7)(b), 17A.9 (1977). IAPA adds "other written statement of law

or policy" or "decision" to "rule or order" of any agency.
75. IOWA CODE § 17A.2(7)(b) (1977).
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Revised Model Act and IAPA exclusions would be of particular, not
general, applicability. Both acts recognize this by specifically stating
that declaratory rulings "disposing of petitions [for such rulings]
have the same status as agency decisions or orders in contested
cases."'" Nevertheless, the specific exclusions have been justified on
the ground that they will forestall argument that declaratory rulings
"do tend to establish law and policy for the agency by precedent and
so are in fact of general applicability and within the rulemaking
procedures."77
A similar argument may be made with respect to decisions in
contested cases. IAPA is consistent and also specifically excludes a
"determination, decision, or order in a contested case," ' as well as a
"decision by an agency not to exercise a discretionary'power." ' Professor Bonfield explains that the latter exclusion is intended to cover
only "certain inactions of particularapplicability which are neither
products of a contested case, nor a declaratory ruling." 8
These exclusions from the definition of "rule" in IAPA attest to
its meticulous draftsmanship, but their absence from MAPA should
not produce the consequences feared by Professor Bonfield. The rulings excluded are exempt from MAPA's basic definition of "rule,"
which includes only agency statements of "general applicability."'"
2. The Revised Model Act excludes "intra-agency memoranda" from its definition of "rule."8 2 IAPA excludes any "intergovernmental, interagency, or intra-agency memorandum, directive,
manual or other communication which does not substantially affect
the legal rights of, or procedures available to, the public or any segL "'
ment thereof.
IAPA's exclusion is thus more limited than that in
the Revised Model Act, which seemingly excludes all intra-agency
memoranda, regardless of their impact on the public. It encompasses
"policy making that is truly only internal administrative housekeeping. 9"
So far as MAPA is concerned, the exclusion of "rules concerning
only the internal management of the agency or other agencies" s may
reasonably be read to exclude intergovernmental, interagency, or
intra-agency memoranda, directives, and manuals. It will be recalled
76.
§ 17A.9
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

83.
84.
85.

REvisED MODEL STATE An NImSTATvE PRoCEDURE Acr § 8 (1961); IOWA CODE
(1977).
Bonfield, supra note 4, at 836.
IOWA CODE § 17A.2(7)(d) (1977).
Id., § 17A.2(7)(j).
Bonfield, supra note 4, at 838 (emphasis in original).
MINN. STAT. § 15.0411(3) (1976).
REVLSED MODEL STATE ADmNmTRATivE PRocEDURE Acr § (1)(7)(C) (1961).
IOWA CODE, § 17A.2(7)(c) (1977).
Bonfield, supra note 4, at 835.
MINN. STAT. § 15.0411(3)(a) (1976).
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that this MAPA exclusion applies only if the rules "do not directly
affect the rights of or procedure available to the public."
3. IAPA also excludes
portions of staff manuals, instructions or other statements issued by
an agency which set forth criteria or guidelines to be used by its staff
in auditing, in making inspections, in settling commercial disputes
or negotiating commercial arrangements, or in the selection or handling of cases, such as operational tactics or allowable tolerances or
criteria for the defense, prosecution, or settlement of cases, when the
disclosure of such statements would:
(1) Enable law violators to avoid detection; or (2) facilitate disregard
of requirements imposed by law; or (3) give a clearly improper advantage to persons who are in an adverse position to the state.u
These exclusions are explained on the ground that the types of
agency activity excluded, which relate to the agency's law enforcement responsibilities or arm's length commercial business dealings
with the public, "must be kept secret in order to serve the public
interest. ' 87 This justification is persuasive and the incorporation of
these exclusions in MAPA deserves careful consideration.
4. IAPA exempts a "specification of the prices to be charged for
goods or services sold by an agency as distinguished from a license
fee, application fee, or other fees." This exclusion was made for two
principal reasons. Public participation in cases of this sort "is arguably of little value due to the obvious point of view of those who would
be most likely to participate," that is, "the purchasers of that which
the agency has to offer." 9 Also, a "very real burden" would be
"imposed on agencies if they were required to follow rulemaking procedures every time they changed the price of carrots and peas in the
cafeteria line."9
IAPA distinguishes between the specification of prices for goods
or services s6ld, which is exempt, and the fixing of "fees," which is
covered. In the latter case, the agency "is acting less like an ordinary
entrepreneur in the market place and more like a sovereign in the
performance of functions which are viewed as unabashedly governmental in nature."'" Professor Bonfield acknowledges the difficulty of
distinguishing between "prices" and "fees," but suggests that a line
can be drawn so as to make the public rulemaking procedures applicable only to "those charges levied in aid of regulatory or similar
purposes which are uniquely governmental functions."'"
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

17A.2(7)(f) (1977).
Bonfield, supra note 4, at 839. See also id. at 787-791.
IOWA CODE § 17A.2(7)(g) (1977).
Bonfield, supra note 4, at 839-40.
Id.
Id. at 840.
Id. at 841.
IOWA CODE §
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Even if this distinction is easy to make in practice, covering the
fixing of fees for drivers' licenses, automobile licenses, fishing licenses, liquor store licenses, permits to enter state parks, and so forth,
may impose greater public costs than public benefits.
5. Finally, IAPA excludes statements "concerning only the
physical servicing, maintenance or care of publicly owned or operated
facilities or property."93 This exclusion was made out of an abundance of caution because some such statements might "arguably...
'
substantially affect the legal rights of some segment of the public."94
It is to be hoped that this argument will not often be made successfully under MAPA. For, as Professor Bonfield points out, without
such an exclusion,
agencies might be forced to follow rulemaking procedures for staff
instructions as to how much rock salt to put on each segment of a
state highway, for statements setting the times to shovel the walk
in front of a particular state building, or for policies governing the
frequency with which floors are to be washed in a state office building.95
Reflection upon the IAPA exclusions not contained in MAPA
makes it evident that the implications of the expansion the definition
of "rule" in MAPA in 1975 may not have been fully comprehended
by the draftsmen or the legislature. IAPA's exclusions seem wise, and
should be incorporated in MAPA.
93. Iowa CODE § 17A.2(7)(h) (1977).
94. Bonfield, supra note 4, at 842.
95. Id.

